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Introduction générale
La géolocalisation consiste en la capacité d’un système de communication à déterminer
la position géographique d’un équipement (i.e. un téléphone portable par exemple). Ce
procédé est utilisé par les services géolocalisés aﬁn de fournir à l’utilisateur des informations
utiles (intérêts de visite, plans, météo) relatives à sa position géographique.
Les applications de la géolocalisation sont nombreuses mais il a été démontré dans [GKdPC10]
qu’elles présentent un réel danger en matière de respect de la vie privée de l’utilisateur.
Diﬀérents textes de loi ont été adoptés dans le but de réglémenter l’usage des données lo-
calisation. Ainsi, la directive [PC] traite de la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard
du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données
au niveau de la communauté européenne. La directive 2002/58/CE vient préciser cette
dernière en posant des règles spéciﬁques sur les traitements des données à caractère per-
sonnel et la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des communications électroniques.
En France, cette protection est assurée par la Loi n 78-17 du 6 Janvier 1978 relative à
l’informatique, aux ﬁchiers et aux libertés.
Le but de cette thèse est donc d’apporter des primitives de géo-communication qui
permettent la construction d’applications géolocalisés respectueuses de la vie privée de
l’utilisateur. L’approche suivie est à la fois architecturale, algorithmique et cryptographique
aﬁn de limiter la dissémination d’information d’ordre privé. Cette thèse est structurée
comme suit:
• Le Chapitre 2 introduit le cadre général des travaux présentés dans cette thèse,
c’est-à-dire la localisation et ses enjeux. Plus précisément, ce chapitre débute par
une présentation des principales techniques de localisation et les principales attaques
qui ont été développées contre elles. Ensuite, nous énonçons le problème de la véri-
ﬁcation de la localisation avant de décrire succintement les techniques de résolution
s’y aﬀérant.
• Le Chapitre 3 introduit les systèmes de preuve de localisation suivit d’une discus-
sion sur les diﬀérentes architectures liés à ces services. Nous y proposons aussi une
catégorisation de ces services.
• Le Chapitre 4, introduit un modèle de sécurité pour les systèmes de preuves de
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localisation.
• Le Chapitre 5, présente l’état de l’art des protocoles délimiteurs de distance.
• Le Chapitre 6, décrit VSSDB (Verifiable Secret-Sharing based Distance-Bounding
protocol) notre première contribution scientiﬁque. Il s’agit d’un protocole délimiteur
de distance basé sur la cryptographie asymmétrique. Nous y analysons par la même
occasion les propriétés de sécurité de ce protocole.
• Le Chapitre 7, décrit PROPS (PRivacy-preserving lOcation Proof System) notre
deuxième contribution scientiﬁque. Il s’agit d’un protocole de preuve de localisa-
tion respectueux de la vie privée conforme aux spéciﬁcations introduites dans le
Chapitre 4.
• Le Chapitre 8, conclut ces travaux et introduit les perspectives.
Les travaux présentés dans ce manuscript ont fait l’objet de trois publications scientiﬁques
à savoir: [GKaT12] qui introduit le locanyme comme primitive de base pour la protection
de la vie privée dans les applications géolocalisées; [GKRT14] qui présente PROPS, notre
système de preuve de localisation; [GKL+] qui décrit VSSDB notre protocole délimiteur
de distance.
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Chapter 1
General introduction
Since the dawn of the Web, accessing the World Wide Web and the services it proposes,
has mainly be experienced through the use of personal computers (PC) connected to each
other with ﬁxed wire connections. At these early times, the stationary nature of PC
combined to the ﬁxed nature of the connections has limited the access to Internet to
customers present at their home or oﬃce only. Potential users away from these locations
were unable to beneﬁt from the web and its associated services. With the recent advances
in the domain of positioning technologies such as Global Positioning System (GPS), Global
System for Mobile Communication (GSM), Radio Frequency IDentiﬁcation (RFID), and
WiFi (802.11b/g/n) and the widespread deployment of wireless local area networks, we
have witnessed the introduction of mobile devices equipped with geolocated and wireless
communication capacities. One of the main advantage of this situation is the possibility
for people to access Internet form anywhere they are then getting more out of existing
web-based services in the form of Location-Based Services (LBS). Therefore, more and
more Internet based services are personalizing the experience of their users by moving to a
mobile setting, relying upon mobile networks and Wiﬁ-enabled devices to deliver users with
personalized services that are tailored to the current location of the individual querying
the service.
LBS have been rapidly adopted by users because of the ubiquity and convenience they
oﬀer. They provide mobile users with a wide range of useful information such as weather
forecasts, tourist attractions, landmarks, restaurants, gas stations, repair shops, public
transportation options (including schedules) and proximity services that inform users when
they are close to each other, are just a few examples of the types of information that would
be more appropriate if tailored by the user’s location. Using the location of users also
allows sophisticated services like security systems to grant access based on establishing a
user’s presence within a speciﬁc area. LBS can also be employed for mobile commerce
(m-commerce) and mobile advertisements. For example, a customer may query a speciﬁc
product, and ask for all businesses in the area selling it. If the database includes other
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product information, such as prices and other terms, then real time comparison becomes
feasible. Also, in many e-commerce situations the buyer and seller need to meet before
validating the transaction, then the speciﬁc location of the buyer and seller becomes useful
to the transaction. More surprisingly, cellular operators are beginning to oﬀer diﬀerent
rates based on the location of callers, (e.g. in a designated home area).
Information regarding a user’s location can be gathered in two main ways: self-location
and remote-location. In the case of a self-location, the location data is supplied to the
service by the user himself. For example, the user can input his location as a postal code
but it is common that the user’s location is automatically determined by his device before
being transmitted to the LBS. One simple example in which self-location can be used is a
user asking for nearby cinemas or requesting weather forecast in his city. In this situation,
the user ﬁrst provides the LBS with his location, then the server looks into its database for
cinemas nearby the desired location. There are many diﬀerent techniques that can be used
for automatically determine the location of a user. Some are more appropriate for outdoor
environments while some others are better for indoors locations and some oﬀer good results
in both environments. For more details about these positioning systems, we refer the reader
to Chapter 2. For self-location, as the location information is supplied directly by the user
or a device under his control, the information provided cannot be guaranteed to be accurate.
Therefore, the LBS cannot have high level of trust in such information. In fact, even if the
GPS device is contained within a Tamper-Resistant Module, the resulting location is not
guaranteed as GPS signals can also be interfered from outside the security module (spooﬁng
attack). These spoofed signals can lead to the computation of an incorrect location, leading
to the provision of a false location to the LBS. Also, remark there is not a mean to check
for the freshness of a GPS coordinates, so data can be replayed or transferred from one
device to another.
In the situation called remote-location, an external entity is responsible to position
the user, rather than the user providing its location directly to the service. The external
entity might not only be a single entity but a group of collaborating entities exchanging
information to determine with precision the position of the user. In order to accomplish
this, the user must carry a device that can be accessed by the entity. An example of such
a situation would be a mobile telephony network. Through the use of triangulation and
other techniques, mobile phone companies can compute the location of a user within their
network, provided that the user remains within the area of the network. This method of
locating a user is somewhat more diﬃcult to tamper with, but some simple approaches
can be employed. An example of such an approach is the use of a Faraday cage to block
or restrict the signal emitted from the user’s device. However, this form of tampering
requires some form of physical interference with the device, which may not always be viable.
Therefore, while remote-location is vulnerable to interference, it is not as susceptible as
self-location. The primary weakness of remote location is its reliance on the infrastructure
to provide a location. This reliance limits the use of any remote location system to those
areas containing an infrastructure and restricts applicability of the system based on the
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use of speciﬁc devices.
As self-location cannot be relied upon to provide trustworthy location information and
remote-location requires adherence to a speciﬁc device or area in which infrastructure ex-
ists, a new approach must be found. An alternative solution is to redeﬁne the problem.
Rather than attempting to locate a user’s device, the user’s device makes a claim regarding
its location that can then be veriﬁed. By altering the approach taken, the problem of pro-
viding a trustworthy location becomes much more manageable. The issue of locating the
user is eliminated and the focus is placed on the veracity of the claim. More speciﬁcally,
rather than a system attempting to prove the location of the user, the user provides proof
of his claim. This approach prevents the need for special and costly hardware or an overly
complex solution. To date, similar to the case of remote location, the trend in localization
techniques relies upon a pre-existing infrastructure to provide trusted devices with which
claiming devices can interact. However, reliance upon a ﬁxed or limited infrastructure re-
duces the applicability of localization technology. In addition to this, the cost of employing
the system increases dramatically. With mobile devices and mobile networks becoming a
staple of current technology, the need for a speciﬁc infrastructure of devices is no longer
present.
This thesis presents research on the development of a decentralized system for the veriﬁ-
cation of location claims, designed without the requirement of a pre-existing infrastructure
for use as proof providers. Instead, our system relies on the collaboration of the users
present at the same location to generate proof shares as a testimony of their presence at
a geographical position. Then, a veriﬁcation service can extract a location proof from the
location proof shares collected by a user.
The development of the location veriﬁcation system presented here, namely PRivacy-
preserving lOcation Proof System (PROPS), is achieved through the combination of two
main approaches. The ﬁrst approach presents a novel distance-bounding protocol [GKL+],
based on an asymmetric setting and oﬀering resistance to last known localization attacks.
The second approach introduces a new security protocol designed to protect the gathering
of location proof by mobile device making a location claim.
The thesis is structured as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we introduce the issues of localization and location veriﬁcation before
discussing existing approaches for solving this problem. In particular, we outline
several important localization techniques employed within the ﬁeld. We discuss a
selection of existing schemes, provide context and background information for the
research presented in this thesis. We also identify the primary attacks existing on
localization techniques.
• In Chapter 3, we provide more details about location proof systems. More precisely,
we ﬁrst introduce the location proof systems before categorizing the related work in
the ﬁeld and then discussing the pros and cons of the two main approaches.
5
• In Chapter 4, we discuss the security properties that are desirable for such protocol
and outline the design process undertaken to achieve a protocol supporting these
properties.
• In Chapter 5, we present the state-of-the-art on distance-bounding protocols.
• In Chapter 6, we describe our ﬁrst contribution to the area of private localization
services: VSSDB, a Veriﬁable Secret-Sharing based Distance-Bounding protocol.
• In Chapter 7, we present our proposal for a privacy-preserving location proof system
called PROPS for a PRivacy-preserving lOcation Proof System. We also analyze the
security of our protocol using the security framework introduced in Chapter 4.
• In Chapter 8, we conclude the present work and give future research direction.
The research presented in this work has been published in the proceedings of three in-
ternational conferences. [GKaT12] gives an early overview of the location veriﬁcation sys-
tem. [GKRT14] presents PROPS and its extensions in an earlier form. It also brieﬂy dis-
cusses the security properties of the protocol. Our work on distance-bounding is presented
in [GKL+], with discussion and analysis about the security it oﬀers against localization
attacks.
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Chapitre 2: État de l’art
Ce chapitre a pour but d’introduire le cadre général des travaux présentés dans cette thèse,
c’est-à-dire la géolocalisation, ses usages ainsi que les problématiques sous-jacentes liées à
la protection des données personnelles et à la vériﬁcation de la position annoncée par les
utilisateurs. Nous déﬁnissons la géolocalisation comme l’action permettant de déterminer
la position d’une personne, ou plus précisément d’un objet le caractérisant. Elle est, en
pratique, rendue possible grâce aux techniques de positionnement (positioning techniques)
telles que: la triangulation, latération ou le ﬁngerprinting. Ces techniques permettent
d’obtenir les coordonnées d’un point par rapport à plusieurs autres connus sur une carte.
La géolocalisation était, il y encore quelques années, réservée aux professionnels et spé-
cialistes du transport maritime, terrestre et aérien. Aujourd’hui de nombreuses applications
y font appel, y compris pour les particuliers: ce sont les services basés sur la localisation.
Les services basés sur la localisation ont fait leur apparition depuis le milieu des années
2000 et ont très rapidement été adoptées par le grand public. Google est un des premiers
grands noms de l’informatique à avoir intégré la localisation dans ses applications pour
terminaux mobiles. Par exemple les résultats des recherches sont diﬀérents en fonction de
l’emplacement géographique du client. Plus encore, de nombreuses applications sportives
et de loisirs utilisent la localisation en temps réel de leurs utilisateurs aﬁn de générer des
informations précises sur les lieux, les vitesses et les obstacles pour mieux se repérer.
Comme toute nouvelle technologie, la géolocalisation mais surtout les service qui en font
usage apportent leur lot d’inquiétudes. En eﬀet, de nombreux services géolocalisés utilisent
les données de localisation recoltées de leurs utilisateurs à des ﬁns commerciales, de proﬁ-
lage, etc. De plus, toute entité pouvant accéder à ces informations peut alors les utiliser
pour déduire des informations personnelles sur les individus concernés par ces données. En
eﬀet, grâce aux attaques par inférence, il est possible de déduire leur domicile ou lieu de
travail, prédire leurs possibles localisations futures, identiﬁer leurs point d’intérêt (POI),
extraire la sémantique des POIs les plus fréquentés ou même de construire leur réseau
social, provoquant ainsi une violation de la vie privée des utilisateurs. Pour remédier à ce
problème, diﬀérentes techniques d’anonymisation des données personnelles ont été dévélop-
pées par la communauté scientiﬁques. Ces techniques bien qu’ayant été prouvé éﬃcaces,
ne sont aujourd’hui pas intégré dans la vaste majorité des applications géolicalisées. En
complément de ces initiatives techniques, des textes de lois ont été adoptés dans l’Union
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Européenne et aux États-Unis aﬁn de déﬁnir un cadre juridique et limiter l’usage qui est
fait des données personnelles de localisation des particuliers.
D’un point de vue sécurité, les services basés sur la localisation présentes des limites.
Ceci est d’autant plus important dans des applications basés sur l’authentiﬁcation ou le
contrôle d’accès à distance. Pour remédier à ce problème, il existe deux grandes familles
de protocoles de sécurité proposées par la communauté scientiﬁque. Il s’agit des protocoles
délimiteur de distance et les systèmes de preuves de localisation. Ces familles de protocoles
sont discutées dans le détail aux Chapitres 3 et 4.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
Recent advances in ubiquitous connectivity, as well as mobile and embedded systems, have
led to the development of a plethora of services that are personalizing the services they
deliver according to the location of the user querying the service. These services known as
Location-Based Services (LBS) oﬀer many advantages to consumers. For instance, a LBS
can be used for resource discovery (e.g, ﬁnding the closest restroom from my position), path-
ﬁnding (e.g., computing the shortest route to a gas station), real-time social applications
(e.g., informing me about the presence of my friends in the vicinity) or location-based
gaming (e.g., playing with the nearest challenger). This chapter provides the context and
relevant background on the topic of localization and privacy. In the ﬁrst part of the chapter
we deﬁne the concept of positioning (cf. Section 2.2) with the techniques used to compute
the position of a device. Next, we introduce positioning systems (cf. Section 2.3) and
location-based services (cf. Section 2.4). Afterwards, in Section 2.5, we discuss the notion
of privacy in general and how it should be handled in the context of localization. Thereafter,
we discuss technologies that can be used to protect privacy of user (cf. Section 2.6). Finally,
Section 2.7 introduces the main research topic presented in this work: the secure location
veriﬁcation problem and the two major techniques that have been proposed in the literature
to resolve it, namely: distance bounding and location proof system.
2.2 Positioning
2.2.1 What is positioning?
Positioning is deﬁned as the act of determining a user’s location, with user’s location taken
to mean a point on the earth’s surface, which could be absolute or relative. The absolute
location is designated using a geographical coordinates system (e.g., latitude, longitude and
altitude). In constrat, the relative location uses a place of reference to locate the desired
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location (e.g., Toulouse is in the South-West of France, here Toulouse is located relative to
France). In the literature, many terms are used for positioning like localization, location
ﬁnding, position location, geolocalization or location sensing. Currently, users as physical
entities can only be located relative to the devices they carry due to the current limitations
of technology. Therefore, positioning is in fact the act of determining a device’s location,
under the assumption that a speciﬁc user is located in proximity to that device. In the
following, we present some localization techniques used to obtain the location of a user.
2.2.2 Positioning techniques
Localization of a node is estimated through communication between localized nodes (i.e:
anchors) and unlocalized node for determining their geometrical placement or position.
Location is determined by means of distance and angle between nodes. There are many
concepts used in positioning a node such as the following.
Fingerprinting technique.
Fingerprinting is a technique that uses location dependent characteristics of the radio signal
to estimate the distance separating the unlocalized nodes and the reference anchors. The set
of location dependent data is called the fingerprint. To better understand the logic behind
ﬁngerprinting, let us consider a local area network equipped with Wi-Fi access points. For
each AP, the strength of the Wi-Fi signal emitted progressively decreases as we move away
from the emitting point. Therefore, measuring the received signal strength from an AP can
be used to estimate the distance to this access point. Location ﬁngerprinting is composed
of two phases : the oﬄine one and the online one. During the online phase, a radio map
is constructed by measuring the ﬁngerprint on diﬀerent points of the location site with
their location coordinates. Then, the map is recorded into a database. During the oﬄine
phase, when the system receives a location query from an unlocalized node, an algorithm
tries to match the node’s recorded ﬁngerprint values with the ones on the radio map that
was previously created to infer the exact location of the node. In practice, the accuracy
of ﬁngerprinting can be enhanced by exploiting diﬀerent methods such as: probabilistic
methods [RMT+02], k-Nearest-Neighbour [PVA00], neural networks [YLAU11], support
vector machine, and smallest M-vertex polygon [VJS+07], Bayesian inference [HPALP09]
and others [HPALP09].
Trilateration technique.
Trilateration is based on the measurement of the propagation time of a signal to estimate
the distance of an unlocalized node relative to at least three anchors. The relative positions
of the unlocalized node can be obtained by measuring either the Time of Arrival (ToA) or
the Round Trip Time (RTT) of the signal. With ToA, the anchor emits a time-stamped
signal towards the localization site. When the signal arrived at an unlocalized node, the
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distance between the anchor and the node is calculated from the transmission time delay
and the corresponding speed of the signal. The knowledge of the ToA allows the node to
be situated on a circle (for simplicity, we conﬁne the coordinates plan to two dimensions
and ideal transmission conditions) with the emitter at the center. By adding two trans-
mitters, the node can be located at the intersection point of the three circles. The "tri" in
trilateration is because we need at least three emitting anchors to obtain a precise position.
A derivation of ToA is the Round-Trip Time (RTT) or Round-Trip Time of Flight
(RToF). RTT measures the time of ﬂight of the signal pulse travelling from the anchor to
the unlocalized node and back. While ToA requires two local clocks in both nodes, RTT
uses only one node namely the anchor to record the transmitting and arrival times. RTT
is usually used in the design of distance bounding protocols. We discuss distance bounding
and its role in secure localization in Section 2.7.
Trilateration is a highly accurate technique. However, it requires high processing ca-
pability and accurate synchronization between the nodes and the emitting anchors. The
Global Positioning System (GPS) uses such technique to position a device relative to a
constellation of satellites orbiting the earth.
Figure 2.1: Trilateration technique.
Multilateration technique
Multilateration is a localization technique based on the measurement of the diﬀerence in
distance to pair of anchors that broadcast signals at known times. The distance between
anchors of a pair is known and they are synchronized to exchange a signal. An unlocal-
ized node that listen to a pair exchanging messages, can measure the Time Diﬀerence of
Arrival (TDoA) of the signals at its position. TDoA allows to compute the diﬀerence in
distance to the two emitting anchors [FNI13]. Here, in the same spirit as trilateration, the
possible locations of the unlocalized node are found on a hyperbola (2D) or a hyperboloid
(3D). To locate the exact location along that curve, multilateration relies on at least four
measurements: a second measurement taken to a diﬀerent pair of emitting anchors will
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produce a second curve, which intersects with the ﬁrst, etc. While the curves overlap, a
small number of possible locations are revealed, producing the position of the node.
Triangulation technique.
Triangulation allows a unlocalized node to calculate its position by measuring two directions
towards two reference anchors. Since the positions of the anchors are known, it is hence
possible to construct a triangle where one of the sides and two of the angles are known, with
the unlocalized node at the third point. This information is enough to deﬁne the triangle
completely and hence deduce the position of the node. Triangulation uses the Angle of
Arrival (AoA) of radio signal at the unlocalized node. AoA can be measured using several
antennas placed side by side (an array of antennas) or a directional antenna to measure
the phase diﬀerence between the signals received by the antennas. For better positioning
accuracy, the angles of incidence of at least three signals may be used for triangulation.
Figure 2.2: Trilateration technique.
2.2.3 Localization attacks
This attack denotes any action intended to defeat the correctness of the localization
process. This can be done for instance by inﬂuencing the outcome of a positioning device,
in fact if an adversary knows the positioning techniques used by his device, then he can
launch a specialized attack to inﬂuence the outcome of the positioning device. In the case
that the positioning device is used as a black-box by the adversary, he can try to directly
attack the LBS. In the following, we enumerate the six existing localisation attacks.
Denial of Service (DoS): The goal of a DoS attack [HHP03] is to prevent a speciﬁc
device or set of devices within an area from localizing others or being localized by the
system. This is generally achieved by interfering with the communication medium. For
example, with RF-based positioning systems the attacker tries to interfere with the targeted
devices ability to receive and send messages (signals), usually by ﬂooding, injecting or
jamming the communication channel with messages of its own. This prevents those devices
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present in the location targeted by the attacker from receiving or sending messages properly,
thus rendering them incapable of localizing themselves properly.
Emitter impersonation: This attack consists in impersonating a signal transmitter in
front of a targeted device [TRPČ09]. It exploits the fact that some ﬁngerprinting-based
systems relies on access point MAC addresses for the identiﬁcations of the anchors. Such
an attack has been demonstrated as eﬀective against the SkyHook’s localization system
in [TRPČ09].
Signal properties attacks: These are attacks targeted against the properties of the
signal used in the localization process. We can distinguish between attenuation and am-
plification attacks [CTM07]. In an attenuation attack, specialised equipment, such as an
absorbing barrier, is used to decrease the speed and strength at which a signal can prop-
agate. This makes appear as though the signal has travelled farther, thereby tricking the
unlocalized node into believing that the anchor is farther than it truly is. Inversely, in
an ampliﬁcation attack, a malicious device may employ specialised equipment, such as a
directional antenna with an extended range, to achieve localization at a location closer to
the anchor devices than it truly is. Ampliﬁcation attacks can impact localization results in
which the signal strength of the signal is employed (see for instance the ﬁngerprinting based
localization technique 2.2.2). However, due to their time-based approaches, triangulation
and multilateration based systems are not as easily defrauded by such attacks.
Proxy attack: In this attack, a malicious node records messages generated within his
range (by the system), before "tunneling them" them to another area in which is located
either another node under its control or a colluding agent within the network [Mar12]. "Tun-
nelling" involves transmitting the recorded messages directly from one agent to another,
without forwarding through multiple nodes. Then the colluding agent while physically lo-
cated out of communication range from the localization anchors, can still communicate with
them and being localized as close. Remote-location systems are particularly vunlnerable
to such an attack.
Collusion attack: In this attack, a malicous device attempts to inﬂuence its own local-
ization results by having a colluding device masquerade as the device being localized and
transmit signals from a closer position to the receivers. The receivers therefore calculate
the location of the colluding device, rather than that of the device being localized, thus
providing a malicious device with a false location in closer proximity to the receivers. This
form of attack is eﬀective primarily due to the fact that localization techniques localize the
source of a signal, not a speciﬁc device.
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Sybil attack: This attack has a similar impact to the collusion attack, but with only
a single attacker involved. In this attack, a system believes itself to be employing several
diﬀerent devices in a localization, when in reality it employs only one [SW07]. This is
achieved through an attacker creating multiple identities for itself and attempting to pass
them as individual devices, a simple task without the presence of some central authority
registering all devices. When a central authority is employed, an alternative method may
be used to circumvent this measure, in which the attacker steals the identity of another
device within the system. This approach may not be detected if the attacker prevents the
legitimate owner of that identity from communicating with the central authority, or if the
owner is not active at that point.
2.3 Positioning systems
A positioning system is a mechanism for determining the location of an object in space.
Technologies for this task exist ranging from worldwide coverage with meter accuracy
to workspace coverage with millimeter accuracy. Positioning systems can be grouped in
many diﬀerent ways, including indoor versus outdoor systems or cellular versus sensor
network positioning. In this section, we categorize positioning systems depending of the
environment targeted. Indeed, we may distinguish: indoor localization systems [Dem03],
outdoor localization systems and hybrid localization systems.
2.3.1 Outdoor positioning systems
The most famous positioning system of this category is undeniably the Global Positioning
System (GPS). GPS employs trilateration to calculate the position of a device relative to
a constellation of satellites orbiting the Earth. Due to the fact that GPS coordinates can
be forged and signals spoofed, the United States military has created a similar system to
GPS known as the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) which encrypts all signals to prevent
spooﬁng. However this technology is unavailable to civilians. Galileo is the ﬁrst public
alternative to GPS. The ﬁrst stage of the Galileo programme was agreed upon oﬃcially on
26 May 2003 by the European Union and the European Space Agency. Galileo constitutes
a signiﬁcant improvement compared to GPS. Indeed it has an increased level of resistance
to jamming and will include encryption within its signals to prevent spooﬁng attacks.
Another well known outdoor positioning system is the Assisted GPS (A-GPS). A-GPS was
introduced on request of the U.S. FCC’s 911 [DR01], to make location data of an emergency
caller available to the corresponding public safety service [DR01]. A-GPS is extensively
used with GPS-capable cellular phones with Internet connection. In practice, the accuracy
of outdoors positioning systems decrease signiﬁcantly when employed within highly built
up areas. Therefore, alternative approaches to position in closed area are required. For
more details about existing outdoor positioning systems, we refer the reader to [BCKM04].
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2.3.2 Indoor positioning systems
An indoor positioning system considers only indoor environments. Dempsey [Dem03] de-
ﬁnes it as a system that continuously and in real-time determines the position of something
or someone in a physical and closed space such as shopping mall, hospitals, airport, subway
and university campuses, etc. In general, many of those systems are based on short range
wireless technologies such as InfraRed (IR), UltraWideBand (UWB), Bluetooth, etc.
The ﬁrst major indoor positioning system proposed was the ActiveBadge [WHFaG92],
created by researchers from AT&T Cambridge. The system was originally designed to
track objects within a speciﬁc area. It functions through the use of a wearable device that
periodically emits its unique identity over IR every ﬁfteen seconds to a ﬁxed infrastructure
of receivers. The beaconing message emitted by the device bounces oﬀ (but does not
escape) the walls bounding the room, thus ensuring the signal ﬁlls the room. The receiver
ﬁxed within the room receives the message and can infer that the device is located within
its walls. ActiveBadge provides symbolic location information of each device such as the
room in which the active badge is.
Researchers at AT&T Cambridge provides 3-D position and orientation information for
tracked tags: the ActiveBat system [APR+99], an improved approach to ActiveBadge which
instead of IR employs UltraSound (US) and RF. Within ActiveBat, many slave anchors are
disseminated over the localization area with a master anchor capable of transmitting an
RF signal. When a node need to be localized, the master anchor transmits a RF signal to
the node as a signal to begin the localization process. Upon reception of the RF signal, the
unlocalized node responds with an US signal, which is heard by the surrounding slaves. The
nearby anchors, which have also received the initialisation signal sent by the master anchor,
record the TDoA between the RF signal and the US signal. From this diﬀerence, each slave
can extract the distance between their location and that of the unlocalized node and send
this information to the master. Finally, the master combines the TDoA from the slaves
at known locations and calculate the location of the node using multilateration. Despite
addressing some issues within the ActiveBadge system, ActiveBat is heavily dependant
on a centralized approach with a ﬁxed infrastructure, thus limiting its applicability. The
system, as reported in 1999, can locate Bats to within 9 centimeters of their true position
for 95 percent of the measurements,
In contrast, the Cricket system [PCB00], has been developed to decentralize the local-
ization process and reduce overheads. Though Cricket also employs a combination of US
and RF signals. In particular, the system operates in the same spirit as the ActiveBat
at the diﬀerence that the node being localized is responsible to compute its own location.
More precisely, pairs of anchors regularly emit RF messages indicating their location along
with US signal. The node that is listening to the exchanges in his vicinity can measure
ToA and consequently calculate its location by itself using triangulation. For a complete
overview and comparison of indoor positioning system and their accuracy, we refer the
reader to [GLN09].
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2.3.3 Hybrid positioning systems
Hybrid positioning systems are localization systems that can work both in indoor and out-
door environments. They usually combine diﬀerent sources of metadata and signal such
as GPS data, cellular signal, WiFi signal, Bluetooth sensors, IP address, network environ-
ment data, etc. Hybrid positioning systems are useful for certain civilian and commercial
services that need to work well in urban areas in order to be commercially and practically
viable. These systems were speciﬁcally designed to overcome the limitations of GPS, which
is very exact in open spaces (precision from 1 centimeter to 100 meters [BCKM04]), but
works poorly indoors or between tall buildings because GPS signals get absorbed by the
buildings. By comparison, signals emitted by cellular tower are not hindered by build-
ings or bad weather, but they provide less precise position (between 250 meters and 35
kilometers [BCKM04]).
With the rapid growth of wireless access points in urban areas, exploiting those wireless
networks may give very exact positioning (between 10 meters and 100 meters in outdoor
and 3 meters in indoor [BCKM04]) provided that the localization area has high Wi-Fi
density and that a comprehensive database of the access points is available. The access
point database is created using a technique called wardriving. Wardriving refers to the
practice of searching a target area for Wi-Fi networks using a portable computer while
travelling by car (derivations are warwalking and warbiking). When the Personal Digital
Assistant (PDA) detects a wireless network, it collects the MAC address with the SSID
of the access point, and associates this with the location (usually determined by GPS)
and the signal strength of the detected network. Then, it uploads the entire record to
a database. When an unlocalized node wants to request its location, it submits (usually
via an encrypted channel) a list of the MAC addresses of Wi-Fi access point identiﬁed
in its range to the database, then the known positions of one or more of these access
points is retrieved, allowing the node to compute its location using ﬁngerprinting. Hybrid
positioning systems include SkyHook’s, Google Maps and Navizon.
2.4 Location-based services
A Location-Based Service (LBS) is an application that tailors the service provided to the
current geolocated context. LBS uses the consumer’s location provided by a positioning
system to provide its service. The popularity of LBS is rapidly growing due in part to
the increased use of location-enabled devices like smartphones and tablets. LBS oﬀers a
variety of services such as navigation tools to help one reach a destination (e.g., Google
Maps); local search to help you ﬁnd nearby businesses or events (e.g., Yelp); friend-ﬁnders
and social networking (e.g., Tinder); applications that allow you to “check in” at certain
locations (e.g., Foursquare); and applications that can link your location to activities (e.g.,
Facebook and Twitter).
LBS can further be classiﬁed based on the functionality it provides. We distinguish
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between four categories of LBS:
Geo-targeting applications: These are applications designed to respond to the
following question: “Where am I?” Given the position of a user, equipped with a device
with geolocated capabilities, this LBS shows on a map or in a social network application,
the location of the user or some of the content that he has posted, such as "Bob was at
Blagnac Airport". For instance, Picasa, Foursquares, Facebook places are examples of
geo-targeting services.
Recommendation services: They provide users with suggestions about products
or places near him. This type of LBS can be proactive or reactive. Examples of proactive
recommendation services include geo-advertising, which pushes information to users about
products or services when they reach a certain area, such as a coupon for a pizza when the
user is at Capitol square (e.g., PayPal Media Network or Twitter) or proposal to pedestrians
potential means of transportation in their neighbourhood whose destination match their
own destination [GKC+13]. In contrast, a reactive recommendation service queries about
the nearest place to ﬁnd some service or product such as "where is the closest Peruvian
restaurant?".
Navigation system: This category of LBS includes application to compute a trajec-
tory to go from one point to another, (e.g., the best itinerary to go from the Charles-de-
Gaulle airport to the Eiﬀel tower). Google Maps and Waze are examples of such services.
Some navigation systems like in the AMORES project [ADG+12] and CooVIA 1 can notify
if there is friends of the user in the neighbourhood or itinerary to pick up passengers in
order to carpool.
Monitoring systems: They continuously record the movements of users in order
to report crowded zones in a city for statistics or to maintain the ﬂow of road traﬃc.
Examples of such application are MapCity, Tom Tom, TeleNav and the density analyzers
like Skyhook or Sense Network.
Other LBS classiﬁcations exist such as the one presented by Andersen and Kjærjaard,
who divides monitoring category in crowd-sensing and city watch [AK12] or Sidney Shek
who classiﬁes LBS depending on the target market, application type and technical capa-
bilities [She10]. Many users actually access LBS through mobile phones, but any location-
aware devices such as laptop, desktop computers, tablets, and in-car navigation systems
and assistance systems can also be used to access these services. However, this is not
without an impact on privacy.
1https://coovia.fr/
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2.5 Privacy and LBS
Privacy taken as a single term cannot be formally deﬁned as it means many things in
diﬀerent contexts and culture. For example, opening a door without knocking might be
considered a serious privacy violation in one culture and yet permitted in another. In 1968,
Alan Westin deﬁned privacy as being: “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others” [Wes68].
Currently, there is no consensus on a single deﬁnition of privacy; in fact, privacy varies
across domains and can therefore be considered as being a subjective notion. For example,
in computer security, privacy is related to the conﬁdentiality of a message or a ﬁle, protected
in general through encryption. Thus, the attack will attempt to decrypt the ciphertext in
order to extract the information it contains. In secure multi-party computation [Gol98],
privacy is associated with the information one is able to infer besides the result of the
computation of some protocol. Therefore, the objective of the attack is to learn as much as
possible from the protocol, by reading the messages passing among the nodes, by having
a malicious behaviour, by implementing a man-in-the-middle attack or by colluding with
several nodes. In social network, privacy is deﬁned by the amount of information (messages,
photos, applications, location, etc.) one shares with his friends. Therefore, the objective
of the inference attack is to proﬁle members of the network based on their features by
extracting implicit information from the social graph.
In the new era of information technology, privacy can be deﬁned as the right to keep
control over our sensitive information. Sensitive information corresponds to any data
related to our person like birth date, personal phone number, location and our religious
aﬃliation. Although privacy is considered a fundamental right, it is diﬃcult to give a
precise deﬁnition of the term. The domain of privacy partially overlaps security, including
for instance the concepts of appropriate use, as well as protection of information.
However, one thing that everyone agrees to is that privacy is a fundamental building
block of a robust democracy; but protecting privacy, when personal data is shared, whether
voluntarily or not, is a diﬃcult and complex task.
2.5.1 Location privacy
Location privacy [BS03] refers to the ability to prevent other parties from learning one’s
current or past location. Indeed, LBS requires to know the location of a user so they can
oﬀer various useful services. However, each time a user transmits his location information
to the service for a single purpose, it may be stored or combined with other information
to produce a history of the user’s activities or a more detailed proﬁle for advertising or
other purposes. Thus, it is necessary to extend the concept of privacy of an individual to
a spatio-temporal context; in other words the sensitive data to protect is the position at a
given time.
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So far, few positioning systems have considered privacy as an initial design criterion.
That is for instance the case for the Active Badge system that detects the location of each
node and broadcasts the information to everyone in the building. The system was originally
deployed assuming anyone in the building was trustworthy. This inconvenient has been
addressed in the Cricket system in which the ﬂow of information recorded by the unlocalized
node, can directly be used to compute its own location (self-positioning) without the system
notifying its presence thus location privacy is preserved. This approach is also used in
GPS.While application designer have a key role in the location privacy protection of users,
they are not the only responsible of privacy leakage; Indeed, some persons disseminate
publicly, almost in real-time, their current location via popular (geo)social application such
as Facebook places, Foursquare or Twitter. In turn, this data can be collected to predict
whether or not they are currently at home like with the website Please rob me2. Thus, there
are many players in the mobile space who have a contributing role to ensuring end-to-end
privacy, whether it is the device manufacturer, the operating system and platform developer,
network providers, application developers, data processors and even users themselves.
Cottrill [Cot11] proposed to allocate roles based on who is responsible for providing
protection to such a data. More precisely, the suggestions goes as follow: users should
establish their own privacy policy through the available privacy settings. They should refuse
to use an application without a declared privacy policy and, have the minimum amount of
location data if possible. Users should be conscious about the risks of location disclosure.
While companies have a privacy-by-disaster approach that is they only care about privacy
protection after a signiﬁcant incident is made public [oNC11]; their developers should
be initiated to privacy-by-design. Privacy by Design is a concept developed back in the
’90s [Cav11]. It aims to identify and examine possible privacy breaches (i.e. data protection
problems, etc.) when designing a technology in order to incorporate privacy protection
mechanisms into the overall design, instead of having to come up with “patches” later on.
If systems are built without respect for user privacy, and adhere to only the most basic
requirements, companies may suﬀer when their systems get compromised or when a large
base of customers reacts negatively. Privacy by Design was unanimously recognized and
supported by the International Assembly of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners,
and is a recommended approach in major U.S. and European regulatory eﬀorts [oNC11].
Service providers are also responsible for setting up access controls to guarantee information
conﬁdentiality and secure storage to prevent information leak. Telecom operators should
follow a self-regulatory approach in order to preserve the privacy of their clients. Finally,
public and private agencies should provide regulation and guidelines to the data processors
about how to manipulate location data in order to ensure location privacy protection. In
the following, we introduce some of the privacy regulations that have been introduced for
privacy protection.
2http://pleaserobme.com/
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2.5.2 Privacy regulation
Privacy is recognized as a fundamental right by governments and organizations all over the
world. This situation has caused the adoption of new regulation laws in order to regulate
the transmission and sharing of user sensitive information. More precisely, in 1995, the
European Union has adopted the 95/46/CE Data Protection Directive [PC] to harmonize
the laws of members states on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data. This directive established several
basic principles for European citizens. These principles include the following rights:
• The right to know where the data originated,
• The right to have inaccurate data rectiﬁed,
• The right of recourse in the event of unlawful processing,
• The right to withhold permission to use data under some circumstances.
On January 2012, the European Commission unveiled a new draft legislative package to
establish a uniﬁed European data protection law [95412]. This regulation brings new
privacy rights, including data subject’s right of portability and the right to be forgotten,
for citizen in the EU. The right of portability will allow a transfer of all data from one
provider to another upon request, for example transfer of a social media proﬁle or email,
whereas the right to be forgotten will allow people to wipe their history clean. The other
remarkable changes to the 95/46/CE Data Protection Directive are the following:
• the EU data protection regulation will also apply for all non-EU companies without
any establishment in the EU, provided that the processing of data is directed at EU
residents,
• any processing of personal data will require providing clear and simple information
to concerned individuals as well as obtaining speciﬁc and explicit consent by such
individuals for the processing of their data (Opt-in), other than in cases in which the
data protection regime explicitly allows the processing of personal data,
• the processing of data of individuals under the age of 13 will in general require
parental consent, which will make it more diﬃcult for companies to conduct business
aiming at minors,
• all companies will be obligated to notify EU data protection authorities as well as the
individuals whose data are concerned by any breaches of data protection regulations
or data leaks without undue delay, that is within 24 hours,
• a harsh sanction regime will be established in case of breach of the uniﬁed EU data
protection law allowing data protection authorities to impose penalties of up to 2 %
of a company’s worldwide turnover in case of severe data protection breaches.
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Moreover, some standards and privacy risk analysis related to privacy are currently
being put forward. For example, the ISO/IEC 29100 [ISO] about Information technology,
Security techniques and Privacy framework, the AICPA/CICA Privacy Risk Assessment
Tool, NIST Privacy Assessment, and the Methodology for Privacy Risk Management. In
U.S., the Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014 [Fra], introduced by Senator Al Franken,
targets those apps designed to maliciously track individuals without their knowledge. The
bill stipulates that each individual may give his explicit consent before using a service, the
collecting entities, the collectable data and its usage. The bill does not include location
data stored locally on the device (the user should be able to delete the contents of the
location data document periodically just as he would delete a log document). The bill
that was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee, also requires mobile services to
disclose the names of the advertising networks or other third parties with which they share
consumers locations.
2.6 Privacy solutions
A number of technical solutions have been proposed to protect the privacy of LBS users.
In the sequel, we present the major ones to be used throughout the manuscript.
2.6.1 Anonymisation
The aim of anonymisation is to ensure that the LBS will not be able to link requests to
speciﬁc users. A mean to comply with this, is by using anonymiser. Anonymiser is an
intermediate trusted system that groups together k users requests before sending them to
LBS provider for process, and returns speciﬁc responses to users. The value of k can be
conﬁgured to ensure suﬃcient anonymity [Liu, 2009]. The main drawback to anonymisers
is that they rely on the anonymiser being a trusted system, thus it becomes a single point
of failure issue in the architecture.
2.6.2 Cryptography
Cryptography [Sch94] is the science of writing in secret code and is an ancient art; some
experts argue that cryptography appeared spontaneously sometime after writing was in-
vented, with applications ranging from diplomatic missives to war-time battle plans. Cryp-
tographic techniques such as encryption and hash chain are commonly applied to conceal
information and to hide user’s identities. These techniques may require more computational
power and sophisticated application code than other methods. Cryptographic techniques
would be useful for both identity-driven and pseudonym-driven applications. For exam-
ple, in [HWK04] authors propose blind signatures as a mean to protect the identity of a
user from his communications provider. Privacy-enhanced cryptographic primitives include
21
group signature [CS97, FZ12], zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol [FFS88], hash
chains [LMP11] and commitment schemes [BCC88].
2.6.3 Location granularity
Location information has a deﬁned accuracy depending on the technology used. For exam-
ple, GPS may be able to resolve location down to 5-10 meters while GSM-based localization
resolve it to 250 meters to 35 kilometers [BCKM04]. While a high-accuracy technology
may be used, applications may not need such high resolution, so a client application can
reduce the accuracy of its location when sending requests to LBS provider thereby reduc-
ing the possibility that the LBS provider can identify the user’s exact location. Accuracy
ﬁltering can be done by selecting the appropriate location technology via the smartphone’s
conﬁguration parameters for accuracy, or by post-ﬁltering of the location information. One
example of post-ﬁltering was a technique described in [LMP11], in which hash chain is used
to certify the location information in such a way that the hashes of the chain correspond to
an increasing level of precision or in [LH10] in which ﬁve levels of granularity are encrypted
and inserted in the request, then LBS requests the corresponding key to the user to unveil
the granularity that it needs.
2.7 The secure location verification problem
LBS are services that take advantage of the position of users to deliver service tailored to
their geolocated context. By the use of a positioning device, a user can acquire his current
position and then transmits it to LBS for processes. However, as pointed in [SW09], a
malicious user can lie about his position, by having his device transmitting a location of
his choice and thus access services inadequately. This situation is critical for emerging
applications such as real-time traﬃc monitoring, location-based access control, discount
tied to the visit of a particular shop or local electronic election. Thus, the enforcement of
location-aware security policies (e.g., this laptop should not be taken out of this building,
this ﬁle should not be opened outside of a secure room, etc..) requires trusted location
information. So, one of the ﬁrst question that naturally arises from this is how can we
convince others about our current position? Thereafter, we will refer to this problem as
the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Problem. Secure location veriﬁcation has been addressed
in the literature in two diﬀerent ways: using time-based approaches, namely distance-
bounding protocols (DB) [BC93] and location proof systems [SW09]. DB is a timing-based
approach that allows an entity (the prover) to interact with a set of authorities (verifiers)
in order to prove his current position. Location proof system is an architecture that allows
a prover to prove his past position to a set of veriﬁers. Many location proof systems are
based on DB protocol to defeat proxy attacks and terrorist fraud attacks. In the following,
we review the state of the art in the domains of distance-bounding protocol and location
proof systems.
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2.7.1 Distance-bounding protocol
Distance bounding protocols are cryptographic protocols that enable a veriﬁer V to estab-
lish an upper bound on the physical distance to a prover P. They were originally introduced
by Brands and Chaum [BC93] to defeat relay attacks and are based on Round Trip Time
techniques (see Section 2.2.2) which measuring the delay between sending out a challenge
bits and receiving back the corresponding response bits. The delay time for receiving the
correct responses enables V to compute an upper-bound on the distance from the prover,
as the round trip delay time divided into twice the speed of the radio wave. Both ra-
dio frequency (RF) and ultrasound channels have been used in the design of secure and
lightweight distance bounding protocols. However, since the speed of sound is six order
of magnitude lower than the one of light (the propagation of RF in air approaches the
in-vacuum speed of light), it is established that RF is more secure.
There exists a signiﬁcant literature on distance-bounding (DB) protocols. Usually, DB
protocols is ran in association with a lightweight authentication protocol. This authentica-
tion procedure can either be symmetric (i.e., based on a common secret shared between the
prover and the veriﬁer [RNTS07,TP07,ALM11,KAK+09,BMV13b]) or asymmetric (i.e.,
dependent of a secret that is only known to the prover [BC93,BB05a]). DB protocols are
made of three main phases which are: the initialization phase (or first slow phase) during
which the prover and the veriﬁer pre-computes the values that are needed to run the DB
protocol. Thereafter, the ﬁrst slow phase is followed by the interactive phase (or fast bit
exchange phase) during which the prover and the veriﬁer exchange bits at very high speed.
Finally, there is the verification phase (or final slow phase), that allows to determine if the
protocol succeeds or not.
The security level of these protocols can be evaluated according to their resistance to
ﬁve types of attack, namely: slow phase impersonation [AT09a], distance fraud [BC93],
mafia fraud [Des88], distance hijacking [CRSC12] and terrorist fraud [BBD+91]. Each of
these attacks targets a speciﬁc aspect of the protocol such as the authentication or the
distance estimated by the veriﬁer. In an impersonation, the adversary tries to impersonate
a legitimate prover to the veriﬁer but does not lie on its distance. In contrast, in a distance
fraud a legitimate but malicious prover attempts to lie on his distance to the prover. A
maﬁa fraud is an attack in which an adversary defeats a DB protocol using a man-in-
the-middle attack between the veriﬁer and an honest prover located outside the area. In
a distance hijacking attack, a malicious prover takes advantage of a protocol executed
between a honest prover and the veriﬁer. Finally, terrorist fraud denotes an attack in
which the adversary plays the man-in-the-middle between the veriﬁer and a prover that
is not located in the vicinity. However in contrast to the maﬁa fraud, the prover is also
malicious and willingly cooperate with the adversary to help him achieve his objective of
defeating the DB protocol. However, the malicious prover only helps the adversary to the
extent that he does not have to give him his long term secret in the process.
Over the years, DB protocols have matured to the point that the MIFARE Plus RFID
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tag [NXP11] is the ﬁrst commercial product (at least up to our knowledge) implementing
distance bounding in a commercial product. Distance bounding can be used as a building
block for the design of other security systems like it is the case of location proof systems.
2.7.2 Location proof systems
A location proof system designates an architecture that allows a prover to obtain a certiﬁ-
cate of his actual position as an evidence of his presence in this geolocated context [SW09].
We call the certiﬁcate obtained by the prover: the location proof (LP). In the same spirit
of real life alibi, a LP can be used by its owner to prove that he was located at position pos
at time time (as endorsed in the LP) to a remote service or to authority. We call the entity
that checks the validity of a location proof the verifier. A secure location proof veriﬁcation
system requires the following two properties:
• Correctness: if the prover and the veriﬁer behaves honestly, and the prover was indeed
at the location claimed then the veriﬁer will accept the claimed position pos of the
prover using a location proof.
• Soundness: if V behaves honestly and accepts the position claimed by a prover, then
the prover or one of colluding party is located at the position accepted.
Location proofs systems are made of two main phases: the proof gathering phase and the
proof veriﬁcation phase. The proof gathering phase is ran by the prover each time he needs
to collect a proof for the location in which he is physically present. The physical presence
of the prover at the claimed location can be established using distance-bounding protocol
with a node of the system (witness). Once the witness is convinced of the presence of the
prover in his proximity, it outputs a location proof to the latter containing the current
location and time informations.
The heart of any location proof system is the gathering process that can broadly be cat-
egorized into two classes depending on whether a user collects his location proof (1) through
an interaction with non-mobile and dedicated access points deployed by the system admin-
istrator, we call this the centralized gathering approach or (2) by directly interacting with
other users of the system which are located in his surrounding, we call this the collaborative
gathering approach. In the former approach, proof issuers are Wiﬁ-Access points adver-
tising their presence by regularly broadcasting beacon signals to their surrounding area.
Afterwards, any nearby device can collect these beacons as a prerequisite to the process of
creation of the location proof by the Access Point. The beneﬁts of a collaborative gathering
approach over a centralized gathering approach are multiples. In fact, the system is more
scalable, deployment/maintenance cost are reduced, pollution is also reduced and ﬁnally
it oﬀers better resistance to DoS attacks.
The second main phase of location proof system is the veriﬁcation phase. This phase
allows a location-based service (veriﬁer) to be convinced of the provenance of the prover
24
before he can access the service. The goal of this phase is for the prover to provide the
veriﬁer with location proof containing the correct spatio-temporal information (past or
present) as needed for the functioning of the location-based service.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we addressed the general concept of positioning, the techniques commonly
used by positioning systems and the attacks that can be launched against them. We also
described the functioning of location-based applications that are built on top of position-
ing systems and how their uses can rapidly becoming a threat against the privacy of users.
Then, we have brieﬂy introduced the privacy regulations in Europe and USA. In addition,
we also described the techniques such as anonymisation, cryptography and location gran-
ularity that have been developed so that only minimal quality of location data needs to
be given to LBS providers. Then, we introduce the concept of secure location veriﬁcation
and the two majors countermeasures developed in the literature to improve the security of
location-based services, namely location proof system and distance bounding protocols. In
the next chapters, we will give more details about such countermeasures and position our
contributions to location veriﬁcation problem. More precisely, in the next chapter, we will
review in more detail the concept of location proof systems.
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Les preuves de localisation
L’apparition de l’informatique mobile et la démocratisation des dispositifs de communi-
cations mobiles (GSM, PDA, smart gadgets...) amènent les organisations à ouvrir leurs
systèmes d’information aﬁn de le rendre disponible n’importe où et n’importe quand. Ceci
ne peut se faire sans une prise en compte de la dimension mobile des utilisateurs dans le
modèle de sécurité des accès. Ainsi, un système d’information doit dorénavant être capable
de prendre en compte des caractéristiques contextuelles (telles que la position du requérant
et l’heure) pour garantir un contrôle d’accès ﬁable à certaines ressources protégées. Dans
ce chapitre, nous abordons la thématique des preuves de localisation. Une preuve de local-
isation désigne un certiﬁcat numérique attestant de la position géographique d’un individu
(le prouveur), plus précisément de son téléphone, à un instant donné. Les preuves de lo-
calisation sont obtenues par le biais d’une requête émanant du prouveur et à destination
d’un système de preuve de localisation.
Un système de preuve de localisation désigne une architecture logicielle permettant à un
prouveur d’obtenir des preuves de localisation. En pratique, chaque preuve de localisation
est émise par une tierce-partie agissant alors comme un témoin pour le prouveur.
De nombreux systèmes de preuves de localisation ont été proposées dans la litterature.
Nous les décrivons dans le détail à la Section, puis nous les catégorisons en deux grandes
familles. La première famille regroupe les système basée sur la présence d’une infrastructure
de points d’accès et la seconde famille regroupe les systèmes basées sur la coopération
entre les diﬀérents utilisateurs. La diﬀérence réside dans la manière dont les prouveurs
sont autorisés à récupérer des preuves de localisation. En eﬀet, dans les systèmes basés
sur les points d’accès, chaque prouveur ne peut demander une preuve de localisation que
lorsqu’il se trouve à proximité de point d’accès spéciﬁques agréés par le système. Par contre,
dans les sytèmes basés sur la coopération, les utilisateurs présents dans une même zone
géographique peuvent directement communiquer et se générer mutuellement des preuves
de localisation.
Nous discutons aussi des impacts que peuvent avoir l’une ou l’autre ces deux architec-
tures. Il en ressort que les systèmes basés sur les points d’accès souﬀrent de leur dépendance
à une infrastructure spéciﬁque. En eﬀet, ils passent diﬃcilement à l’échelle, nécessitent des
coûts d’entretien et d’administration. De plus, du point de vue de la vie privée, les util-
isateurs de tels systèmes ne sont pas à l’abri d’un traçage permanant. À l’inverse, les
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systèmes basés sur la coopération exploitent les ressources grandissantes de nos smart-
phones. Cependant, elles nécessitent la mise en place de mécanismes strictes pour éviter
les abus liés aux collusions entre utilisateurs.
Dans le chapitre qui suit, nous discuterons des propriétés de sécurité et de vie privée
que nous jugeons indispensables aux systèmes de preuves de localisation en général et aux
systèmes basés sur la coopération en particulier. Nous verrons en particulier que la sécurité
de la phase de collecte des preuves de localisation peut être signiﬁcativement améliorée en
faisant appels aux protocoles délimiteurs de distance.
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Chapter 3
Location proof systems
3.1 Introduction
Location-Based Services (LBS) are a general class of services that use location data to
control features. Individuals can use it to ﬁnd nearest interesting spots. Parents can
use it to locate their child at any time. Professionals can locate their vehicles, track
personnel, deliveries and detect any problem. Authorities can use it to manage suspect
alibis. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, LBS cannot rely solely on the user’s
devices to discover and transmit location information because they have an incentive to
cheat. Instead, such applications may require their users to prove their locations: location
proof system serves this purpose.
This chapter introduces the domain of location proof systems. We describe the related
work by grouping them according to the way location proof are collected by the users
before discussing the pros and cons of the diﬀerent approaches.
3.2 State-of-the-art
A location proof system designates an architecture that allows its users to prove their
location to location-based services before they are authorized to access a service. A location
proof designates the piece of information that is actually used by the users to convince the
content provider about their current or past location.
To illustrate the importance of location proof systems, consider the scenario of a content
delivery server (i.e. a movie server). The movie server wants to restrict the content it
delivers to users depending on their locations due to some copyright laws. Before starting
a download, the server needs ﬁrst to ensure that the recipient device is authorized to access
the downloadable content in accordance with the copyright laws. Thus, the mobile device
needs to obtain a location proof before requesting the hosted service. Therefore, one can
imagine that the mobile device transmits to the movie server the identiﬁer of its nearest
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communicating cell tower. Then, using the latter identiﬁer and the help of the telephony
network, the movie server can infer the position of the mobile user by mapping the identiﬁer
of the cell tower to its geographical location. The movie server can then verify the device’s
current location and then decide whether or not access to the content should be granted.
In another application, suppose a store wants to oﬀer discounts to frequent customers. In
this context, making devices aware of their location is not suﬃcient; instead, users must
be able to show evidence of their repeated visits to the store.
In the sequel, we investigate the literature on location proof system by grouping them
according to the way users obtain location proof. Firstly, we enumerate system in which
users collect location proof by interacting with access point disseminated over the local-
ization area. We call such approach of implementing location proof system, the bipartie
gathering approach. Secondly, we consider systems in which users collect location proof by
collaborating together. We call this latter approach the collaborative gathering approach.
3.2.1 Bipartite gathering approach
This is the ﬁrst class of location proof system introduced at a time when the wireless net-
works were becoming increasingly popular, and the ﬁrst Wiﬁ-enabled mobile devices were
introduced to the market. In such systems, user requests location proof from designated
Wiﬁ Access-Point (AP) present over the localization area. The protocols were designed to
be expanded on-the-shelf to existing Wiﬁ-networks. The expansion is done by a system ad-
ministrator, responsible to conﬁgure each AP of the network to run a simple program which
computes location proof transmitted to the requester devices. In the following, we propose
to describe the systems which have been developed on this idea [WF03,SW09,LH10].
Waters and Felten (2003)
Waters and Felten [WF03] turn their attention to equip small wireless network with mech-
anisms that can vouch for the presence of mobile devices within the small area they cover.
Here, the access-point responsible to issue location proof is called the LM (Location
Manager). To obtain a location proof, user convinces the LM that they are within prox-
imity. LM judges of their proximity to user by using RTT like techniques.
To start the process of obtaining location proof, user needs to know the public key of
the service he want to convince of his position. Once this condition is satisﬁed, the user
sends a location proof request to the nearest LM. A location proof request is a simple
message containing the user’s public key encrypted with the public key of the service the
user wants to convince of his position. The request is then transmitted encrypted with the
public key of the intended LM. Authors did not explicitly describe how user can obtain the
public key corresponding to the nearest LM.
After the reception of the proof request, the LM starts its clock and sends a nonce to
the user. At the reception of the nonce, the user must send back the nonce to the location
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manager as soon as possible. When the LM receives the response from the user, it stops
its clock and computes the latency of the round-trip exchange with the user. Next, the
LM issues a location proof to the user. The proof contains two blocks of information. The
ﬁrst block contains the public key of the LM, the latency computed by the LM, the current
date and time information and lastly the encryption of the user’s public key. The second
block contains a signature of the ﬁrst block with the private key of the LM.
At the reception of the location proof, the user must immediately sends a message for
proving his location to the remote service, he has speciﬁed in the proof request. The mes-
sage contains two blocks of information, the ﬁrst one contains the location proof received
from the LM concatenated with the LM’s public key concatenated with the user’s public
key. The second block contains a signature of the ﬁrst block with the private key of the
user to express the consent of the user to prove his position to the service. The message is
then sent to the service encrypted with its corresponding public key for approval. Service
has access to a database mapping the public key of LM to their physical position. Then
by retrieving the latency of the communication between the LM and the user, the physical
position of the LM, the service can decide of the validity of the user’s location claim.
With respect to privacy, the main objective of this protocol is to hide the identity of the
device and the veriﬁer from LM and potential eavesdroppers. This protocol is not secure
against attack in which a malicious prover transmits his public key and a well deﬁned
location proof request to a colluder to masquerade as him in front of an AP. Another
limitation is that each location proof collected by the prover can be used with only one
veriﬁer.
Saroiu and Wolman (2009)
Saroiu andWolman [SW09] have proposed to include the latitude and longitude coordinates
of Wi-Fi access points into the beacon frames they periodically broadcast to announce their
presence. Then, a device capturing such beacon, can use it to explicitly request a location
proof from that respective AP. A location proof request contains the sequence number of
the last beacon captured from the AP and the public key of the user. The proof request is
also signed with the private key of the user before it is sent to the AP.
At the reception of a proof request, the AP checks two things. The ﬁrst one is that the
sequence number included in the request matches well with a beacon it has broadcasted
a few times ago. The second thing is that the signature of the proof request corresponds
to the public key of the user. If those veriﬁcations succeed, the AP replies with a location
proof addressed to the user. The proof contains two blocks of information. The ﬁrst block
contains in clear text: the access point’s public key, the device’s public key, the date and
time of the creation of the proof and the latitude and longitude coordinates of the AP. The
second block of information contains a digital signature of the ﬁrst block made with the
secret key of the AP.
To prove his location to a service, a user signs his location proof and prepends to it his
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public key. The resulting message is then transmitted to the service. Upon reception of
the message, the service performs two signature veriﬁcation. Firstly, it checks the user’s
signature over the location proof using the public key of the user. Secondly, it checks that
signature included in the second part of the location proof is correct. Those veriﬁcations
ensure that the location proof has not been tampered while being transmitted to the service
and that the client has not tampered with the location proof created by the AP. If those
veriﬁcations succeed, then the service is convinced that the client is indeed the genuine
recipient of the location proof and that the location proof is legitimate.
Figure 3.1: Saroiu and Wolman Location proof System.
This protocol is not secure against an attack in which a malicious prover transmits
his public key and a well deﬁned location proof request to a colluder to help the latter in
masquerading as him in front of an AP. However, the authors have also propose a number
of improvements to enforce privacy guarantees of their protocol and strong authentication.
From a privacy point of view, one of the main issue of this protocol is that prover needs
to publicly reveals his identity before obtaining a location proof.
VeriPlace (2010)
VeriPlace has been proposed by Luo and Hengartner in [LH10]. The system puts in relation
a number of trusted-third party that are the TTPU (Trusted Third Party for managing
User informations, the TTPL (Trusted Third Party for managing Location) and the CDA
(Cheating Detection Authority). The above mentioned trusted entities are run by diﬀerent
parties to avoid collusion and to protect user’s privacy: each entity knows either a user’s
identity or her location, but not both of them.
Within VeriPlace, the ﬁrst step is for users to request intermediate proof to AP present
in their vicinity. To obtain intermediate location proof from AP, user ﬁrst sends a message
to the TTPU to obtain a token. The message contains the identity of the user and the
identity of the AP encrypted with the CDA public’s key. In response to this message,
the TTPU replies to the user with a nonce. At the same time, the TTPU registers in his
database the identity of the user, the encryption of the identity of the AP and the date
and time at which it has created the nonce for the user.
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Afterwards, the user uses the token to obtain intermediate location proof from the AP.
An intermediate proof has two blocks. The ﬁrst block contains the public identity of the
AP, the token from the TTPU and the time the access point received the proof request
from the user. The second block contains a digital signature of the ﬁrst block with the
private key of the AP.
Later, to provide a service with a location proof, user ﬁrst presents his intermediate
proof to the TTPL to obtain a ﬁnal proof. The user also speciﬁes a granularity for the
proof he wants to receive. User can choose among ﬁve levels of granularity for the location
they want to reveal. The TTPL creates a ﬁnal location proof by replacing the AP identity
in an intermediate proof with the location of the AP at the granularity speciﬁed by the
user and the AP’s signature with its own signature.
When verifying a ﬁnal location proof submitted by the user, the service submits the
identity of the user and the date and time information to the TTPU. The TTPU extracts
a list of encrypted access point identities from his database that match the user identity
and roughly the same date and time values. The list is then submitted to the CDA for
cheating detection.
After receiving the list of encrypted AP information from the TTPU, the CDA de-
crypts it and checks whether any two APs of the list are far apart, which is a sign of
cheating (because the same user can not request location proofs at two far-apart places
simultaneously). The CDA notiﬁes the TTPU in case cheating is detected.
If all the steps above are passed successfully and no cheating is detected by the CDA
then the service accepts the proof.
3.2.2 Cooperative gathering approach
In the cooperative gathering approach, users obtain location proof not by communicating
with a dedicated infrastructure but by collaborating with other users present at the same
location. This approach assumes that the users can communicate with each other using
range communication technology, such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi in Adhoc mode.
The SLVPGP system (2009)
SLVPGP stands for the Secure Location Verification Proof Gathering Protocol. Gra-
ham and Gray propose three versions of the protocol with increasing security properties
in [GG09]. In the following we describe the functionality of the third version that oﬀers
the best security properties among the others. The protocol is based on the assumption
that there exists a central server knowing the identities and public keys related to all users
of the system. It is also assumed that for any location claim made by a user, the central
server knows the identity of some other devices present at the location.
At the beginning of the protocol, the user sends his location and his identity to the
central server for veriﬁcation. The central server replies with a list of other users known
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to be present in the same area. At the reception of the list, the user contacts each of the
device present in the list to obtain a proof of proximity from them. More precisely, the
user provides each device with a message containing their identity and two nonces: the
initiating nonce and the replying nonce. These nonces are used by both parties to compute
two registers: the register of challenges and the register of responses.
Next, each device sends to the user a message containing a value picked at random in the
register of challenges, the position of the value in the register and a nonce. Then the device
starts its clock. At the reception of the previous message, the user checks that the value
received exists at the position speciﬁed in the register of challenges. If the veriﬁcation
succeeds, the user continues the protocol and replies with a message containing a value
picked at random in the register of responses, the position of the value in the register of
responses and the nonce received from the neighbouring device. Once the user’s response
is received, if the value received from the user is present within the register of response, the
neighbouring device sends to the user a proof of proximity message containing, its identity,
its position, the round-trip latency and the date and time information of the creation of
the message.
Finally, the user sends all the proximity messages to the central server. Based on those
informations, the central server computes a location proof for the user. The location proof
obtained from the central server can now be used to prove his location to other services.
APPLAUS
Zhu and Cao designed APPLAUS [ZC11] that stands for A Privacy-Preserving LocAtion
Updating System.
When joining the system, each user receives a set of public/private key pairs and the
corresponding public key certiﬁcates from an online trusted authority called the Certiﬁca-
tion Authority (CA). The public part of each key pair is considered as a pseudonym for
the user, the private part serves to create location proofs for other users and the public
key certiﬁcate helps to authenticate the user. The table for mapping the pseudonyms of
users to their real identity is secret and managed by the CA.
To obtain a location proof, a mobile user broadcasts a proof request containing his
pseudonym at the given time (computed by a deterministic algorithm, see [ZC11] for more
details), to its surrounding devices. Each surrounding devices decides whether to accept
the location proof request according to its scheduling. In case of a positive response to the
location proof request, the neighbouring device creates a location proof for the user. The
location proof contains the public key of the device, the public key of the user, the current
date and time, the GPS coordinates of the device and a signature on all the previous using
the current secret key of the device. The location proof is then encrypted using the public
key of the location storage server and transmitted to the user.
Finally, the user sends the encrypted location proofs to the location proof storage server
using the Internet. During the veriﬁcation process, the user announces to the veriﬁcation
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service the time at which he was at position posT˙hen, the veriﬁcation service queries the
CA for the location proofs of this speciﬁc prover. This query contains the real identity of
the user and a time interval. The CA ﬁrst authenticates the veriﬁcation service, and then
converts the real identity of the user to its corresponding pseudonyms during that time
period and retrieves their location proofs from the location storage server. The location
proof server only returns hashed location rather than the location in clear to the CA, who
then forwards it to the veriﬁcation service. Finally, the veriﬁcation service compares the
hashed location with the claimed location acquired from the user to decide if the claimed
location is authentic or not.
LINK (2012)
The Location verification through Immediate Neighbors Knowledge (LINK) has been pro-
posed by Talasila, Curtmola and Borcea. LINK uses a trusted centralized entity called
the Location Certification Authority (LCA), that is responsible to register user within the
system. During registration, each user receives a public and private key pair, and a default
trust score value. The LCA is responsible to update the trust scores associated to each user
of the system based on their interactions. More precisely, a user’s trust score is additively
increased when her claim is successfully authenticated and multiplicatively decreased oth-
erwise in order to discourage malicious behaviour. As a consequence, during the collection
of a proof, user prefer to interact with neighbouring users with high trust scores.
Before submitting a location proof to a veriﬁcation service, the users must register
a proof request signed with his private key to the LCA. The proof request contains the
identity of the user, the location claimed by the user, a sequence number to identify the
request and the name of the service he wants to convince of his position. Then, the user
broadcasts a location certiﬁcation request to his neighbouring users. The request contains
the identity of the user and the sequence number registered with the LCA. Next, each
neighbouring device sends a message signed with their respective private key to the LCA.
This message contains the identity of the neighbouring device, the location of this device
and the certiﬁcation request received from the user. The certiﬁcation request is included
to allow the LCA to match the user’s proof request with the certiﬁcation messages received
from the neighbouring devices.
The LCA waits for a short period of time to receive enough certiﬁcation messages
and then starts the decision process. The LCA decides the claim’s authenticity based on
spatio-temporal correlation between the users and the trust score associated with each
neighbouring users. Finally, the LCA informs the veriﬁcation service about its decision,
causing the veriﬁcation service to provide or deny service to the user.
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Privacy-preserving Alibi system (2012)
Davis, Chen and Franklin introduced ALIBI [DCF12]. Location proof can be collected
from neighbouring users and from so-called public corraborator. A public corroborator acts
like an AP in the bipartite gathering approach: their identities and locations are publicly
known to the users of the system and they can vouch for the position claim by a user. At
the registration phase, each user and public corroborator receive a public/private key pair.
A user can opportunistically request the creation of a location proof whenever public
corroborators or other users are available in his neighbourhood. The user then creates an
OwnerStatement, which is included in the location proof request. The OwnerStatement
is tied to the identity of the user and his current location, but by itself cannot reveal
those informations unless the user reveals that link. At the reception of the OwnerState-
ment, a neighbouring user signs it using his private key and commits to this data using a
cryptographic string commitment scheme. Finally, the neighbouring user prepends to the
commitment his own location and time informations to form the location proof. At this
time, the only information that can be obtained from the location proof is the location of
the neighbouring user and the time at which the proof has been created. Other information
like the identity of the user, the identity of the neighbour and its signature, are hidden
within the proof.
During the veriﬁcation of the location proof, the user ﬁrst contacts the neighbouring
user to obtain the openings for the hidden part of the location proof and the public key
of the neighbouring user. Then the user sends those information to the veriﬁcation service
along with the information needed to open the OwnerStatement. Finally, the veriﬁcation
service uses the informations provided by the neighbouring user to obtain and check the
signature of the OwnerStatement. Then, the information provided by the user are used
to check that the OwnerStatement includes the real identity of the user. Finally, if the
location and time information provided by the user corresponds to the information included
in the location proof then the proof is accepted, otherwise the proof is rejected.
STAMP (2014)
Recently, Wang and co-authors propose STAMP [WZP+], in which co-located mobile de-
vices mutually generate location proof for each other using bluetooth or WiFi in ad-hoc
mode. Then the prover convince a veriﬁer of his location by showing him the location proofs
he received. STAMP ensures the integrity of LPS (i.e, a prover cannot modify the data in-
cluded in a LPS once generated), the non-transferability, and the anonymity of prover and
witnesses generating the proof. Users have also the possibility to choose the granularity
to reveal to a veriﬁer. However, in contrast to Props, the LPSs are encrypted under the
CA public key, thus the prover cannot check himself the validity of location information
endorsed by the witness. During the veriﬁcation stage, the veriﬁer needs to contact the
CA to validate a LP. The collusion detection algorithm is an entropy-based trust evalu-
ation approach like the one used in APPLAUS. STAMP incorporates the Bussard-Bagga
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distance-bounding protocol [BB05a] as a countermeasure to the proxy attacks. The au-
thors also provide a prototype implementation on the Android platform with an averaging
running time of 8 seconds.
3.2.3 Comparison
We propose here to discuss the pros and cons for each of the approach that we have
enumerated early.
Recall that within a cooperative gathering approach, a user who needs a location proof
can request the other surrounding users to generate such location proof. At the beginning
of the 2000’s, with the low performance of cell phones, this was not the best choice for
implementing a location proof system. However, things have evolved, our smart phones
and tablets have now suﬃcient processor power and storage memory to run even complex
security protocols and store gigabytes of information. As mentioned in the literature, even
complex protocol such as STAMP can run within second on a smart phone. Therefore,
leveraging the creation of location proof to our mobile devices is now a perfectly viable and
feasible idea. However, when we give users the ability to create and store location proofs,
we also give them more possibilities to cheat the system. As pointed by many of the related
work, we can imagine situation in which users may deviate from the normal running of the
protocol, to create location proof for requester who are not physically present at the same
place for money or proﬁt. Therefore, a location proof system based on a collaborative
gathering approach may also include mechanisms to detect collusion of users. We give
more details about this in the Chapter 4. In addition, this type of infrastructure does
not need to manage or monitor any of these mobile devices, thereby drastically reducing
management costs and privacy concerns.
Within a bipartite architecture, there is publicly known wiﬁ-access point that can gen-
erate location proof for users. Here, the advantage is that all the proof providers are trusted
by default, so there is no risk of collusion between the proof issuers and the users. How-
ever attacks like distance fraud and terrorist fraud are still possible and we need to design
security mechanisms to counter these attacks. Here, the security of the whole system relies
on the Wiﬁ-Access points side. In fact, these access points constitute the system’s central
point of failure and require attention of the system administrators. Each time the Access
point is relocated then it must be reconﬁgured to the new longitude and latitude to provide
the valid location proof to requester. Access-point located in outdoors environment can
be equipped with GPS capabilities to dynamic reconﬁguration after movement. In the
case of indoor environment, the system can be equipped with a proper indoor or hybrid
localization system or reconﬁguration can be done manually by the system administrator.
Due to the cost in the maintenance of Access-point, bipartite approach should be preferred
in applications which only require a small-scale deployment of infrastructure capable of
handing out locations proofs. For example, a coﬀee store can start running a promotion
promising a free drink to any customers that visited their store daily in the past week. A
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Wi-Fi access point issuing location proofs is a simple and cheap way of implementing such
a promotion. Similarly, a teacher can oﬀer rewards to those students who never miss a class
during the semester. With location proofs, students can collect them and submit them at
the end of the semester to receive their reward. A sensible consideration is making sure
that APs are conﬁgured with the correct location coordinates. While it is cheap to provi-
sion APs with GPS to routinely determine their location, most APs are situated in indoor
environments in which GPS does not work ﬁne. One way to overcome this complexity is
to provide the AP with an additional conﬁguration interface for administrators. To point
a location proof-enable AP, the administrator initially takes the AP outdoors and runs a
setup program using GPS to establish the AP’s location.
Independently of the chosen architecture, the system is subject to privacy issues. In a
cooperative approach, users interact with other users so they may have control over how
much information they disclose to their surrounding.
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the notions of location proof, location proof system and
location proof architecture. We classiﬁed the state of the art to the nature of proof issuers.
In fact, we distinguish between systems in which users interact with dedicated access-
points and systems in which users collaborate together. In general, all these protocols acts
globally on a similar manner. That is, they consists of a series of exchange between the
mobile device and the proof issuers. Then the proof issuers generate a signature attesting
of the presence of the user in his neighbourhood. Location proof systems provide LBS
with a mean to verify the position claims of mobiles users before granting them access to
a service. In the next chapter, we analyse the security and privacy properties brought by
the aforementioned systems.
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Chapitre 4: Un modèle de sécurité
et de vie privée pour les système
de preuves de localisation.
Arpès avoir parcouru l’état de l’art des systèmes de preuves de localisation, le but de ce
chapitre est d’étudier les propriétés de sécurité et de conﬁdentialité des données nécessaires
à ces dits systèmes. Cette étude a abouti à l’identiﬁcation de menaces à considérer lors
de la phase conception de futurs systèmes. Nous illustrons chacune de ces menaces par
des scénarios d’attaques précis. L’identiﬁcation de ces menaces, nous a permis par le suite
d’énumérer les propriétés désirables à une preuve de localisation. En eﬀet, une preuve de
localisation doit être garantir la non-transférabilité, la non-forgeabilité et la résistante aux
attaques de type MITM et ses dérivées. Côté vie privée, une preuve de localisation doit
pouvoir garantir l’anonymat de ses utilisateurs et la non-chaînabilité de leurs actions à
travers le système. Plus encore, nous montrons qu’il est nécessaire de protéger la phase
de vériﬁcation des preuves contre de potentiels vériﬁeurs malveillants dont l’objectif serait
d’établir un proﬁl du prouveur, ou de ré-utiliser la preuve de localisation de ce dernier à des
ﬁns personnels, etc. Ce dernier point, bien que s’inscrivant dans des scénarios d’attaques
possibles n’avait pas encore été abordé dans l’état de l’art. Nous encapsulons ensuite toutes
nos recommandations ansi que celles déjà présente dans l’état de l’art dans un modèle de
sécurité unique.
Finalement, ce chapitre se termine par une analyse détaillée des protocoles issus de
l’état de l’art dans ce nouveau modèle. Cette comparaison montre que l’ensemble des
systèmes de l’état de l’art sont vulnérables aux attaques de localisation de type MITM
et ses dérivées. À cet eﬀet, le prochain chapitre introduira les protocoles délimiteurs de
distance qui peuvent être utilisés pour sécuriser le processus de collecte des preuves de
localisation.
39
40
Chapter 4
Security model for
privacy-preserving location proof
system
4.1 Introduction
There exists a plethora of location-proof systems that have been developed in the literature
during recent years (see Chapter 3). These systems aim at proposing infrastructure for the
gathering and the veriﬁcation of location proof. Some are based on a bipartite gathering
approach in which users interact with publicly known access point to obtain location proof.
Other systems enable users to directly collaborate together to generate location proofs. The
purpose of location proof is to avoid situation in which a prover can lie about his position
to a veriﬁer. Then location proof system may thwart attacks in which provers pretend
they are in a location where they are not. Unfortunately, there is no clean deﬁnition of
the properties which may fulﬁl a location proof system. In fact, each of the system we
found in the literature comes with its own terminology, deﬁnition and notion of security.
For example, with the system [ZC11], users privacy is preserved with respect to the ﬁnal
veriﬁer but witness can easily obtain the identity of the prover. In another one [WZP+],
user’s privacy means that user’s identity needs to be hidden from witnesses. So behind the
intuitive idea of what privacy and security needs, we have diﬀerent interpretation of such
properties across environment.
This Chapter provides to provide a uniﬁed framework to ascertain the security and
privacy properties of location proof systems. In Section 4.2, we model location proof
systems in terms of their algorithms and the users interaction within the system. Then,
in Section 4.3, we introduce an adversary model qualifying the attackers of the system in
terms of their capabilities and objectives. Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 introduce the security
and privacy properties that must be provided by location proofs system. Finally, in the
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Section 4.6, we give an analysis of the related work before concluding in Section 4.7.
4.2 Preliminaries
This section aims to describe our security model for location proof system. The model ﬁrst
describes the users and their interactions, the algorithm and how the adversaries interact
to cheat the system. We also describe some oracles that can be used by an adversary to
obtain information about the system.
4.2.1 Modelling of users and their interactions
As introduced early, a location proof system is a set of mechanisms with which mobile
users can obtain location proofs from proof issuers and with which applications can verify
the location claimed by users.
To use the system, users need to be registered by a trusted entity that we call the
Certification Authority (CA). More precisely, the CA is responsible for setting the system
global parameters and creating credentials for the users of the system. Credentials are
substitutes for the real identity of the user within the system. The CA is therefore the
entity knowing the mapping between the real identity and the credentials for each user
of the system. Credentials are used to establish communications between users, to create
proof of their location and to tied location proofs to a particular user. Because of the central
role played by the credential, it must be protected in order not to be easily shared among
users. Otherwise it may be diﬃcult to properly identify users and distinguish between their
actions within the system. One way to achieve this is to relate credentials to high sensitive
information of user like their account access number or their security social number. Thus,
deliberately revealing his credential may cause great damages to the user.
While caring about privacy, the role of the CA may be supported by a second entity
that we call the Anonymity Lifter (AL). While it is obvious that the AL may be part of the
CA, we strongly recommend to split the role among two diﬀerent entities to avoid abuses
from the CA. The role of the AL is limited to the capacity of unveiling the user’s identity
from a proof of location to disambiguates situation. However, the complete process of
identifying a user based on his interaction within the system may always require active
collaboration between the AL to retrieve the credential and the CA to identify the real
owner of the credential.
The users of a location proof system may play diﬀerent roles among prover, witness
and verifier. The role of prover is played by any user who wants either to obtain a location
proof for the position he is visiting at a given time or to prove his location to a veriﬁcation
service. We do not require that the prover, at the moment he is collecting a location proof,
knows the identity of the veriﬁcation service he will interact with. The only condition to
obtain a location proof is that the prover shares the same context with other users of the
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system. In practice, sharing the same context means to be present at a location at the
same time and we use the term context to uniquely associate a location to the time.
A witness is a user of the system who shares the same context as the prover. Obviously,
a witness can either refer to an Access Point in the case of a bipartite gathering approach
or to a neighbouring user in the case of a collaborative approach. Witness reacts to
location proof request received from prover by generating a location share. A location
share designates a piece of contextual information that testiﬁes the presence of the prover
nearby the corresponding witness. Location share acts like testimonials of witness telling
“I testify that I have been within proximity of such prover at such location at such time”.
In other words, a location share may uniquely associate a context as deﬁned by the prover
to the prover and a witness. At this time, the prover may collect location shares from as
many witnesses as possible to strengthen his future location claim to verifier.
A veriﬁer is an entity permitted by the user to verify his location claimed for some
purposes. When this situation occurs, the prover emits a location claim to verifier as his
approval to start the process of veriﬁcation of his past or actual location with the veriﬁer.
A location claim contains a location proof and additional information needed to check the
validity of the proof. A location proof is created using location shares corresponding to
the location claimed by the prover and can be checked by the intended veriﬁer. Finally,
if the location proof is genuine and corresponds to the context that the prover and the
veriﬁer have agreed on, then the veriﬁcation process succeeds. Otherwise it is rejected by
the veriﬁer.
4.2.2 Definition of the algorithms
Browsing the wide literature of location proof system, we can deﬁne a location proof system
as the following suite of algorithms (Setup,URegister,VRegister, LTestify, LProve,Vf). These
algorithms are the following.
• Setup(λ) This algorithm is ran only one time at the initialisation of the system by the
CA. It takes as input a security parameter λ which is related to the size of the secret
keys employed in the system. The algorithm’s output is a couple of keys spar, ppar)
with (spar representing the secret parameter of the system. This information will
be kept secret by the CA or splitted among the trusted parties like the AL if it
does exists, while ppar represents the public parameter of the system that is publicly
available to users. It may help them to interact each other, to verify a location proof,
etc.
• URegister(IDu, spar) → (sku, pku) When a user wants to join the system, he needs
to run this procedure together with the CA or an authorized Issuer to obtain his
credentials sku, pku in which sku represents his private key and pku represents his
public key. The algorithm takes as input the identity IDu of the user and spar the
the secret key of the CA.
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• VRegister(IDv, spar) → (skv, pkv) This algorithm serves to register veriﬁer to the sys-
tem. The algorithm takes as input IDv the public identity of the veriﬁer and spar the
secret parameter of the CA. It outputs the tuple of keys (skv, pkv), which respectively
represent the secret key and public key functions of the veriﬁer. This allows any
device to communicate over secure and authenticated channel with veriﬁer once it
possesses that veriﬁer’s identity.
• LTestify(L,T, skp, skw) → πi This is a distributed algorithm that is ran between a
prover and a witness to obtain a location proof. The prover initializes the session
using his secret key skp and the witness does the same with his secret key skw. L
represents the location data that the prover want to certify, T represents the time at
which the witness certify to have seen the prover at that location. The output is a
location proof share denoted as π.
• LProve({
∑
πi}, Li,Tj) → πL,T This algorithm is ran by the prover to generate a loca-
tion proof from the location shares he has collected. The algorithm takes as input
the location shares πi that corresponds to the claimed context. The values Li and Tj
represent the location and time respectively at granularity i and j that the prover
is willing to disclose to the veriﬁer. The output is a fresh location proof πL,T to be
showed to the veriﬁer.
• Vf(πL,T, Li,Tj) → {0, 1} This algorithm enables the veriﬁer to check the validity of a
location proof received from the prover. The algorithm veriﬁes that the location and
time granularity L and T corresponds indeed to the data enclosed in the location proof
πL,T. It is possible to envision that if the procedure outputs Reject, the veriﬁcation
has failed so the veriﬁer suspects a cheating attempt from the current prover, then it
may forwards the fraud evidence (i.e. πL,T) to the Anonymity Lifter (AL) who has
the capacity to reveal the identity of the cheater.
4.3 Threat model
Location proof provides prover with a trustworthy set of information to convince veriﬁers
about they positions they are claiming. Therefore, the security of location proof system
could be threaten in diﬀerent ways depending on the way location shares are managed by
the users of the system. To illustrate our position, imagine a user who is able to modify the
context included in the location share without invalidating the location proof. Such user
can make any veriﬁer believes that he was at a place where he was not and thus render
the whole location proof architecture useless. We can also imagine veriﬁers collaborating
together to use location proof they received from a particular prover to infer information
about his social network, etc.
As a consequence, the processes of creation, veriﬁcation and storage of a location share
has to be carefully designed so as to counter attacks from either provers, witnesses and
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veriﬁers. Such a secure system beneﬁts to all the users of the system as veriﬁers will have a
high conﬁdence in the location proofs received from users. Moreover, provers and witnesses
must be able to control the amount of information disclosed during a veriﬁcation process.
In this section, we enumerate the threats to be considered while designing each part of
a location proof system. Our model diﬀers from the others as we give more possibilities
to a malicious veriﬁer in attacking the system. The adversaries we introduced here are
the following: malicious prover, malicious witness, distance adversary, terrorist prover and
malicious verifier. We describe each adversary in terms of his capabilities, his goals and
the strategies he may use to attain his goal. The adversary can be any user of the system,
in particular he may have credentials received from the CA. In this case, they are labelled
as malicious because they deviate from the normal running of the protocol. We use the
term intruder to designate an attacker that is not registered within the system. Intruder
can collaborate with malicious users to attack the system. In our security model, we are
given the adversary the ability to wiretap communication taking place in his vicinity.
4.3.1 Malicious prover
A malicious prover is registered within the system by the CA. Therefore, he shares the
same capabilities as the honest users of the system. More precisely, a malicious prover
can communicate with users present in his neighbourhood, he can request location share
from them, he can process location shares into corresponding location proofs to convince
a veriﬁer of his location claim.
The goal of a malicious prover is to forge location proofs using location shares he received
from honest witnesses. Forging a location proof means to create location proof using
location shares from a diﬀerent context. To obtain location shares, this adversary acts like
in the normal way. More precisely, he run the protocol for the gathering of location shares
with witnesses within his proximity. Once the location shares received, the malicious prover
tries to create a location proof with a diﬀerent context than the one included within the
location shares.
We say that a location proof system is secure against actions of a malicious prover, if it
is impossible for a prover to create location proof with a context diﬀerent from the context
included within the location shares.
4.3.2 Malicious witness
A malicious witness can be any user registered by the CA within the system that deviates
from the protocol when he is acting as a witness. Because a malicious witness has valid
credential of the system, he has the same capabilities as a witness within the system. He
can listen to the network and obtain location proof request from surrounding honest prover
and he can create location share for honest prover. The goal of such adversary is to testify
a context (location and time) diﬀerent from the one he received from the honest prover
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in order to invalidate the future location proof that will be generated by the prover. The
malicious witness may also aim at infering the real identity of the prover and to link the
diﬀerent actions of a targeted prover within the system.
4.3.3 Malicious verifier
A malicious veriﬁer is a registered veriﬁer within the system. He is given the authorization
from honest prover to process their location proof in exchange of some services. Malicious
veriﬁer received location proof from prover. Their objective is to obtain the identity of
the witness who have helped the prover in the creation of the proof or the identity of the
prover if he is communicating to the veriﬁer over an anonymous channel. By identifying
the witness and the time at which the prover has interacted with the witness can help the
malicious veriﬁer to infer social network of the user and other valuable information.
4.4 Privacy
Privacy is of central importance to mobile users. Namely, we must prevent issuers and
veriﬁers of location proofs from violating a user’s privacy. In the context of ubiquitous
computing, privacy of users depends of two major factors that we call anonymity and
unlinkability.
4.4.1 Anonymity
In the domain of location proof systems, anonymity has been deﬁned to require that an
adversary, not in possession of the secret information of the CA and not registered in the
system, cannot recover the identity of the prover and witnesses from a location proof and
the corresponding location shares.
While this notion preserves the indistinguishably of the users interaction according to
an attacker external to the system, we need to go beyond to comply with the principle of
data minimization. Data minimization requires that users share only the minimum set of
amount of information to obtain a service. In other terms, users of the system should hold
personal data about an individual that is suﬃcient for the purpose of the service they are
providing. We will now see what this means in practice.
We recall that the ﬁrst principle of a location proof is to allow provers to convince
veriﬁers about their position. The term veriﬁer is very broad as it includes any service
to which the prover wants to prove his location. For instance, a veriﬁer may be police
authorities to which the prover may want to provide alibi or merchants to which a prover
may want to prove their loyalty to obtain discount. Veriﬁer can also be any LBS which
requires veriﬁcation of the location claimed by the prover before granting access to its
service. While a prover is willing to share personal information with police authorities,
this is not always the case when communicating with LBS. Because of the diversity of
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entities that can play the role of a veriﬁer, we do not require the veriﬁer to be trusted by
the prover.
In this context, applying the data minimization principle shows two supplementary
notions of privacy that are the witness’ anonymity with respect to the prover and the final
verifier, and prover’ anonymity with respect to the witnesses and the final verifier.
In fact, when a prover asks his witness for a location proof, all the witnesses need
to know is the context to be certiﬁed and nothing more about the prover. Therefore,
information like for example the prover’s identity public key or any other information that
can be used to uniquely identify the prover among the users of the system has to be hidden
from the witnesses during the collection of a location share. This requirement may also
hold during the veriﬁcation of location proof in which the veriﬁer is not required to know
the identity of the prover nor the identities of the witnesses. The only information that
may be available to the veriﬁer is the context of the location proof.
4.4.2 Unlinkability
Unlinkability is a privacy property of crucial importance. Here, a user continuously gathers
location proofs. If the (maybe colluding) parties that issue location proofs learn the user’s
identity, the user would become traceable.
In our context, unlinkability should hold for the witnesses and also for the prover. More
precisely, given two gathering sessions S1 in which the prover P receives a location share
σS1 from a witness W and S2 in which the prover receives a location share from the same
witness. Then any user of the system that has access to the proof σS1 and σS2 may not be
able to tell if the proof originated the same witness. This is needed here to avoid situation
in which attacker can exploit collocation information in order to infer private information
about the users.
4.4.3 Location granularity
Granularity designates the level of details considered in a model or decision making process.
In our context, location granularity refers to the ability of the system to be ﬂexible in terms
of the representation of the location of its users.
Intuitively, a location proof has to contain location information in some form. The
location information in the proof not only vouches for the location of the prover, but it
might also indirectly reveal sensitive information about that person like his interests to a
veriﬁer. For example, if a service is oﬀered only to mobile users in Toulouse, users who
present a proof showing that they are at the Airbus site not only prove their qualiﬁcation
to the service, but also reveal more location and personal information than necessary
to the service provider. Therefore, the user should be given the ability to control how
much location information to disclose in response to the location requirements of diﬀerent
applications and services.
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More precisely, the location of a prover may be hidden in the location proof and repre-
sented into diﬀerent levels of granularity, like city, neighbourhood, or an exact geographical
point. Therefore, when a prover tries to claim his location to a veriﬁer, he can decide of
the level of granularity he is willing to reveal to that particular veriﬁer without revealing
more private information than needed.
4.4.4 Location sovereignty
Location sovereignty is the guarantee that users have control over the location shares they
have collected.
In fact, in [ZC11], location shares of users are stored on a central server that needs to
be contacted by the veriﬁer during the veriﬁcation of the location claimed by the prover.
Storing private information of the users on a remote server poses many privacy concerns.
At a high-level, these privacy concerns stem from two issues: ﬁrst, users must rely on
the infrastructure not to be malicious; and second, the infrastructure must provide access
control and data sharing policies that are easy to use and satisfy the requirements of users.
While both issues are challenging in practice, we suggest to design a system that put users
in control of their privacy policies. Therefore, location proof system should put the users
in control of the location shares they have collected.
Users can continuously collect location proofs and store them locally on their devices.
The role of the infrastructure may be restricted to providing location shares to those
provers. Provers can then use the set of location shares they have collected over time for
a multitude of services of their choice. This puts users in control to decide how they want
to use this information and who they want to share it with.
4.4.5 Location privacy
A location share should protect the location privacy of a prover, by ensuring that the
location information does not appear in clear in the proof. Therefore, an attacker cannot
deduce the location of the prover from the knowledge of the location share alone. We
also require that the location proof does not reveal information about the location of
witnesses involved in its generation. Indeed while it is obvious that witnesses are in the
communication range of the prover during the creation of the proof, the resulting location
share may not reveal more ﬁne-grained location information about witnesses and their
identities.
4.5 Security
In this section, we motivate the security properties that are required for location proof
systems.
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4.5.1 Ownership proof
Location is the basic component in the process of creation of location proof. Prover may
collect location shares from immediate witnesses in order to generate corresponding location
proof for a particular veriﬁer. A location share represents a piece of contextual information
testifying of the presence of the prover nearby the corresponding witness. Location share
acts like a testimonial of the witness telling to the veriﬁer that he have seen the prover
at position P and time T . Therefore, location proof should include information that can
be used to link them to their genuine owners. In other words, location shares and the
corresponding location proofs should be personal and not transferable.
4.5.2 Unforgeability
In [WF03], Walters and Felten have deﬁned unforgeability of location proof based on a
bipartite approach as being the impossibility for an attacker to create location proof on
their own as long as the private keys of the access points are not compromised.
However, in a collaborative approach, user can be both prover and witness depending of
the role they are playing during the collection of the proof. Therefore, it becomes diﬃcult
for the veriﬁer to know if the proof has been created by the prover himself or by a witness
because the prover is allowed to act as his own witness. In this particular case, veriﬁer
may require the prover to provide at least two location shares to validate a location proof.
With the condition that each witness can deliver only one location share to the prover in
a particular context. In practice, it means that it should exists an algorithm which when
provided two location shares from the same context, returns true if the shares has been
created by the same user and false otherwise. We call this the uniqueness of location share.
Therefore, provided that location share has uniqueness property and the prover needs
at least two location shares to validate his location proof then the veriﬁer can easily check
that the prover can not forge location proofs on his own.
4.5.3 Resistance to localization attacks
Localization attacks constitute a major threat against location proof system. In fact,
consider a user situated in a context and trying to obtain location shares from a diﬀerent
context. To succeed this attack, the prover can launch in real-time a wormhole attack
against the witnesses situated at the desired location. The wormhole would be responsible
for relaying messages between the targeted location and the location of the attacker without
the witnesses being able to detect such situations. While many location proof systems
do not consider such attacks, some [SW09] has proposed RTT-like techniques echoing
challenges between the prover and the witnesses. However, the techniques proposed by such
systems are not very eﬀective as they are vulnerable to attacks related to RTT measurement
like distance fraud, maﬁa fraud, terrorist fraud and distance hijacking (See Chapter 5 for
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more details). To our knowledge, the only secure alternative is the use of distance-bounding
protocol.
4.5.4 Collusion prover-prover
A collusion prover-prover [WZP+] puts in relation a malicious prover and one or more
colluders (the colluding party). Their objective is to provide the malicious prover with
location shares for a context in which the latter is not. In the sequel, we call the context
in which the prover is not physically present the targeted context.
To be valid, a collusion prover-prover requires the malicious prover to have valid cre-
dentials from the CA, with the condition that he never discloses these credentials to the
colluding party. The colluder role can be played by either a user registered in the system
or not. During the collection of the location shares, the colluder may receive information
from the malicious prover in real time. For this purpose, we give the colluder and the
dishonest prover a secure communication channel in which they can exchange information.
4.5.5 Collusion prover-witness
The term collusion prover-witness has been ﬁrst introduced in [WZP+]. It denotes an
attack in which a witness colludes with a prover to create a location proof share for the
latter, even though one or both of them are not at the location as claimed in the location
proof share. To the best of our knowledge, there is no eﬀective solution to detect this type
of collusion yet. Thus, it remains one of the most challenging attacks to protect against in
location veriﬁcation.
4.6 Analysis of previous work
Based on the notions we have presented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5, we investigate the
security and privacy properties of state-of-the-art location proof systems. The result of
the analysis is shown in the Table 4.6. In terms of notation, a checked cell means that the
protocol ensures this property while a blank cell indicates the opposite.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a model for studying the properties, in terms of the
security and privacy, oﬀered by location proof systems described in Chapter 3. The ad-
versary model we elaborate diﬀers from the others as we give more possibilities to veriﬁer
in attacking the system. In fact, the veriﬁer’s role can be played by any party without re-
quiring the prover to trust him. A malicious veriﬁer is interested in learning the identity of
the users in order to proﬁle them, thus users need to be anonymous regarding the veriﬁer.
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Properties
Protocol [LH10] [SW09] [WF03] [ZC11] [GG09] [TCB12] [DCF12] [WZP+]
APPLAUS SLVPGP LINK STAMP
SE
C
U
R
IT
Y
Correctness X X X X X X X
Ownership proof X X X X X X X X
Unforgeability X X X X X X X X
Resistance to distance fraud X X X X X
Resistance to maﬁa fraud X X X
Resistance to distance hijacking X
No single point of failure X X X X X
Resistance to terrorist fraud X X
Proof share uniqueness X
P
R
IV
A
C
Y
Prover anonymity & unlinkability (gathering phase) X X X X X X
Prover anonymity & unlinkability (veriﬁcation phase)
Witness anonymity & unlinkability (gathering phase) X X X X
Witness anonymity & unlinkability (veriﬁcation phase) X X X X X
Witness location privacy X X X
Conﬁdentiality X X X
Location sovereignty X X
Table 4.1: Comparison of diﬀerent location proof systems
The comparison shows that many of the location proof systems we analyse are vul-
nerable to some sort of localization attacks in which malicious prover relays the signal to
made them appear at a location where they are not. Therefore, location proof system may
provide the witnesses with security mechanisms to properly determine that the prover is
present within proximity. The next chapter introduces the concept of distance-bounding
protocol, a cryptographic primitive that can be used to threaten the process of gathering
location proofs.
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Les protocoles démiteurs de
distance
L’authentiﬁcation sur les réseaux conventionnels tels que l’Internet, est construit sur quelque
chose que l’utilisateur sait (un mot de passe, etc.), quelque chose que l’utilisateur a (une
carte d’accès, etc.) ou ce que l’utilisateur est (biométrie). Dans les réseaux sans ﬁl,
l’information de localisation peut être utilisée pour authentiﬁer un périphérique ou un
utilisateur. Ce chapitre introduit les protocoles délimteurs de distance ou protocoles de
distance-bounding, leurs contextes d’application et les attaques contre lesquelle elles protè-
gent. Les protocoles délimteurs de distance sont des protocoles de sécurité qui permettent
à un vériﬁcateur V de s’assurer qu’un prouveur P se trouve à une distance bornée et déﬁnie
de lui même. Ces protocoles sont issus des travaux réalisés par Stefan Brands et David
Chaum en 1993, dont le but est d’améliorer les mécanismes d’authentiﬁcation traditionnels.
Les protocoles délimiteurs de distance permettent entre autre de se prémunir des attaques
du type man-in-the-middle (MITM) et de ses dérivés ( cf. Section 5.3), en calculant la
distance séparant V et P. Cette distance est obtenue en multipliant la vitesse de prop-
agation de l’onde électromagnétique par le temps que met P à répondre aux challenges
envoyés par V. Il existe deux grandes familles de protocoles délimiteurs de distance. Ceux
basés sur la cryptographie symmétrique et ceux basés sur la cryptographie asymmétrique.
Les protocoles délimiteurs de distance symmétriques à la diﬀérence des protocoles asym-
métriques nécessitent que P et V partagent un secret commun au préalable. La sécurité de
ces protocoles est évaluée en considérant quatre types d’attaque, que nous décrivons dans
ce chapitre ainsi que les modèles de sécurité formelle s’y aﬀérant.
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Chapter 5
Distance Bounding protocols
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have seen that before sending a location proof to the prover,
the witness has to ensure that the prover that has initialized the session is indeed within
physical proximity as a countermeasure to wormhole attacks. This chapter introduces
distance-bounding (DB): a process whereby a party (the veriﬁer) is assured (i) of the
identity of a second party (the prover) and (ii) that the prover is located in his close
vicinity (known as neighbourhood).
This chapter starts by deﬁning the notion of distance-bounding before presenting the
actors involved and the terminology used in such system (see Section 5.2). Then we inves-
tigate the security of DB protocols by presenting the diﬀerent attacks such protocol must
be able to thwart along with the security model used to analyse the security properties
of distance-bounding protocol (See Section 5.3). Finally in Section 5.4, we give a security
analysis of some existing DB protocols.
5.2 Overview of distance-bounding
Authentication protocols are classically run between two entities namely a prover and a
veriﬁer and enable the latter to decide whether the prover is legitimate or not. Such
protocols enable access control, and are used in logistics, public transport, or personal
identiﬁcation. However, security models for classical authentication schemes do not capture
relay attack in which a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) adversary just forwards data between
the prover and the veriﬁer trying to impersonate an honest prover in front of the veriﬁer.
Relay attack is a concept ﬁrst proposed in 1976 by Conway in a scenario referred to as
the "Grand master chess problem" [Con76]. In this scenario any player, even a person not
familiar with the rules of chess, could play against two grand masters by challenging both
of them to a game by post. The player would then simply forward the move received from
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one grand master to the other, eﬀectively making them play against one another. This
results in the player either winning one match, or earning a draw in both matches. The
concept of relay attacks as described above has been extended to authentication protocol
by Desmedt with an attack on the Fiat-Shamir identiﬁcation protocol [Des88]. In this
scenario, the MITM adversary is typically a coalition of two adversaries, a leech, which
interacts with the prover, impersonating a veriﬁer, and a ghost, which interacts with the
veriﬁer, impersonating a prover. The two adversaries usually communicate via fast, reliable
communication channels, and by relaying correct, honestly-generated information between
them, they ensure that the ghost, which is an illegitimate party, authenticates to the veriﬁer
thus defeating the security requirements.
Following the idea that relays seem to cause a processing delay in the MITM attacker,
Brands and Chaum introduced Distance-Bounding protocols [BC93] as a feature to en-
hance traditional authentication mechanisms to withstand MITM relay attacks. In such
protocol, a clock is mounted on the veriﬁer, such that it can measure the Time-of-Flight
(ToF) between sending a challenge and receiving a response from the prover. The number
of challenge-response interactions is determined by a chosen security parameter. To be
correctly authenticated, the prover must reply such that the measure RTT of the signal is
less than a pre-set value tmax representing an upper bound associated with the maximum
trusted communication distance. Assuming that the communication speed is constant and
very fast, if the protocol succeeds then (1) the veriﬁer is convinced that the prover is le-
gitimate, and (2) the prover is within the maximum distance associated with tmax. In
a distance-bounding protocol, not all exchanged messages are subject to round-trip-time
measurements. In general, a DB protocol can be divided into the three following phases.
1. Initialization phase: This is the ﬁrst step of the protocol in which the prover and
veriﬁer exchange information to initialize the session. There is no time-constraint for
this phase, which is why it is also called lazy phase.
2. Distance-bounding phase: During this step, prover and veriﬁer exchange bits at very
high speed. The veriﬁer sends a challenge bit to the prover and measures the time
ti from the moment he sent a challenge to the moment the corresponding response
is received. In fact, once a challenge bit is received, the prover must compute a
response bit using a response function and then forwards the response as soon as
possible. The response function serves at the same time to authenticate the prover
and to prove that he actually receives the challenges. To eﬀectively obtain a secure
distance estimate, the time taken to calculate the response must be minimal and
constant. This round is repeated several times to increase the robustness and the
security of the estimate provided.
3. Verification phase: this step allows the veriﬁer to decide if the authentication succeeds
or not.
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More formally, by considering a single veriﬁer V and a single prover P, we can deﬁne a
distance-bounding authentication scheme as follows. .
Definition 1 (Distance-bounding authentication). A distance-bounding authentication scheme
for timing parameters (tmax, Tmax, Emax, Nc) is a triplet of efficient algorithms DB =
(Kg,P,V) in which:
(i) Kg is a key generation algorithm with parameter n ∈ N . Kg generates a keypair
sk/pk, the verifier is initialized with the public part of the key, namely pk and the
prover with the secret part of the key sk.
(ii) The authentication algorithm run on the joint execution of algorithms P(sk) and
V(pk) generates, depending on tmax, Tmax, Emax, Nc, a verifier outputs b ∈ {0, 1}.
The value Nc denotes the number of rounds in the time-critical phase, tmax is the upper-
bound associated with the timing of each round of the time critical phase. With the value
Tmax represents the number of rounds in the time critical phase exceeding tmax. Similarly,
Emax is the maximum number of time-critical phases with erroneous transmissions. When
we have pk=sk , then the DB scheme is said to be symmetric otherwise if pk Ó= sk, the DB
scheme is said to be asymmetric.
We require the DB scheme to be complete. Thus, for any pair of key (sk, pk), the
decision bit b produced by an honest veriﬁer V(pk) interacting with honest prover P(sk)
under the requirements following from the timing parameters tmax, is 1 with probability
(negligibly close to) 1. In addition, the protocol should be sound in the sense that if
the decision bit b produced by the honest party V(pk) is 1, then the party P(sk) is in
the proximity distance as deﬁned by the parameter tmax. Such protocols were recently
implemented by Rasmussen and co-authors [Rv10].
5.3 Security of distance bounding protocol
The security of distance bounding protocols largely depends on the assumption that the
prover’s processing time is negligible compared to the measured challenge-response round-
trip times. Given that the veriﬁer does not trust the prover and cannot estimate the
prover’s hardware and processing capabilities, the safest assumption that the veriﬁer can
make is that the prover is able to process the challenges and transmit the replies in negligible
time. If the veriﬁer overestimates the prover’s processing time (i.e., the prover is able to
process signals in a shorter time than expected), the prover would be able to pretend to
be closer, thus violating the distance bound. Despite this fact, DB protocols must be able
to withstand four main types of location attacks that we describe thereafter.
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Distance fraud
Definition 2 (Distance fraud.). In the distance fraud, two parties are involved: one of them
(the verifier V) is not aware of the fraud that is going on, the other one (the malicious
prover P¯ is placed far from the verifier) performs the fraud. The fraud enables P¯ to
authenticate to V, thus proving a fake statement related to his physical distance to V.
Distance fraud was ﬁrst introduced by Brands and Chaum in [BC93]. The fraud is
eﬀective when the malicious prover knows the response before he receives the challenge
from the veriﬁer, then he can reply in advance, thus fooling the veriﬁer’s clock. In practice,
the prover can guess the challenge, or he can wisely select some initialization parameters
so as to make sure that the responses do not depend of the challenges for some rounds.
We say that a protocol is resistant to distance fraud if a dishonest prover situated outside
the proximity of the veriﬁer has negligible probability to be accepted.
Mafia fraud
Definition 3 (Maﬁa fraud.). In the mafia fraud, three parties are involved: two of them
(the honest prover P and the verifier V ) are not aware of the fraud that is going, on while
the third party (the Man-In-The-Middle adversary consists of two collaborating parties Vˆ
and Pˆ ) performs the fraud. Vˆ impersonates V in front of P and Pˆ impersonates P in front
of V . The fraud enables Pˆ to convince V of an assertion related to the private key of P .
This fraud was ﬁrst introduced by Desmedt in [Des88]. The adversary is modelled by
a couple of collaborating entities (Pˆ ,Vˆ ) relaying messages between P and V. Pˆ initiates a
session with V and Vˆ initiates a session with V, then they relay messages between the two
sessions initiated. The adversary’s aim is to be authenticated by the honest veriﬁer. Due to
the delay introduced by the transmission of messages between the adversaries (Pˆ ,Vˆ ), they
are not allowed to purely relayed messages during the distance-bounding phase. Purely
relay happens when V sends a challenge b to Pˆ , thinking he is communicating with P.
Pˆ sends the received bit to his collaborator Vˆ before than Vˆ delivers b to the P. Then,
P provides Vˆ with the corresponding response bit b and then Vˆ sends the response bit
to Pˆ that sends it to the veriﬁer V. Such kind of interaction is not allowed because due
to the delay introduced by the interaction between P and V in the transmission of the
challenge and its associated response, this will be detected by the veriﬁer’s clock. We say
that a distance-bounding protocol is resistant to maﬁa fraud is the MITM adversary has
negligible chance to be authenticated.
Terrorist fraud
Definition 4 (Terrorist fraud.). In the terrorist fraud, three parties are involved, one of
them (the verifier V) is not aware of the fraud going on, the two others (the malicious
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prover P and the adversary A also called terrorist) collaborate to perform the fraud. The
help of P enables A to convince V of an assertion related to the private key of P.
Intuitively, during a terrorist attack, a MiM adversary situated in the vicinity of the
veriﬁer actively colludes with a malicious prover (which is situated outside of the proximity
of the veriﬁer) to impersonate the latter. While the prover is not allowed to give trivial
information such as the whole secret key. The restriction on how much a prover can help the
terrorist has been formalized in the distance-bounding literature according to three main
security models [ABK+11,DFKO11a,FO13b,Vau13]. The objective here is to discourage
malicious provers to collaborate with an adversary because it will implicitly leak helpful
information to the adversary to authenticate latter.
The ﬁrst model [ABK+11] introduced by Avoine and co-authors says that the protocol
resists terrorist fraud if when the terrorist authenticates to the veriﬁer then the terrorist
gains any information about the secret (even some bit of the secret key). In other terms, to
perform such attack the secret key should be information-theoretically hidden during the
fraud. This notion is rather weak as many attacks are ruled out such the one proposed by
Hancke [Han12] that proposes to use the noise tolerance of DB scheme to perform terrorist
attack.
The second notion called GameTF introduced by Fischlin and Onete in [FO13b] stipu-
lates that a protocol resists to terrorist fraud if the terrorist adversary gains advantage to
launch better maﬁa fraud.
The third notion called SimTF introduced by Dürlrhoz and co-authors in [DFKO11a]
says that a protocol resists terrorist fraud if there exists a simulator based on the state of
the adversary that must always authenticate. Here, the malicious prover can provide the
terrorist with any kind of information excluded the data contained in the prover’s internal
state (the secret key). This deﬁnition is very broad, enabling syntactic attacks like the one
in [FO12] against the scheme of Reid and co-authors.
As introduced early, the deﬁnition of [ABK+11] [ABK+11] is weak but it enables eﬃ-
cient constructions. The notion of SimTF [FO13b] is very strong and diﬃcult to achieve in
practice as recognized by its authors. Finally, the GameTF [FO13b], which is a game-based
notion, for terrorist-fraud is strong enough for practical applications.
Terrorist fraud is a very strong attack and thus many existing DB protocols (notably
including that of Hancke and Kuhn [HK05a]) do not address it. Terrorist Fraud resilient
protocols preserve the basic structure of distance bounding protocols, but bind the prover’s
private key to the nonces that are exchanged in the protocol. This prevents the prover
from simply handing over the nonces to the external attacker without disclosing its secret.
Most of the terrorist resistant DB protocols are in general symmetric. This is the case
for the Swiss-Knife protocol [KAK+09] and for the scheme of Avoine, Lauradoux, and
Martin [ALM11], which resists terrorist fraud according to the deﬁnition of Avoine and
co-authors [ABK+11]. The class of SKI protocols [BMV13b], which thwart terrorist fraud
using the deﬁnition of [Vau13] in a provable way, is also symmetric.
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A notable exception to this approach is the DBPK-Log protocol [BB05a] due to Bussard
and Bagga. This protocol also requires secret sharing, but does not involve a shared secret
between the prover and the veriﬁer.
Distance hijacking
Another type of fraud, known as distance hijacking [CRSC12], has recently been proposed
by Cremers, Rasmussen, Schmidt and Capkun. The fraud considers a malicious prover
who aims to convince a veriﬁer that he is located within the veriﬁer’s neighbourhood. To
realize this, he will abuse some other provers who are indeed in the veriﬁer’s neighbour-
hood. For example, a malicious prover can reach his goal by hijacking the fast phase of
a distance-bounding protocol executed between an honest (closer) prover and the veriﬁer.
Conceptually, distance hijacking is situated somewhere between distance fraud and terror-
ist fraud. In contrast to terrorist fraud, where a dishonest prover colludes with another
attacker, distance hijacking considers a dishonest prover who interacts with (abuses) other
honest provers. Unlike distance fraud that only involves a dishonest prover and a veriﬁer,
distance hijacking also involves other honest provers. Avoine and Tchamkerten [AT09b] also
suggested another attack, namely slow-phase impersonation resistance. This attack is espe-
cially applicable to cases where distance-bounding protocols are implemented on resource-
constrained devices (e.g., RFID tags) that cannot support many time-critical rounds. Since
in many distance-bounding protocols the level of impersonation security heavily depends
on the number of time-critical rounds, the overall security level for resource-constrained
implementations would then become too low in practice. By employing lazy-phase authen-
tication, the security level of the protocol is increased.
5.4 Overview of the state-of-the-art
As introduced early, Brands and Chaum [BC93] were the ﬁrst to introduce distance-
bounding protocol in the literature. The heart of their protocol resides in the design
of the response function. In fact, the response function simply consists of a XOR operation
that takes as input a fresh challenge generated by the veriﬁer and a secret information only
known to the prover. Then, the prover must reply with the response bit to the veriﬁer as
soon as possible to avoid the authentication session to fail. The protocol also uses commit-
ment and signature schemes to intertwine the physical time measurement and the prover
authentication. These methods allow the protocol to achieve resistance against distance
and maﬁa frauds with probabitlity (12)
m, with m being the number of rounds during the
distance-bounding phase.
Another category of distance-bounding protocol is the one proposed by Hancke and
Kuhn [HK05b]. Their idea is to optimize the the Brands and Chaum protocol for RFID
devices. Then, their protocol uses precomputed registers to compute the response bits
during the distance-bounding-phase and no additional messages need to be transmitted
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during the veriﬁcation stage. However, with the computation lightening, Hancke and
Kuhn’s protocol has two issues: its vulnerability against the terrorist fraud, and its non-
optimality concerning maﬁa and distance frauds (i.e., the protocol optimal bound against
maﬁa fraud is (34)
m). All Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol descendants attempt to solve one
of these issues.
Bussard and Bagga had the idea to interleave the prover’s secret and his answers during
the fast phase to prevent terrorist fraud. Their protocol [BB05a] uses the precomputed
registers due to Hancke and Kuhn, but it has maﬁa fraud resistance to (12)
m at the cost of
a complex zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. To decrease the computational cost of the
Bussard and Bagga protocol, Reid and co-authors introduce a terrorist resistant distance-
bounding protocol [RNTS07] with a maﬁa security bound of (34)
m. Its direct descendant, Tu
and Piramuthu’s protocol [TP07] proposes a protocol composed of a succession of fast and
slow phases. However this protocol suﬀers from vulnerabilities, and two articles [KAK+09,
MP08] attacked it. These attacks demonstrate in particular that the prover’s secret can be
leaked to an eavesdropper. Moreover, this attack can be fasten, if the adversary interacts
with the parties during the protocol session. The other descendant of the protocol of Reid
and co-authors, the Swiss-knife [KAK+09] ﬁxes the poor maﬁa fraud resistance problem by
adding a third phase. In addition, it provides mutual authentication. In [PLHCvdLT09],
the authors claim that they found an attack on the Swiss-knife, and propose Hitomi,
a descendant of the latter, to solve this issue. However, the attack is based on nonces
repetitions. Moreover, under the same assumption, nonces repetitions, Hitomi suﬀers, to a
similar ﬂaw. The other Swiss-knife descendant [ALM11] explicitly introduces secret-sharing
to counter the terrorist fraud, and studied the best settings to use it. The study led to
the explanation of some vulnerabilities found in previous protocols designed to mitigate
the terrorist fraud. Table 5.1 depicts a comparison of the properties of several well-known
distance-bounding protocols.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the concept of distance-bouding protocol, which is a crypto-
graphically secure protocol aiming to prove the proximity of two devices relative to each
other. We have also seen that the security of these protocols is evaluated against ﬁve mains
attacks which are the distance fraud, mafia fraud, terrorsit fraud, impersonation and dis-
tance hijacking. The resistance to these attacks has been covered in literature within three
main security models: namely DFKO [DFKO11a], and ABKLM [ABK+11] and [Vau13].
The models cover resistance to distance fraud, maﬁa fraud, terrorist fraud and imperson-
ation in respectively formal and informal methods. Actually, the ABKLM is considered
outdated because it has been shown by Hancke that its deﬁnition of terrorist fraud re-
sistance is rather weak (a terrorist adversary can still defeat the protocol by exploiting
the noise tolerance threshold). Many of the distance-bounding protocol oﬀering resistance
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Protocol
Fraud
Impersonation Mafia Terrorist Distance
Symmetric
Reid et al. [RNTS07] 1 ?∗ No ?∗
Tu & Piramuthu [TP07] 1 1 No
(
3
4
)m
Swiss-Knife [KAK+09]
(
1
2
)m
+ AdvUnfA
(
1
2
)m
Yes
(
3
4
)m
Avoine and co-authors [ALM11] 1
(
2
3
)m
Yes ?∗∗
SKIpro [BMV13a] (12)
m
(
2
3
)m
Yes
(
3
4
)m
Asymmetric
Brands and Chaum [BC93]
(
1
2
)m
+ AdvUnfA
(
1
2
)m
+ AdvUnfA No
(
1
2
)m
GOR [GOR14] 2−|G|
(
1
2
)m
No
(
3
4
)m
DBPK-Log [BB05a]
(
1
2
)4m′ (
1
2
)m
No 1
Table 5.1: Success probability of classical attacks against well-known DB in noiseless con-
ditions. ∗ No generic bounds applicable; one speciﬁc instantiation is NOT Maﬁa-Fraud
resistant, but resists distance fraud with probability 34 per round [FO13a].
∗∗ Bay and co-
authors show that stronger assumptions on f are necessary to achieve the claimed bound
of 34 per round. The value m
′ := 50 is a system parameter deﬁned by [BB05a].
to all types of frauds found in the literature are symmetric. However symmetry is not
a desirable property to ensure privacy within location proof system. Furthermore, the
only terrorist resistant distance-bounding protocol that oﬀer resistance to terrorist fraud
has been showed insecure by Reid and co-authors. Therefore, the next chapter present
our proposal for an asymmetric distance-bounding protocol which oﬀer provable security
against all the frauds using the DFKO model.
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VSSDB: Un protocol délimiteur de
distance asymmétrique
Dans ce chapitre, nous introduisons la première contribution de nos travaux présentés
dans ce manuscript. Il s’agit de VSSDB (Verifiable Secret Sharing Distance-Bounding
protocol), un protocol délimiteur de distance basé sur la cryptographie asymmétrique.
Dans ce chaptire, nous commençons par décrire DBPK-Log, un protocole délimiteur de
distance asymmétrique proposé par Laurent Bussard et Walid Bagga. DBPK-Log est basé
sur la cryptographie asymmétrique et a été initialement conçu pour résister à l’attaque
terroriste. Cependant, Bay et al. ont récemment montré des limites quant à la sécurité de
DBPK-Log contre les attaques terroristes et par distance.
À la diﬀérence des protocoles délimiteur de distance présents dans la littérature, VSSDB
utilise la version vériﬁable des schémas de partage de secret. Ainsi, à partir d’une clé
publique, le vériﬁeur est capable d’authentiﬁer bit par bit la clé secrète correspondante,
empêchant ainsi le scénario d’attaque terrosite décrit par Bay et al. contre DBPK-Log.
De plus, la fonction de réponse de VSSDB est basé un système de modes. Les modes sont
des bits choisis de manière aléatoires par le vériﬁeur lors de la phase d’initialisation du
protocole. Ils sont utilisés en complément des challenges habituels émis par le vériﬁeur lors
de la phase d’échange rapide. Nous prouvons par la suite qu’ils permettent eﬀectivement
d’améliorer la sécurité générale du schéma proposé. VSSDB est construit sur une fonction
de réponse pouvant utiliser au choix deux ou quatre modes de réponses. D’un point de vue
pratique, opter pour la fonction à deux modes implique une réduction des temps de calcul
mais nécessite que les clés privées soient générées par une autorité centrale et de conﬁance;
Ce qui n’est pas le cas pour la fonction à quatre modes.
Finalement, nous prouvons la sécurité formelle de notre protocole contre la fraude
distance, la fraude maﬁa et la fraude terroriste.
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Chapter 6
VSSDB: an asymmetric
distance-bounding protocol
resistant to terrorist fraud
6.1 Introduction
Relay attacks are a critical threat to both authentication and proximity-testing protocols,
as demonstrated for RFID-based Passive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES) systems in
cars [FDv11], NFC smartcards [FHMM10], geosocial networks such as Foursquare [CP12]
and location proof systems. DB protocols (see Chapter 5) were speciﬁcally designed by
Brands and Chaum [BC93] to counter this type of attacks. DB speciﬁcally enables a
veriﬁer to authenticate the prover only if the latter is within a speciﬁc proximity and
knows a secret key registered within the system. Indeed, the DB veriﬁer is equipped with
a clock used to measure the RTT between the sending of a challenge and the reception of
the associated response from the prover. The measured RTT is compared to a predeﬁned
bound tmax, which corresponds to a trusted distance (also called proximity) to the veriﬁer.
DB protocols may aim to prevent several attacks, amongst which terrorist fraud, where a
dishonest prover helps the adversary to authenticate, but without passing data that allows
the adversary to later authenticate on its own. However, most of the DB scheme that oﬀer
resistance to this type of fraud are symmetrics then a veriﬁer can always link the actions of
a prover within the system. Therefore they do not ﬁt the privacy requirements for location
proof systems.
In this chapter, we introduce a new distance-bounding protocol called Vssdb (A Ver-
iﬁable Secret Sharing Distance-Bounding protocol) for use within location proof system.
Like the original protocol of Bussard and Bagga [BB05a], Vssdb is asymmetric and uses
homomorphic bit commitment to hide the secret of the prover within the nonces exchanged
during the session. In addition, the prover can demonstrate to the veriﬁer that he knows
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the secret key used to create the nonces used during the session without revealing it. This
chapter is organized as follow: in Section 6.2, we review the basis of the Bussard and
Bagga protocol (namely DBPK-Log) and why it fails to achieve resistance to terrorist and
distance frauds. In Section 6.3, we present the concept of veriﬁable secret sharing and how
it can be used to implement distance-bounding through the presentation of toy protocol.
Then, we propose our practical solution for a secure and asymmetric distance-bounding
protocol (cf. Section 6.4). Afterward, in Section 6.5 we prove the security of our protocol
in the formal security model proposed by Dülrhoz, Fichlin, Kasper and Onete (DFKO)
in [DFKO11b]. Finally, Section 6.6 discusses some practical considerations about the pro-
tocol and Section 6.7 summarizes the present chapter.
6.2 The distance-bounding proof of knowledge protocol
In general, most DB protocols in the literature that oﬀer resistance to terrorist fraud are
symmetric (e.g., they use a secret shared between the prover and the veriﬁer). This is
the case for the Swiss-Knife protocol [KAK+09] and for the scheme of Avoine and co-
authors [ALM11], which address terrorist fraud by using secret sharing. In these schemes,
the shared private key is masked by another random string and used to respond to fast
challenges. The class of SKI protocols [BMV13b], which prevent terrorist fraud in a
provable way, is also symmetric. Asymmetric distance-bounding protocols were proposed
by Gambs and co-authors [GOR14], Hermans and co-authors [HPO13] and Brands and
Chaum [BC93], but they fail to thwart terrorist fraud. Bussard and Bagga were the ﬁrst
to consider terrorist-fraud resistance in an asymmetric setting [BB05a]. The next section
introduces their protocol and shows the most recent attacks that have been developed
against it in [BBM+12].
6.2.1 Presentation
Bussard and Bagga have proposed DBPK-Log, which is a distance-bounding protocol based
on a proof of knowledge and a commitment scheme. This protocol (see Figure 1) is run
in a cyclic multiplicative group G of prime order p −1 generated by an element g. The
prover P has a secret key x along with an associated public key y := Γ(x) = gx certiﬁed
by a trusted third party and known to the veriﬁer V. DBPK-Log is based on three ingre-
dients: a (2, 2) secret-sharing scheme (i.e., two shares are distributed and both are needed
to reconstruct the secret), a homomorphic bit commitment scheme (namely Pedersen’s
commitment [Ped92]) and a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPoK) protocol.
During the initialization phase the prover picks a random m-bit integer k and uses
it to encrypt the long-term secret x as e ← Ek(x) = x − k mod p. The values k and
e act as shares in a (2,2)-secret-sharing scheme. Then, the prover commits in a bitwise
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Protocol 1: DBPK-Log [BB05a]
Verifier V Prover P
Public key y := Γ(x) Private key x
Initialization phase
k
$
← {0, 1}m
e ← Ek(x)
For i = 1 · · ·m
vi, wi
$
← {0, 1}∗
ai = Ω(ki, vi)
bi = Ω(ei, wi)
{ai, bi}
m
i=1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Interactive phase
For i = 1 to m
Choose ci
$
← {0, 1}
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ri =
{
ki if ci = 0
ei otherwise
Measure δti
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verification phase
γi←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− γi =
{
vi if ci = 0
wi otherwise
ZKPoK[well formed]
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if and only if all ri are coherent with respect to ai, bi, γi, δti ≤ tmax ∀i, and ZKPoK veriﬁes.
manner to each bit of each share using a homomorphic commitment scheme1, which leads to
commitments of the form a = {ai}mi=1 and b = {bi}
m
i=1, with ai = Ω(ki, vi) = g
kihvi mod p
and bi = Ω(ei, wi) = geihwi mod p. Finally, this string of commitments is sent to the
veriﬁer, thus completing the initialization phase.
Afterwards during the distance-bounding phase, the prover and veriﬁer exchange binary
challenges and their corresponding binary responses to estimate the RTT. Each response
is equal to either a bit of the random share k or a bit of the encrypted secret e.
Finally during the verification phase, the prover sends the randomness (either vi or wi)
used to generate the commitment of the fast round responses (this value is denoted as γi).
Since the commitment is homomorphic, the veriﬁer can compute z =
∏m
i=1 (aibi)
2i−1 =
Ω((k + e), v). Then, the prover and veriﬁer runs a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
(ZKPoK) protocol in which the prover demonstrates the knowledge of a tuple (x, v) such
that z = Ω(x, v) and y = Γ(x)]. The veriﬁer accepts if (1) all the fast responses are
1The authors suggest to use Pedersen’s commitments [Ped92].
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coherent with respect to the committed values, (2) all RTT values are below tmax and (3)
the ZKPoK succeeds. .
6.2.2 Attacks against DBPK-Log
Avoine, Lauradoux and Martin [ALM11] proposed a key-recovery attack against DBPK-
Log as well as other DB protocols. This key-leakage attack also enables to conduct a
maﬁa fraud against another protocol due to Bussard and Bagga (see [FO13a] for more
details). In this attack, the adversary uses faulty challenges during the protocol to get
the two shares and thus recover the key. Note, However, this key-recovery attack does not
work if the prover is honest in the DBPK-Log protocol. Indeed when sent the complement
of the challenge, the prover will also send the randomness to open the commitment for
the complementary challenge, thus preventing the adversary from knowing whether or not
ki = ei for some round i. They conclude that a (t, 3) secret-sharing scheme should be used,
with t ≥ 3 an arbitrary number of shares, instead of the original (2, 2) scheme.
Recently, at Inscrypt 2012, Bay and co-authors [BBM+12] proposed another terrorist
fraud whose probability of success is 12 against DBPK-Log. Their attack is based on the
observation that the homomorphic commitment check proceeds over all the commitments.
Thus, the adversary A can generate random values for the shares k and e and use them, as
long as it sacriﬁces one of the commitments to add a value given by the prover ensuring the
correct homomorphic veriﬁcation. More precisely, the prover computes z′ := Ω(x, v′) with
a newly generated v′ and sends z′ to the adversary A. Now A generates two random m-bit
strings k and e, for which he generates honestly the commitments ai and bi (for i = 1 to
m). Using these values, A constructs two strings of commitments to send to the veriﬁer,
using as many of the honestly-computed commitments as possible, but also ensuring that
the homomorphic veriﬁcation still holds. More speciﬁcally A sends two arrays A and B
with m elements each, which he ﬁlls from position 2 to m with the commitments ai and bi
that he has generated himself. For A1 and B1, the adversary guesses c1 with probability
1
2 and inserts in the corresponding array (A if ci = 0 and B otherwise) the correct, self-
generated commitment (i.e., a1, respectively bi). In the other array (corresponding to the
complement of c1), A adds a value ensuring that z =
∏m
i=1(AiBi)
2i−1 mod p. Now A can
correctly answer to all challenges and reveal unconditionally the correct randomness for
the rounds 2 to m as well as the correct randomness for the round 1 if he has correctly
guessed c1. Afterwards, the malicious prover helps the adversary to succeed in conducting
the ZKPoK. Thus, no information about x is leaked (except a commitment and a ZKPoK,
which reveal nothing) and the adversary A wins with probability 12 .
6.3 Verifiable secret sharing
In cryptography, secret sharing refers to a method that allows one entity called the dealer
to distribute a secret amongst a group of n users. In fact, the dealer gives diﬀerent share of
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the secret to the users, but only when speciﬁc conditions are fulﬁlled will the users be able
to reconstruct the secret from their shares. For example, the secret can be reconstructed
only when a suﬃcient number of shares are combined together. Secret sharing has been
introduced independently by Adi Shamir [Sha79] and George Blakley [B+] in 1979. The
idea to use secret-sharing within distance-bounding protocol is due to Avoine and co-
authors [ALM11]. Indeed, they proved that secret sharing can counter terrorist fraud, and
detail a method that can be applied directly to most existing distance bounding protocols to
implement resistance to such attack in the framework [ABK+11]. However, their framework
only works for DB protocols in which the prover and the veriﬁer share the same secret key
(symmetric DB). Therefore, the prover can not cheat while creating the nonces (which are
the shares of his secret key) because this will be detected by the veriﬁer. However, when
the distance-bounding protocol is ran in a asymmetric setting, we propose to switch to
another variant of secret sharing called Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS).
A secret sharing scheme is veriﬁable if auxiliary information is included that allows the
users to verify their shares as consistent. More formally, veriﬁable secret sharing ensures
that even if the dealer is malicious there is a well-deﬁned secret that the players can later
reconstruct. The concept of veriﬁable secret sharing (VSS) was ﬁrst introduced in 1985 by
Chor and co-authors [CGMA85].
A VSS protocol consists of two phases: a sharing phase and a reconstruction phase.
1. Sharing: initially the dealer holds a secret as input and each user holds an indepen-
dent random input. The sharing phase may consist of several rounds. At each round
each player can privately send messages to other players and it can also broadcast a
message. Each message sent or broadcasted by a user is determined by his input, his
randomness and messages received from other players in previous rounds.
2. Reconstruction: in this phase each player provides his entire view from the sharing
phase and a reconstruction function is applied and is taken as the protocol’s output.
Veriﬁable secret sharing is important for secure multi-party computation [Gol98]. Multi-
party computation is typically accomplished by making secret shares of the inputs, and
manipulating the shares to compute some function.
In the following we present a simple VSS scheme that is the protocol by Paul Feld-
man in [Fel87b]. The scheme is based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme combined with
any homomorphic encryption scheme. Then, we show how this algorithm can be used to
implement distance-bounding protocol.
6.3.1 Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing
Feldman’s veriﬁable secret sharing [Fel87a] combines a classical secret sharing scheme and
an homomorphic commitment scheme. Let us consider g the generator of a cyclic group G
of prime order p. The dealer wants to distribute a secret x over n participants such that
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each group of t participants can reconstruct the secret. The dealer generates (and keeps
secret) a random polynomial
P (X) = x + α1 ×X + · · ·+ αt ×X
t.
The coeﬃcients αi are chosen in Zp. The dealer also computes βi = gαi and y = gx.
Finally, he reveals publicly all the βi as well as y, g and p. Each of the n participants
receives as input a share si = P (i), which can be veriﬁed using the following formula:
gsi = y ×
t∏
j=1
(βj)
ij−1 .
6.3.2 Application of verifiable secret-sharing to distance-bounding
Protocol 2 shows how veriﬁable secret sharing can be used to create a DB protocol. This
toy protocol has a unique round compared to regular distance-bounding protocol and is
described here only for pedagogical purpose. In this example, we use a (3, 3) secret sharing
scheme, which means that all the three shares are needed to recover the secret.
Protocol 2: Toy protocol
Verifier V Prover P
Public key y = gx Private key x
Initialization phase
k, ℓ ∈R G
e = x− k − ℓ
a = gk, b = gℓ
d = ge
a,b,d
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Interactive phase
Choose c ∈R {0, 1, 2}
c
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ r =


k if c = 0
ℓ if c = 1
e otherwise
Measures δt r←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verification phase
Accept if and only if y =all are coherent with respect to ai, bi, γi, δti ≤ tmax ∀i, and ZKPoK veriﬁes.
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Initialization phase. The prover generates randomly two shares k and ℓ and computes
e = x − k − ℓ. He also computes a = gk, b = gℓ and d = ge, which are respectively the
commitments of k, ℓ and d. Then, he sends these commitments to the veriﬁer.
Interactive phase. During the interactive phase, the veriﬁer and the prover use a single
challenge/response to measure the time of ﬂight. Depending on the value of c, the prover
answers with a given share.
Verification phase. The veriﬁcation phase is composed of two steps. First for each
share, the veriﬁer checks that the received share matches the commitment and that the
timing respects a predeﬁned upper bound tmax. Then, he veriﬁes that all the shares are
related to y. For instance, consider the case that c = 0, which corresponds to r = k. In
this situation, the veriﬁer checks that the relation y = gr × b× d holds.
Sketch of the security analysis. We do not give here a complete security analysis of
our toy protocol. Nonetheless, we brieﬂy discuss the resistance of this protocol with respect
to an impersonation attack. Let us assume that an adversary knows y and executes the
protocol with a veriﬁer. The adversary picks his own k′ and ℓ′ and computes a′ = gk
′
,
b′ = gℓ
′
and d′ = y × g−k
′
× g−ℓ
′
. However, even if he cannot compute e′ = x− k′ − ℓ′, we
still have y = a′ × b′ × d′. Then, the adversary sent a′, b′ and d′ to the veriﬁer. During the
interactive phase, the adversary answers randomly if c = 2. All the values used during the
veriﬁcation are consistent except if c = 2. In this case, the probability that he gave the
correct share is 1|G| , in which |G| is the size of the group. Therefore, the success probability
of an impersonation attack is:
P(impersonation) =
2
3
+
1
3|G|
. (6.1)
One possible modiﬁcation to enhance the security of this toy protocol could be to chose
a diﬀerent secret sharing scheme such as the following one.
e = x− k − ℓ,
f = x + k,
h = ℓ− x.
In this version, the prover computes a = gf , b = gh and d = ge. For the veriﬁer, this
modiﬁcation has no consequence and the protocol is unchanged from his point of view.
From the knowledge of y, an adversary can compute valid commitments but cannot
only answer randomly when a share is asked. However, this is not the best strategy for
the adversary. For instance, suppose that the adversary still picks his own k′ and ℓ′ and
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computes a′ = gk
′
, b′ = gℓ
′
and d′ = y×g−k
′
×g−ℓ
′
. While he cannot compute e′ = x−k′−ℓ′,
it is still true that y = a′ × b′ × d′. Thus, his exact probability of success is still described
by Equation (6.1). The choice of the secret-sharing scheme has no impact on the security
level because of the homomorphic commitment.
In this toy example, the prover and the veriﬁer have exchanged values belonging to
large group during the interactive phase, while in most DB protocols it is generally assume
that single bits are exchanged during this phase. In the following, we propose a protocol
based on veriﬁable secret-sharing that achieves stronger security properties.
6.4 Verifiable secret-sharing based distance-bounding pro-
tocol
Our construction, called Vssdb, is summarized in Protocol 3. In this section, we ﬁrst
discuss the intuition behind it before describing it in details. In addition, we deﬁne a
relaxation of the GameTF terrorist-fraud resistance [FO13b]. We also prove that Vssdb
achieves this relaxation, called KeyTF security. Finally, we provide in 6.5.5 a version of
Vssdb achieving GameTF-security, while preserving the resistance to other frauds of the
original Vssdb protocol.
6.4.1 Overview of the protocol
The main idea behind our protocol is to make the prover choose at each round of the
distance-bounding phase two m-bit strings, denoted respectively ki and ℓi, that are used to
hide the bit xi of the private key x among three values ki, ℓi, and ei. At initialization, the
prover generates these values and sends them to the veriﬁer. The latter generates a m-bit
random value, essentially a string of m-bit values Mi ∈ {0, 1}, encoding a speciﬁc response
mode among two possible ones. The response bits subsequently given by the prover during
the time-critical rounds will depend both on the fast-phase challenges and on the mode. In
particular, the response function, denoted f, takes as input Mi and the round challenge ci,
and outputs a corresponding response ri. The fact that the modes are chosen honestly by
the veriﬁer and the response components (i.e., ki, ℓi and ei) are committed before receiving
the mode values enforce distance-fraud resistance. We hide the committed values from the
adversary by encrypting them into Enc with the veriﬁer’s public key. Furthermore, we
prevent the adversary from forwarding self-generated values by including a signature with
the prover’s private key on these values within the plaintext to be encrypted. Finally, we
avoid replay attacks by making the veriﬁer send a session-speciﬁc nonce at each session.
The use of homomorphic commitments allows one to verify that ai × bi × di corresponds
to the i-th component of the prover’s public key denoted as Comi. Furthermore, a non-
interactive zero-knowledge (ZKPoK) proof of knowledge ensures that the value used by the
prover is really his secret key, consistent with the values Comi and with the ciphertext Enc.
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During the time-critical rounds, the veriﬁer measures and stores the RTT of each ex-
change, denoted δti. In order to enable the veriﬁer to check the response values ri, the
prover must then open the relevant commitments of the values used to generate the re-
sponse. Thus, in a subsequent veriﬁcation step, the prover sends the necessary auxiliary
information (the randomness used to commit and possibly the response values themselves),
which we denote as a function γ, which takes two inputs Mi and ci. Due to the use of
commitments, the values of xi are hidden in each session of the protocol. Finally, we use
the countermeasure proposed in [KAK+09] and sign the session transcript (e.g., the modes,
challenges, and responses used in this session, as well as the session-speciﬁc nonce) thus
ensuring that a MIM adversary cannot tamper with the exchanged messages and their
order.
More speciﬁcally, the protocol consists of the following phases.
6.4.2 Setup phase
The Trusted Third Party (TTP) begins by setting-up the global parameters: he picks at
random two distinct large prime numbers p and q and computes their product n ← pq.
The TTP also generates t $← Z∗n such that t Ó= ±1 of order ϕ(n)/4 and computes s = t
2
mod n. In particular, it holds that s2 = 1 mod n and, for any two bits a and b, it holds
that sa+b = sa⊕b. The parameters n and s are considered to be public and thus known to
all parties, while p and q are secret parameters known only to the TTP. These parameters
will enable the use of the (homomorphic) commitment scheme (originally called a blob)
due to Brassard, Chaum and Crépeau [BCC88].
6.4.3 Registration phase
All the provers and veriﬁers are initialized by the TTP acting as a registration authority.
At prover registration, the TTP generates a private/public signature keypair:
(skSign, pkSign) ← SSKGen().
The signature scheme is modelled as a tuple S = (SSKGen,Sign,Vf) and can be any un-
forgeable signature scheme (e.g., El-gamal or DSA). The TTP also generates a secret x
for the prover. Afterwards, each bit xi is committed to a value Comi as follows: the TTP
generates a witness zi and sets
Comi ← z
2
i s
xi mod n ; zi = H
i(x).
In this equation, H denotes a cryptographically secure hash function modeled as a random
oracle, while Hi(x) represents the ith iteration of this function on input x. The tuple
Com := (Com1, . . . ,Comm), pkSign is the prover’s public key and is given to all veriﬁers.
We delegate the generation of the keypair (skSign, pkSign) and x to the TTP to rule out
some attack using some weak key (see Section 6.6 for more details).
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6.4.4 Initialization phase
At the beginning of the protocol, the veriﬁer generates a session-speciﬁc nonce NV that
he sends to the prover. We add at the beginning a 0 to this value as an encoding, to
diﬀerentiate between an honest protocol run and the all-or-nothing disclosure function. As
intuitively described above, at the beginning of each session the prover must generate two
m-long bitstrings k and ℓ. These strings are used to symmetrically encrypt (we speciﬁcally
use bitwise XOR) each bit xi of the private key.
ei ← Eki||ℓi(xi) = xi ⊕ ki ⊕ ℓi.
Subsequently, the prover uses a secure bit-commitment scheme Cmt = (Commit,COpen)
to commit to each bit ki, ℓi, and ei, using respectively the randomly generated witnesses
ui, vi, and a value wi ← (uivi)−1Hi(x) mod n. Each commitment takes two inputs,
the committed value b and the randomness r, and outputs Commit(b, r) := r2sb for the
parameter s generated at setup.
ai = Commit(ki, ui) = ui
2 × ski mod n
bi = Commit(ℓi, vi) = vi
2 × sℓi mod n
di = Commit(ei, wi) = wi
2 × sei mod n
Afterwards, the prover sends all the committed values ai, bi, and di to the veriﬁer, who
generates randomly a sequence of m response modes Mi ∈ {0, 1}. The modes M ∈ {0, 1}
form one of the two inputs required for the computation of the responses during the time-
critical rounds. Finally, the prover pre-computes the responses for each received mode Mi
and for each possible bit challenge ci = {0, 1}. The responses function f : {0, 1}×{0, 1} −→
{0, 1} is computed as follows, in which for a bit b we use the notation b to denote the
complementary bit (i.e., b := b⊕ 1):
f(Mi = 0, ci) =
{
ei if ci = 0
ki ⊕ ℓi if ci = 1
f(Mi = 1, ci) =
{
ki if ci = 0
ei ⊕ ℓi if ci = 1
Furthermore, for each tuple of inputs (Mi, ci), the function γ : {0, 1} × {0, 1} −→
Z
2|u1| × Z2|a1| lists values allowing the veriﬁer to later open the relevant commitments
amongst ai, bi and di and verify the responses. Although we deﬁne the range of γ to be a
tuple of four values, two of the bit-length of the randomness to commit (i.e., ui) and two
of the bit-length of the output commitments (i.e., ai), the prover sometimes needs to send
only a subset of these values. In this case by convention the remaining output values are
ignored by the veriﬁer. More precisely for each input (Mi, ci), the function γ outputs the
values of the shares used to compute f(Mi, ci) if these are not given in clear (but rather
XORed) and the relevant witnesses. For example, since f(0, 0) = ei, the corresponding
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γ(0, 0) is equal to wi, which is the randomness used to construct the commitment di of
ei. In contrast, f(0, 1) = ki ⊕ ℓi, thus the output γ(0, 1) will consist of the two component
shares ki, ℓi, as well as the randomness ui, vi that opens the respective commitments ai, bi.
The complete output space of γ is given in Figure 3.
6.4.5 Distance-bounding phase
The prover and veriﬁer then begin the time-critical rounds, which are eﬀectively a sequence
of m challenge-response exchanges in which the veriﬁer sends a bit challenge ci ∈ {0, 1}
and the prover replies with the response bit f(Mi, ci). The veriﬁer stores δti the RTT of
the exchange for each round. We point out that implementing a precise measurement of
the RTT during the challenge-response rounds is still a diﬃcult technological challenge,
although one implementation has been recently proposed [RTv+12].
6.4.6 Verification
During this phase, the prover provides the output γ(Mi, ci) for each round, as well as a
ﬁnal signature over the entire transcript of the protocol generated with his signature key
skSign. Then, the veriﬁer performs the following veriﬁcation steps.
1. He checks the received signature σˆ based on his view of the transcript,
2. he opens the commitments and validates the received responses,
3. he veriﬁes that δti ≤ tmax for all i = 1, . . . ,m, in which tmax is the trusted proximity
bound,
4. he checks that for each i = 1, . . . ,m, it holds that Comi = aibidi mod n.
If any of these veriﬁcation steps fails, the veriﬁer aborts, which means rejecting the prover.
Otherwise, the veriﬁer accepts (i.e., authenticates) the prover.
6.5 Security analysis
In this section, we present the security proofs for the Vssdb protocol from Section 6.4,
providing in particular exact bounds for its security. More precisely, our protocol is ana-
lyzed in the DFKO security model [DFKO11a] in which terrorist fraud is deﬁned using a
game based approach called GameTF.
6.5.1 Resistance against distance fraud
Theorem 1 (Distance fraud resistance). For any (t, qV )-distance-fraud adversary A against
VSSDB with m challenge-response exchanges, there exists an adversary A1 against the
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binding property of the commitment scheme Cmt such that
Adv
Dist
A ≤ 4mqV Adv
Cmt.Bind
A1 +
(
3
4
)m
Proof. Our proof relies on the fact that, since for each mode Mˆi, the XOR sum of the
responses for the two challenges f(Mˆi, 0)⊕ f(Mˆi, 1) = xi, a value that is 1 with probability
exactly 12 if x is honestly chosen at random. In particular, for each mode the adversary has
a probability of at most 34 to win the round, regardless of his choice of ki and ℓi. We ﬁrst
rule out cheating on the commitments (which would allow the adversary to claim a false
response as the correct one), thus losing a term 4mqV AdvCmt.BindA1 (accounting also for the
commitments to x).
More formally, this is the same as assuming that the adversary now plays the game
against a protocol wherein the prover has to also give the values of ki, ℓi, ei, as well as the
commitments ai, bi, di and the randomness used for each commitment, in the ﬁrst message.
The prover also has to give the bits of the secret x and the randomness used to generate
the commitments Comi. The veriﬁer does not check consistency of the responses with the
responses/randomness included in the initialization. However, clearly if the prover is able
to commit to one value in, for instance ai, and then use the conjugate value with a diﬀerent
randomness at the end, he breaks the binding property of the commitment. We use this
for our forgery in the reduction. We have to hope that the forged commitment is actually
queried by the veriﬁer and that this veriﬁer-adversary session is successful, which is why
we lose a factor 4mqV . This factor includes the m bit-commitments to the bits of x.
We now exclude the probability of the prover using diﬀerent values that those he
has committed to. Since the commitments are sent before receiving the string of modes
{Mi}
m
i=1, we argue that whatever strategy the prover employs in maliciously choosing con-
venient k, ℓ at each round, these values are chosen to facilitate an answer µi for each round i
before knowing Mi. Depending on the choice of k and ℓ, as well as on the bits of x, the proba-
bility that µi is the correct answer at each round is diﬀerent. We denote Prob[µi = ei] =: p1,
Prob[µi = ki ⊕ ℓi] =: p2, Prob[µi = ei ⊕ ℓi] =: p3, and Prob[µi = ki] =: p4. We stress that
the value of µi does not reﬂect the fact that the adversary must commit to a response
before knowing Mi, but rather that the adversary must commit to a choice of ki and ℓi
before knowing the modes. This skews the probability that, for a certain mode, the ad-
versary is able to give a better response and indeed maximizes the distance-fraud success
probabilities. As a consequence, we are indeed able to even indicate the most successful
adversarial strategy in distance fraud.
We now bound the probability that, with these values already set, the adversary can
win one of the interactive rounds.
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Prob[A wins 1 round] ≤
3∑
k=0
Prob[Mi = k]Prob[µi = f(Mi, ci)]
=
1
4
3∑
k=0
Prob[µi = f(Mi, ci)]
=
1
4
3∑
k=0
1∑
b=0
Prob[ci = b]Prob[µi = f(Mi, b)]
=
1
8
3∑
k=0
1∑
b=0
Prob[µi = f(Mi, b)]
1
=
1
8
[p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p1 + (1− p2) + p3 + (1− p4)]
=
1
8
[2 + 2p1 + 2p3] ≤
1
8
[2 + 2 + 2] =
3
4
.
We remark that the equality 1= holds due to our notation. Indeed, we have that
Prob[µi = f(0, 0)] = Prob[µi = f(2, 0)] = p1, Prob[µi = f(0, 1)] = p2, Prob[µi = f(1, 0)] =
Prob[µi = f(3, 0)] = p3, Prob[µi = f(1, 1)] = p4. Since f(0, 1) = f(2, 1) and f(1, 1) = f(3, 1),
it holds that Prob[µi = f(2, 1)] = 1−p2 and Prob[µi = f(3, 1)] = 1−p4. The ﬁnal inequality
holds due to the fact that noting that p1 ≤ 1 and p3 ≤ 1. Indeed, the prover can maximize
these probabilities by choosing ℓi = 0 for all i, irrespective of the values of ki.
6.5.2 Resistance against Mafia Fraud
Theorem 2 (Maﬁa fraud resistance). For any (t, qobs, qP , qV )-mafia-fraud adversary A
against VSSDB, there exists: an adversary A1 against the hiding property of the commit-
ment scheme Cmt=(Commit, COpen), an adversary A2 against the unforgeability of the
signature scheme S = (SSKGen,Sign,Vf) and an adversary A3 against the pseudorandom-
ness of function f (in the random oracle model), such that
Adv
Mafia
A ≤
(
1
2
)m
+ AdvUnfA2 + m(qP + qV )[4Adv
Cmt.Hide
A1 + Adv
H−PRF
A3
]
+
(
qobs + qV
2
)
2−2m +
(
qP + qobs
2
)
2−3m−3|u1|
Proof. For maﬁa fraud resistance, we ﬁrst replace the randomness wi by truly random
values, losing a term m(qP + qV )AdvH−PRFA3 . At this point we can be sure that the hiding
properties of the commitment does not suﬀer from the fact that the wi is not chosen truly
at random. The next step is to consistently replace the committed values chosen by the
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prover each prover-veriﬁer and adversary-prover session by values independent of the real
choice of the prover, losing the advantage of an adversary against the hiding property of
the commitment, 4m(qP + qV )AdvCmt.HideA1 .
We next rule out the probability that in two diﬀerent sessions, the honest veriﬁer
chooses exactly the same string of modes, losing a term
(qobs+qV
2
)
2−2m. Furthermore, we
exclude the possibility that the prover chooses the exact same randomness and the same
shares k and ℓ in two sessions. We lose a term
(qP +qobs
2
)
2−3m−3|u1|. As a consequence, for
each veriﬁer-adversary session there is at most one adversary-prover session sharing the
same mode values (this is a session in which the adversary forwards the same modes seen
before). The next step is to rule out that the adversary is able, for the two concurrent
sessions sid and sid∗, the ﬁrst one being a veriﬁer-adversary session while the second one is
an adversary-prover session, to change any of the veriﬁer’s input and yet be able to forge
the signature at the end. We lose here a term AdvUnfA2 .
Now the adversary’s only solution is to guess either: (a) the values of all the challenges
(which happens with probability 2−m), (b) the value of the bits of the key x (which happens
with probability 2−m, but in this case the adversary also needs to forge the signature or the
values of all the pertinent witnesses for the veriﬁcation), (c) the values of all the responses
(with probability 2−m). Combining all these results this leads to the indicated bound.
6.5.3 Resistance against slow phase impersonation
Theorem 3 (Slow phase impersonation resistance). For any (t, qobs, qP , qV )-impersonation
adversary A against VSSDB, there exists an adversary A1 against the unforgeability of the
signature scheme S = (SSKGen,Sign,Vf) such that:
Adv
ImpSec
A ≤
(
qobs + qV
2
)
2−2m +
(
qP + qobs
2
)
2−3m−3|u1| + AdvUnfA1 .
Proof. We ﬁrst rule out the possibility that the veriﬁer chooses the same modes in
two diﬀerent sessions, and then the possibility that the prover chooses the same shares
and randomness for two diﬀerent sessions, thus losing the same two terms as for maﬁa-
fraud resistance. Thus, any veriﬁer-adversary session the adversary opens has at most one
adversary-prover session for which it shares modes and commitments. At this point, the
deﬁnition requires that the adversary wins without producing the same transcripts with
the concurrent adversary-prover session. We upper-bound this probability by observing
that any change in the transcript requires the adversary to be able to forge the signature,
thus obtaining the claimed bound.
6.5.4 Resistance against Terrorist fraud (KeyTF-security)
Theorem 4 (KeyTF-Security). The VSSDB protocol is KeyTF-secure.
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Proof. We prove this statement in two steps. We ﬁrst consider a successful terrorist
fraud adversary A. Our goal is to show that either this adversary has a negligible success
probability or that he is helpful to a maﬁa-fraud adversary A′. In the ﬁrst step of the
proof, we show how the adversary A′ reconstructs a guess of the secret x by running A
as a black box. In the second stage of the proof, we show that this gives A′ an advantage
over any other maﬁa-fraud adversary.
We consider an adversary A′ who runs A internally, and who ends up with a guess xˆ
of x. For each veriﬁer-adversary session of the terrorist-fraud adversary A, the adversary
A′ queries A for each fast round and each of the two challenges (A′ does not change the
mode). If A answers on both branches, A′ sets xˆi to be the XOR of the two responses. If
the adversary does not respond on at least one branch, A′ sets xˆi to be a randomly-chosen
bit. The following statements hold.
• A knew both bits correctly. In this case, A always passes the round, but the guessed
bit xˆi is also correct.
• A gets exactly one bit correctly. In this case, A′ has the wrong bit. On the other
hand, the adversary fails the session with probability 12 .
• A gets both bits wrong, in which case A fails the session, but A′ gets the right bit.
• A refuses to answer at least for one branch. At this point the adversary has a
probability of at least 12 to fail, while A
′ guesses the corresponding guessed bit of x
is 12 .
In fact the number of bits of x that the adversary A′ expects to retrieve is A’s success
probability to succeed in the fast rounds. The adversary A′ does the same thing for each
of the qV sessions A has with the veriﬁer. Thus, LeakA′(x||skSign) = P[A wins].
In contrast, for any maﬁa-fraud resistant adversary, the expected number of retrieved
bits is 0, since with high probability nor the signatures, neither the committed values cannot
be forged. In addition, since the modes and commitments are picked at random by the
honest prover and the honest veriﬁer, it is highly unlikely to have two sessions with exactly
the same committed values, and for which at least one round of the distance-bounding
phase have the same modes with diﬀerent challenges.
We now show that A′ is more successful than any maﬁa-fraud adversary B. If B’s
strategy is to change any of the input between the prover and the veriﬁer during that
session, then A′ runs the ﬁrst part of the protocol (which depends on x) using his guess of
it in every session with the veriﬁer, succeeding with the same probability as A, and uses
the same strategy to forge the signature as B does.
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6.5.5 Introducing cheat modes to tackle terrorist fraud security (Ga-
meTF security)
In order to ensure terrorist-fraud resistance, we have to build a backdoor into the protocol.
To do this, we use an idea similar to that proposed by Fischlin and Onete in [FO13b].
However, we cannot directly import their solution as our protocol is asymmetric, whereas
the original trick assumes that the veriﬁer knows the prover’s secret key. Instead, we take
an approach similar to all-or-nothing security and modify the protocol in two steps. More
precisely during the ﬁrst step, if the prover receives a message starting with a 1 instead of
the ﬁrst protocol message (0|NV ), he will compare the remainder of the message with the
secret key x. If the received message is suﬃciently close, he returns the full key x as well
as the witnesses (H)i(x) that were used by the TTP to compute the commitments Comi
as depicted in Protocol 4.
Any party, including an adversary, can run this strategy. However, note that the
protocol does not return the secret signature key of the prover, thus on its own knowing x
will not signiﬁcantly help an adversary to authenticate due to the ﬁnal signature. To enable
a successful terrorist-fraud adversary to authenticate afterwards without the prover’s help,
we also change the authentication protocol. More precisely, we introduce a "cheat" running
mode, in which a party can use the values of x and vi to authenticate just by echoing the
received challenges. As an honest prover only discloses the values of x and vi in exchange
for a good guess of the secret key x, these values will not occur in observed honest-prover
to honest-veriﬁer communication. We also prevent distance fraud, as using this strategy
will reduce the success probability of a distance-fraud adversary to just 12 per round (the
probability of guessing the challenges in advance). However, if a malicious prover helps a
MIM adversary to authenticate during terrorist fraud, the adversary will learn a signiﬁcant
part of the secret key x. This will enable the terrorist-fraud MIM adversary to learn (with
high probability) the values of x and vi, which in turn enable him to make the veriﬁer run
the protocol in cheat mode, as depicted in Protocol 5.
Theorem 5. GameTF-Security The VSSDB protocol is GameTF-secure.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the proof goes as for the VSSDB protocol. We conclude that
the maﬁa fraud adversary A′ gains as many bits of x as is the terrorist adversary A’s
probability to win. We denote by pA the probability that A wins. Then the cheating mode
is activated with exactly this probability. In this case, one the two following events holds:
• pA is negligible, in which case we dismiss him.
• pA is non-negligible and thus larger than the (negligible) maﬁa-fraud resistance of
the protocol.
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6.6 Improving the response functions
In section 6.4, we have designed a distance-bounding protocol that uses modes in conjunc-
tion with the default challenge bit scheme that is usual to distance-bounding protocols.
We introduce the notion of modes to prevent a malicious prover from selecting the values
ki and ℓi in order to maximize his success probability in a distance fraud like described in
section 6.2.2. In fact, during the initialization phase, the prover commit to the xi, ki and
ℓi. Then, the veriﬁer announces the mode for each round of the distance-bounding phase.
Provided that the modes are chosen at random by the veriﬁer, the adversary cannot reply
in advance during the distance-bounding phase because the responses bit of the modes are
never the same regardless of the value of xi, ki and ℓi chosen in advance. Therefore, for
each round of the protocol, the distance adversary may receive the challenges from the ver-
iﬁer before sending the corresponding response to the veriﬁer. To succeed a distance faud,
the adversary has two options: (i) he guesses each mode of the distance-bounding phase in
advance with probability 12 of success. (ii) if the bit xi = 0 then he chooses ki = ℓi = xi = 0
then regardless of the modes, he win the round with probability 1 (see the ﬁrst line of the
table 6.6.
From the point (ii) we see that the advantage of an adversary to succeed a distance
fraud can be correlated to the number of bits of his secret key equal to 0. In the latter we
refer to this type of key (with as many bits equal 0 as weak key).
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Protocol 3: Veriﬁable Secret Sharing and Distance-Bounding (VSSDB).
Verifier V Prover P
Public key pk = {Com, pkSign} Private key x, skSign, {ν1, . . . νm}
with Com := (Com1, . . . ,Comm)
Private encryption key: skV
Initialization phase
For i = 1 to m generate:
ki, ℓi
$
← {0, 1}
ei = Eki||ℓi(xi)
ui, vi
$
← Z∗n
wi = u
−1
i v
−1
i H
i(x) mod n
ai = Commit(ki, ui)
bi = Commit(ℓi, vi)
di = Commit(ei, wi)
0||NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Set: mP := {ai, bi, di}mi=1||NV
Compute: cP = EncpkV(mP ||Sign(skSign,mP))
Set: W := {x, {ki, ℓi, ei, ui, vi, wi,
ai, bi, di, νi}
m
i=1, skSign}
π := Prove{W : cP well formed∧
consistent with {Comi}mi=1}cP , π←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Decrypt cP to m′||N∗V||σ
∗;
If π, σ∗ do not check or N∗V Ó= NV, abort.
For i = 1 to m generate
Mi
$
← {0, 1}
{Mi}
m
i=1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Parse as:
Mˆ1, . . . Mˆm ∈ {0, 1}
For i = 1 to m, compute f(Mˆi, 0), f(Mˆi, 1),
γ(Mˆi, 0), and γ(Mˆi, 0) as below:
f(0, 0) =← ei
f(0, 1) =← ki ⊕ ℓi
f(1, 0) =← ki
f(1, 1) =← ei ⊕ ℓi
γ(0, 0) =← wi
γ(0, 1) ← (ki, ui, ℓi, vi)
γ(1, 0) ← ui
γ(1, 1) =← (ei, wi, ℓi, vi)
Interactive phase
For i = 1 to m
Picks ci
$
← {0, 1}
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Parse as cˆi
Store ri and RTT δti
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri ← f(Mˆi, cˆi)
Verification Phase
{γ(Mˆi, ci)}
m
i=1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− σ ← Sign(skSign, {Mi}
m
i=1||{ci, ri}
m
i=1||NV)σ
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify σ, open commit for f(Mˆi, cˆi) with γ(Mˆi, cˆi), check δti ≤ tmax ∀i. Accept iﬀ. all checks succeed.
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Protocol 4: All-or-nothing key disclosure.
Party Prt Prover P
Input xˆ Private key x, skSign, {ν1, . . . νm}
1||xˆ
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
With probability 2−(x⊕xˆ) do:
Set: Keys := {x, skSign, {ν1, . . . , νm}}.
Keys
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Protocol 5: Terrorist VSSDB.
Verifier V Prover P
Public key {Com, pkSign} Private key x, skSign
with Com := (Com1, . . . ,Comm)
Private encryption key: skV
Initialization phase
Initialize as in Figure 3.
0||NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If ﬁrst bit is 0, run protocol in Protocol 3.
Else react as in Figure 4 and halt.
0|cP , π←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
If ﬁrst bit is 0, run protocol as in Figure 3.
Else: parse message as xˆ, {νˆi}mi=1
If ∃i such that Commit(xˆi, νˆi) Ó= Comi reject P .
Else, set SBit = cheat.
Interactive phase
For i = 1 · · ·m
Pick ci
$
← {0, 1}
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Store ri and RTT δti
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verification Phase
Accept if and only if for all i, ri = ci and δti ≤ tmax .
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xi ℓi ei ki ⊕ ℓi ki ei ⊕ ℓi
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
Table 6.1: Truth table representing the response function with two modes.
One solution to rule out such possibility is to assume that the keys are always generated
by the TTP honestly, thus ensuring that each bit of the key is 0 with probability 12 (inde-
pendently). This assumption is used in the bound for our distance-fraud resistance above.
While this assumption is suﬃcient in theory, in some case, we would like that the prover
register a key without revealing the actual key to the TTP. Therefore a second response
function is needed.
In the following, we construct an improved response function that resolves the problem
mentioned previously (it does not rely on the assumption that the TTP generates the secret
key for the user). Therefore, any party can register a key directly with the CA.
The new response function we propose, is based on the default response function. For
the mode 0 and 1 we keep the same behaviour as the default response function. We create
the two remaining modes by ﬂipping (the bit is x-ored with the value 1) the bit of one
response-bit out of the two available.
f(Mi = 0, ci) =
{
ei if ci = 0
ki ⊕ ℓi if ci = 1
f(Mi = 2, ci) =
{
ei if ci = 0
ki ⊕ ℓi if ci = 1
f(Mi = 1, ci) =
{
ei ⊕ ℓi if ci = 0
ki if ci = 1
f(Mi = 3, ci) =
{
ei ⊕ ℓi if ci = 0
ki if ci = 1
Then during the veriﬁcation phase, the prover reveals the value γ(Mi, ci) in which Mi
reprensents the modes and ci the challenge received from the veriﬁer.
γ(Mi = 0 or 2, ci) =
{
wi if ci = 0
ki, ui, ℓi, vi if ci = 1
γ(Mi = 1 or 3, ci) =
{
ei, wi, ℓi, vi if ci = 0
ui if ci = 1
Therefore, we have always the condition that revealing the response bits of one mode
reveals the corresponding bit of the secret key. By forcing one response-bit to its opposite
value (x-ored with 1), we rule out the possibility that the choice of the value xi = ki = ℓi
has incidence on the construction of the response-bits .
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xi ℓi ei ki ⊕ ℓi ki ⊕ ℓi ei ⊕ ℓi ki ki
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Table 6.2: Truth table representing the response function with four modes.
From the table 6.6, we see that with any value for xi, ki, ℓi the adversary can maximize
his success probability for at most two modes out of the four availables. As the modes
are selected at random by the veriﬁer, and the prover does not know them during the
commitment phase, then the adversary success probability is equivalent to the probability
to guess the mode in advance that is 12 .
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a DB protocol called Vssdb, which is asymmetric (i.e.,
the prover and veriﬁer do not share secrets) while provably resisting terrorist-fraud attacks
(as captured by the GameTF ﬂavor of terrorist-fraud resistance [FO13b]). One of the main
novelty of our protocol is the use of modes, which are communicated during slow phases,
and complement the challenges sent during the time-critical rounds. More precisely, the
responses answered by the prover during one of these rounds depend both on the mode of
this round and the challenge. This feature improves the protocol’s security, while preserving
the lightweightness of calculations performed during the time-critical rounds. In addition,
in contrast to other DB protocols, we rely on the use of three shares rather than two, which
allows for more richness in the responses while better hiding the secret. In particular,
by using a homomorphic commitment scheme and bitwise veriﬁcation of the commitment,
we essentially prevent the attack of Bay and co-authors [BBM+12] against DBPK-Log
scheme on which Vssdb builds. We also rely on the countermeasure of signing the entire
protocol transcript at the end to ensure strong maﬁa-fraud resistance. Finally to achieve
GameTF-security, we add a cheating mode that relies on a trick proposed by Fischlin and
Onete [FO13b]. In a nutshell, if the adversary can supply a close-enough guess of the secret
key x, the prover will return the correct secret key x as well as the witnesses that were
used to generate the commitments of each bit of x that the veriﬁer has. By using these
values, the adversary can then authenticate to the veriﬁer.
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PROPS: Un système de preuves
de localisation respectueux de la
vie privée
Comme énoncé précédemment, les services basés sur la localisation doivent répondre à de
nouvelles exigences sécuritaires, à savoir garantir l’authenticité de la position annoncée
par un utilisateur sans la disponibilité au préalable d’une architecture de conﬁance. En
se basant sur le modèle de sécurité présenté au chapitre 4, nous proposons un système de
preuve de localisation baptisé PROPS (Pivacy-pReserving lOcation Proof System).
PROPS emploie une approche collaborative au problème des preuves de localisation,
permettant ainsi à des dispositifs voisins de se générer mutuellement des preuves de locali-
sation. Plus précisément, le protocole se déroule en trois phases: la phase d’enregistrement,
la phase de collecte et la phase de vériﬁcation. Lors de la phase d’enregistrement, chaque
utilisateur reçoit une clé secrète certiﬁée par une autorité de certiﬁcation. Cette clé se-
crète est unique à chaque utilisateur et nous supposons qu’elle n’est jamais partagée avec
d’autres entités. Ensuite, lors de la phase de collecte, le prouveur demande aux témoins
présents dans son voisinnage immédiat de lui signer sa position (au format encodé) et une
mise en gage sur son identité secrète. Chaque témoin désireux de participer à la création
de la preuve, procède à la vériﬁcation de la présence physique du prouveur dans son voisin-
nage immédiat, auquel cas, il lui génère sa preuve de localisation sinon la phase de collecte
est annulée et possiblement reportée à une autorité de gestion de fraudes. La vériﬁcation
de la position du prouveur est réalisée à l’aide d’une primitive appelée ProximityTesting
construite à partir d’un protocole délimiteur de distance (voir Section 7.3 pour plus de
détails). Finalement, lors de la phase de vériﬁcation des preuves, le prouveur présente ses
preuves de localisation au vériﬁeur accompagnée d’une preuve de connaissance de l’identité
secrète contenu dans les mise en gage et une granularité liée à la position encodée. Les
propriétés de sécurité que nous garantissons par le biais de notre protocole sont les suiv-
antes: la non-transférabilité des preuves, la non-forgeabilité de celles-ci et la résistance
contre les attaques de localisation lors de la phase de collecte (voir Section 7.5 pour plus de
détails). Du point de vue de la protection de la vie privée, nous garantissons l’anonymat
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de l’identité secrète du prouveur et des témoins durant la phase de collecte et la phase
de vériﬁcation. Nous garantissons aussi la non-chaînabilité de leurs actions à travers le
système (voir Section 7.5 pour plus de détails).
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Chapter 7
PROPS: a PRivacy-preserving
lOcation Proof System
7.1 Introduction
A secure LBS requires that a mobile user certiﬁes his position before gaining access to a
resource. This is especially the case for location sensitive application like location-based
access control and deﬁning location-aware security policies (e.g., this laptop should not
be taken out of this building, this ﬁle should not be opened outside of a secure room,
etc..). Currently, most of the existing solutions addressing this issue do not oﬀer enough
security or privacy guarantees to their user (see Chapter 3). In this chapter, we describe
our protocol for a secure and decentralized location proof system. Our design aims to
satisfy the security and privacy properties we have deﬁned in Chapter 3. We also rely on
the concept of distance bounding, to provide a method of detecting various situation of
localization attacks. In fact, we have shown in Chatper 5 that a distance-bounding protocol
is an accurate method of gauging a prover’s presence within range of the witness.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: in Section 7.2, we describe how users interact
within the system and describe the system assumptions. Then, in section 7.3, we present
the cryptographic primitives we used in the design of our protocol. In Section 7.4, we
describe the process for users of collecting location shares from their witnesses and how
veriﬁer can check for the validity of location proofs. Next, in Section 7.5 we analyse the
security and privacy properties of our proposal. Section 7.6 reviews the implementation
and performance of our protocol. Finally, in Section 7.7 we summarize this chapter.
7.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss the technical information pertaining to Props. More precisely,
we give a global overview of the architecture, then we deﬁne the algorithms used by the
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system before presenting the system assumptions. We discuss the relevant threats that
Props must protect against and the security properties required in order to meet our
deﬁnition of a complete and secure protocol. Finally, we brieﬂy outline the role of the
veriﬁer within the protocol.
7.2.1 User interactions
Our system consists of a set of mobile users equipped with location enabled devices that are
all synchronized according to a global clock. Each mobile device is capable of obtaining his
current absolute position thanks to a positioning system and we suppose that these systems
are interoperable. For sake of simplicity, let be a user P visiting a location L at time T . P
can request a location proof from other users present at the same location L during time T .
During this interaction, the device of P plays the role of the prover while the other devices
that collaborate to create the proof are called the witnesses. The ﬁrst step of the protocol
is for the prover to broadcast a request (location proof request) stating his current secure
pseudonym, the claimed location and the current time to potential witnesses present at
the same location. When a surrounding user accepts to testify the presence of the prover,
the latter becomes a witness for that session. Then, the rest of the procedure consists in a
secure bipartite computation between the prover and that witness during which the witness
is responsible for verifying the correctness of the spatio-temporal information claimed by
the prover; that is he is indeed at the location L close to the witness at global time T.
To counter localization attacks (see Chapter 2), the prover engages in a distance-bounding
protocol (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 7) with each of the witnesses to ascertain that he is
within proximity of that device, thus proving himself to that particular proof provider. It
is assumed that the distance-bounding process employed will provide an accurate reading
of the proximity of the prover to a witness. The ability of distance-bounding to accurately
place a device in an area is an underlying security property of Props and is required for its
correct functionality. It is also assumed that proxy/terrorist fraud attacks will be detected
through the use of the distance-bounding protocol employed. When the prover behaves
honestly, he obtains a location proof share (LPS) from his witness. The location proof share
contains the cryptographic pseudonym of the prover, the results of the distance bounding
exchanges and the encryption of the spatio-temporal information (location and time). At
this stage, the location proof shares can be aggregated to create a location proof (LP).
A location proof may be used by the prover to convince a verifier (for example police
authorities, location-based service, etc.) of his presence at the location L. The veriﬁer
then makes his decision based on this proof information. This situation is illustrated
in Figure 7.1. Users are registered to the system by a trusted central authority called
the certification authority (CA). CA is the trusted third party responsible for issuing the
credentials to newly registered users. These credentials can be considered as being the
“secret identity” of these users. The cryptographic pseudonyms are derived from the secret
key of the user. The anonymity lifter (AL) is the trusted party that has the capacity to lift
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the anonymity of a particular user from a location proof when needed (for instance upon
request from a judge).
Figure 7.1: Global overview and data ﬂow of Props.
7.2.2 Definition of the algorithms
The architecture of Props is summarized in Figure 7.1 and consists of the following four
diﬀerent procedures.
• Initialisation. During the set up of the location proof system, the Certiﬁcation
Authority (CA) runs the Setup algorithm to generate the group public parameter
gpk = (V KG, V KCert) in which V KG represents the public veriﬁcation key for
the unique group signature and V KCert the public veriﬁcation key for CL-signature
certiﬁcate issued by the CA. It should also be possible for the CA to generate is-
suance keys that will be used by authorised issuer party to dynamically add users to
the system. The CA also decides at that time on the values of parameters such as
m, the maximum number of malicious users tolerated by the system and k the min-
imum number of diﬀerent location shares needed to generate a valid location proof
certiﬁcate. By assumption, we always have m < k.
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• Join. When a user want to join the system, he needs to run the procedure VRegister
together with the CA or an authorized Issuer to obtain his anonymous credentials
usk = (SKGu, Su, certSu) in which SKGU represents his private key for unique group
signature, Su the secret identiﬁer of the user and certSu) a certiﬁcate over Su made
by the certiﬁcation authority or an authorized issuer such that the user can later
prove that he has a valid CA-certiﬁcate on his secret identiﬁer in a zero-knowledge
way.
• Location proof gathering. When a prover wants to obtain a proof of his current
location, he runs the procedure LTestify in collaboration with neighbouring users
(i.e., witnesses) to obtain location shares. After collecting at least k shares from
diﬀerent witnesses, the prover can produce a location proof by running the algorithm
LProve.
• Location proof verification. During this step, the prover run Vf with a veriﬁer to
prove to the latter that he was at a speciﬁc location at a particular moment in time.
In our case, this veriﬁcation process (cf. Section 7.4.2) requires a proof of ownership
by the current prover and also a check from the veriﬁer that the location proof of
the previous step contains at least k shares from diﬀerent witnesses. It is possible
to envision that if the veriﬁer suspects a cheating attempt from the current prover
(e.g., if the location proofs is composed of two or more shares generated by the same
witness), then he may forwards the fraud evidence to the Anonymity Lifter (AL) who
has the capacity to reveal the identity of the cheating witnesses.
7.2.3 System Assumptions
Within the architecture of Props, we make the following system assumptions.
Positioning capability. Users are mobile entities capable of positioning themselves into
space. For instance, a user might be able to localize himself by using his GPS or through the
help of a dedicated positioning infrastructure. We assume the imprecision of the location
computed to be negligible.
Synchronized clocks. Each user possesses a local clock on his device that is synchronized
with the clocks of other users. Thus, when two users communicate together, they rely on
the same time referential. In practice, users can use the clocks of their GPS or GSM device.
Anonymous communication channel. Provers can broadcast message to neighboring
witnesses without disclosing identifying information (e.g., MAC or IP addresses).
7.3 Building blocks
We assume that users of Props have access to standard cryptographic tools such as
(pseudo-)random number generators, hash functions and public key signature schemes.
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However, our protocol also relies on other cryptographic primitives that we use as building
blocks. These primitives are detailed thereafter.
7.3.1 Unique group signatures
Group signature schemes have been introduced by Chaum and van Heyst to provide
anonymity to the signer of a message [CvH91].
In fact, there is a single public veriﬁcation key for the group, but each member of the
group receives a diﬀerent private signing key from the group manager (who could be for
instance the CA). A group signature scheme (with optional anonymity removing) consists
in general of the four following operations.
• Registration of the user. During the Join operation, the CA assigns to the user a new
private signature key, which we denote by SKGU .
• Signature of a message in behalf of the group. The SignGroup operation takes as
input a message m and a signing key SKGU and produces a signature σG,U (m) of
the message m.
• Verification of a group signature. The VerifySignGroup operation allows to check the
validity of a group signature. It requires as input a veriﬁcation key for the group
V KG, which has been setup by the CA and is publicly known, as well as a message
m and a group signature on this message σG,U (m). VerifySignGroup produces a binary
output : accept or reject depending on the validity of the signature.
• Anonymity removing. From the point of view of the veriﬁer, it is impossible to
distinguish if two group signatures come from the same individual or not. However
in exceptional situations, the AL can (in association with the veriﬁer) retrieve the
identity of a particular signer via the LiftAnonymity operation. This operation takes
as input a message m and a group signature on this message σG,U (m) and produces
as output the identity of the signer U. In practice, this is often done by ﬁrst ﬁnding
the corresponding signature key SKGU and then retrieving the identity associated
to this key.
Group signatures provide multiple-show unlinkability in the sense that, from the point
of view of the veriﬁer, it is impossible to distinguish if two group signatures originates
from the same individual or not. However, in some speciﬁc cases, such as the situation
in which the same message is signed twice, it might be interesting to be able to link the
signatures performed by the same user. For instance, in the context of location proof
we want to ensure that all the shares of a location proof are signed by diﬀerent unique
witnesses (uniqueness property). In order to enforce this property, we use an extension
of group signatures known as unique group signature [FZ12]. More precisely, in a unique
group signature if a signer produces two diﬀerent signatures of the same message (i.e., two
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location shares of the same proof), then both signatures while randomized will always have
a large common component with high probability. This component can act as a unique
identiﬁer in order to link these signatures. Therefore, unique group signatures are usually
equipped with a detection algorithm that can infer if two signatures on the same message
have been issued by the same signer, and raises an alarm if this situation occurs.
7.3.2 Commitment schemes
Commitment schemes [GS07,DF02] arise from the need for parties to hide from the others
a choice until they decide to reveal that choice in such a way that it is fair to all parties.
The main problem here is that we do not want one party to ﬁnd out about any party’s
commitment before the latter opens this value (hiding property). On the other hand, we do
not want a party to be able to open its commitment in multiple ways (binding property).
More formally, a commitment scheme consists of a triple of algorithms (Setup, Commit,
Open) that are respectively used during the initialization of the commitment scheme, the
commit phase and the opening phase. For an example of how a commitment scheme
works, let consider Bob who wants to send a commitment to Alice. At the beginning of
the protocol, the commitment scheme may be initialized by a trusted party that we called
Oscar using the Setup algorithm.
During the commit phase, Bob uses the algorithm Commit that takes as input a pri-
vate input m and a random string r, then the algorithm outputs a value C called the
commitment, (i.e., C ← Commit(m, r)). Actually, the value C is revealed to Alice.
Later, when Bob wants to open the commit C to Alice, he sends the value r. Then
Alice runs algorithm m˜← Open(C, r) and accepts if the value m˜ Ó= ⊥. This step is called
the opening phase.
7.3.3 Zero-knowledge proof
Zero-knowledge proof [GMR85] is a protocol enabling a party (the prover) to convince
another party (the veriﬁer) about the validity of a statement without revealing any infor-
mation apart from the veracity of the statement itself. If proving the statement requires
knowledge of some secret information on the part of the prover, the deﬁnition implies that
the veriﬁer will not be able to prove the statement in turn to anyone else, since the veriﬁer
does not possess the secret information.
Indeed, a zero-knowledge protocol may not allow the veriﬁer to learn any computational
information about the secret input of the prover. LetW denote a boolean statement, (i.e., a
function that on input α either outputs 1 (true) or 0 (false)). Suppose a prover P that knows
some valid input string w, (i.e. . . , w is valid iﬀ W (w) = 1. P wants to convince V that he
knows some valid input without revealing that value in fact to V). Such a zero-knowledge
protocol can be denoted by ZKProof{(w) : W (w) = 1}. At the end, if the protocol outputs
true, then V can be assured that P knows a string w′ such that W (w′) = 1. In fact, our
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notational convention is that the elements listed in the brackets denote knowledge of which
is being proved and not known to the veriﬁer. A zero-knowledge proof must satisfy at
least the three following fundamental properties, which are completeness, soundness and
zero-knowledge.
The completeness property means that if the statement is true then a veriﬁer who fol-
lows the recipe of the protocol will always be convinced provided that the prover knows the
secret input. The soundness property ensures that if the statement is false then the prover
cannot convince the veriﬁer about the validity of the statement, except with a negligible
probability. Finally, the zero-knowledge property guarantees that the interactions between
the prover and the veriﬁer do not convey any information about the secret information
except its validity.
Possible application of zero-knowledge proofs is the design of privacy-preserving iden-
tiﬁcation schemes and anonymous credentials [FS87,FFS88,GQ88,BCL06].
7.3.4 Proximity testing protocol
We assume that each user has access to a proximity testing protocol, which will be used
to convince the witness that the prover is indeed located within some range. We do not
make any a priori assumptions about the technology used to implement this protocol, but
rather we will use it as a black-box during the execution of the location proof protocol.
However, we are conscious that the choice of a particular implementation of a proximity
testing protocol (as well as the underlying technology) will inﬂuence the resulting security
of the architecture. For instance, most of the current proximity testing protocols robust
against the proxy attack only exist currently as research prototypes. Distance bounding
(see Chapter 6) is employed within this research to provide proof of a device’s presence
in the area for use by the location proof system. The technique allows the witness to
distinguish whether the prover is physically present within the claimed area.
Implementing the Bussard and Bagga protocol
Here, we describe how to incorporate a distance bounding protocol in our setting. Mainly,
we use the Bussard and Bagga [BB05b] because it is asymmetric and preserves the anonymity
of the prover but our architecture is actually agnostic to the DB protocol used.
The proximity testing procedure consists of three phases. The ﬁrst phase is the prepa-
ration one, in which the prover encrypts his private key SU with a random symmetric key
k and gets the corresponding encrypted message e. Then, the prover commits individually
to each bit of e and k, which results in two sequences of bit commitments R0 and R1. This
phase can be performed oﬄine by the prover to save time.
During the second phase, the prover sends R0 and R1 to the witness, which then
starts a multi-round fast-bit-exchange with the prover. In each round i, the witness sends
a challenge bit bi ∈ {0, 1}, to which the prover replies with the i-th bit of Rb. Since the
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witness never learns both bit values, he will also never learn the secret SU . After the multi-
round fast-bit-exchange, the witness veriﬁes the corresponding bit commitments of R0 and
R1 (only for the received bits) by asking the prover to provide the opening information for
these commitments.
During the third phase, the values R0 and R1 are used by the witness to derive a
pseudonym C2. Finally, the prover convinces the witness that C2 and C1 correspond to
Pedersen commitments on the same value through a zero-knowledge proof [CL03]. For
more details about how the pseudonym C2 is constructed, we refer the reader to [BB05b].
In contrast to the original protocol from [BB05b] and its implementation in STAMP [WZP+],
the witness and the veriﬁer do not need to have a public key to authenticate the prover.
Instead the authentication is performed using pseudonyms and zero-knowledge proofs to
preserve the privacy of the prover. Revealing the values k and e to a colluder also disclose
the long-term secret of the prover, thus ensuring that the proximity testing procedure is
resistant to terrorist frauds.
Thereafter, we refer to the black-box primitive executing the proximity testing protocol
as ProximityTesting(∆), in which ∆ represents the distance threshold of the protocol. This
primitive outputs accept if the prover is indeed within ∆ range of the witness and reject
otherwise.
7.3.5 Hash chains
A hash chain C is a set of values x0, . . . , xn where xi = h(xi−1) such that h is a cryptographic
hash function, i ∈ [1, n] and x0 is a valid input for h. The length of a hash chain is equal
to the number of evaluations of the hash function required to create the hash chain. For
instance, a hash chain with values x0, . . . , xn is said to have length n. In this paper, we
will use the hash chain as a primitive for a user to control the precision of the location
information disclosed while still ensuring that the location proof remains valid using the
approach described in [LMP11]. In the following, we describe the three mains algorithms
used in this approach, mainly Hide, Reveal and Verify.
Without loss of generality, we assume that a location data pos can be represented by
n location parameters, pos = {x0, . . . , xn}. In practice, a well-formed GPS location data
has a length n = 3 and a location pos = (lat, long, time), in which lat is the (normalized)
latitude, long is the longitude and time is the actual time. We assume that each location
parameter xi is a natural number and that it consists (possibly after padding with zeroes)
of d digits. For instance for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have xi = xid−1xid−2 . . . xi0, where xid−1
is the most signiﬁcant digit of xi and xi0 the least signiﬁcant one. The accuracy of the
parameter xi can be controlled by hiding its rightmost digits. Let pos|p (for d− 1 ≤ p ≤ 0)
denotes the location pos of which the p least signiﬁcant digits of each of the parameters are
blinded. Let h be a cryptographic hash function satisfying pre-image resistance, second
pre-image resistance and collision resistance. To encode a location data pos using the
procedure Hide, Bob has to encode each location parameter xi in pos. Indeed, for each
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xi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in pos, Bob computes a hash chain Kxi = Kxi
d,Kxi
d−1, . . . ,Kxi
0 in which
Kxi
0 is a randomly chosen seed and Kxi
j+1 = h(xi
j ,Kxi
j) (for d − 1 ≥ j ≥ 0). Thus,
the next hash value in a chain contains the following most signiﬁcant digits of the location
parameter xi. Finally, the encoded value of pos is the hash chain for the diﬀerent location
parameters Kpos = (Kx1 ,Kx2 , . . . ,Kxn). Here, Bob gives Kpos to Alice. Alice compute
S=Sign(Kpos) and sends S to Bob. Now, Bob can reveal diﬀerent granularity over the
position pos to Oscar using the procedure Reveal. To do so, Bob ﬁrst determines a
precision p (for d−1 ≤ p ≤ 0) and then reveals the hash value of the chain associated with
that precision, Kposp, together with the partially blinded location pos|p to Oscar. Then,
during the Verify procedure, Oscar reconstructs the parts of the hash following Kposp and
compares the ﬁnal value with the one contained in the signature S. Using this method,
Oscar only learns and checks the d − p most signiﬁcant bits of the location parameters
certiﬁed by Alice, while the least signiﬁcant bits remain unknown to him.
To encode the temporal information, the prover format the current time into ﬁve values
(i.e., {x
′
1, . . . , x
′
5}) that correspond to the time (hh:mm:ss), period of the day (morning,
afternoon or night), day, month and year. Then, he also relies on a hash chain to encode
the temporal information in the LPS. The uncertainty of the position revealed depends
of the number of digits hidden by the function Hide has illustrated in Table 7.1. A GPS
coordinate relies on seven digits for the precision, thus the prover can hide a maximum of
six digits.
Number of hidden digits 1 2 3 4 5 6
Radius in meters 0,1 1,3 13 136 1 369 13 701
Table 7.1: Radius of uncertainty with respect to the hidden digits.
7.4 Overview of PROPS
In this section, we describe in more details location proof gathering phase and the location
proof veriﬁcation phase.
7.4.1 Location proof gathering
The proof gathering protocol between a prover and a witness (summarized in Figure 7.2)
consists of the following four rounds. The gathering process starts with an initialization
phase in which the prover P generates random values key and rand1 and uses them to
compute the following values :
Kpos = hide(pos, key) andKtime = hide(time, key) and C1 = [Commit(SiU , randi), i = 0, · · · ,m.]
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Witness Prover1. m|σP (m)
2. {Kpos|R}kAB |NB
3. {ZKProofR{C1 is well formed}|Kpos|key}kAB
4. proximityTesting(δ, C1)
5. {LP S = s|σj(s)}kAB
Figure 7.2: The location proof gathering phase.
The valuesKpos,Ktime represent the encryption of pos and time under key, and C1 is a serie
of the homomorphic bit commitments on the each bit of the secret SU . It also corresponds
to the cryptographic secure pseudonym of the prover for this session.
The prover P then broadcasts a location proof request to his neighbouring users over
an insecure (i.e. unencrypted and unauthenticated) channel:
(1) P → ∗ : {LPSReq = m|σG,P (m) , m = pos|time|C1|Kpos|Ktime|NA}.
The request contains the following information: pos, the current position of the user and its
encryption Kpos, time the actual time and its encryption Ktime, C1 acting as a pseudonym,
as well as NA a share of the Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement and ﬁnally σG,P (m) a group
signature to authenticate the request.
Upon receiving the request Req, the witness W computes the following values: NB
a random share of a Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement, which is then combined with NA in
order to generate a session key kAB. This session key kAB will then be used to encrypt all
subsequent communications between P and W by relying on a symmetric cryptosystem,
thus ensuring the conﬁdentiality and integrity of communications and R a fresh challenge
for the zero-knowledge proof.
Afterwards, the witnessW notiﬁes the prover that he accepts to continue the generation
process:
(2) W → P : {LPSReply = Encrypt((Kpos|R), kAB)|NB}.
The request LPSReply contains the value of NB in clear, the value Kpos and a challenge R
encrypted as an acknowledgement to the previous phase. At the reception of LPSReply,
P can reconstruct the session key kAB using NB and retrieves the challenge R of the
zero-knowledge proof. P replies to W with the following zero-knowledge proof:
(3) P →W : {ZK = Encrypt((ZKProof(C1 wellformed)|Kpos|key), kAB)}
The message ZK contains a zero-knowledge proof that the C1 are valid commitments over
the bits of the secret SU certiﬁed by the CA. It also contains the value key to convince the
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witness that Kpos and Ktime are valid encoding of pos and time.
ZKProof{(certSU , SU , randi) : C1} ← ZKProof
{
(certSU , SU ) :
VerifyCommit(Ci1, SU , randi) = 1 ∧
CLS.VerifySign(SU , certSU , pkcert) = 1
}
.
In order to ensure the freshness of the proof, the zero-knowledge proof will also depend on
R, the nonce generated by the witness at the previous step. This is made possible by the
use of zero-knowledge proofs based on CL-signatures.
Figure 7.3: Overview of the gathering procedure.
Afterwards, P starts the proximity testing protocol with W .
(4) P ⇆W : {ProximityTesting(δ, C1)}
This protocol consists in a sequence of fast bit exchanges between the prover and the
witness. More precisely, the witness selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends it to the prover.
Then, the prover replies with a response r. W records the time needed by the prover to
produce the response to each of the challenges. These timings are used to estimate the
proximity of the prover and this process is repeated several times in order to increase the
robustness of the proximity testing protocol. If the timings are close enough to δ, then the
ProximityTesting(δ, C1) procedure outputs accept, while otherwise it outputs reject. At this
point, W is convinced that P is within proximity.
Finally, Finally, W creates a LPS s = {C1|Kpos|Ktime} and a signature σW (s) =
UGS.GroupSign(s, gskW ). P receives from W :
(5) W → P : {Encrypt(LPS, kAB)}, LPS = s|σW (s)
Afterwards, the prover locally stores the LPSs collected from surrounding witness, the
associated variables (the encoding key key) and the current spatio-temporal context (time
and pos).
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After collecting at least k diﬀerent shares coming from k unique witnesses, the prover
P can aggregate them into a location proof that we denote thereafter as certificate.
7.4.2 Location proof verification
The proof veriﬁcation phase described in Figure 7.4 enables a prover to convince a veriﬁer
that he was at a speciﬁc location at a particular moment in time. The veriﬁcation process
requires a proof of ownership by the current prover and also a check from the veriﬁer that
the location proof contains LPSs from diﬀerent witnesses. If this last veriﬁcation fails,
then the veriﬁer will forward the evidences of the fraudulent LPS to the AL who has the
capacity to reveal the identity of the cheater using the opening key ok.
Without loss of generality, consider that the prover has collected k LPSs before sending
a LP veriﬁcation request to a veriﬁer. A LP is generated as follows:
P → V : LP = s|σW1(s)| . . . |σWk(s)|auxpos|Lpos|auxtime|Ltime
in which Lpos (resp. Ltime) represents the granularity of the position (respectively the time)
to be revealed. The values auxpos and auxtime are used to check that these granularities
are conformed with the values Kpos and Ktime of LP. These values are computed using the
function Reveal (cf. Section 7.3.5).
Once he has received the LP , the veriﬁer V runs sequentially the following veriﬁcations
steps.
1. First, V checks for each LPS σi(s) in certificate whether UGS.GroupVerif(s, σi(s), gpk)
returns accept. More precisely, the function UGS.GroupVerif(s, σWi(s), gpk) veriﬁes
the validity of the group signature of each of the k LPSs σi(s):
k∧
i=1
(UGS.GroupVerif(s, σWi(s), gpk)) = true.
2. Then, the veriﬁer validates the uniqueness of the LPS in LP by verifying that all
these LPSs have been generated by diﬀerent witnesses:
k∧
i=1
k∧
j=i+1
(UGS.Detect(s, σWi(s), σj(s))) = false.
3. Next, V anonymously authenticates the prover P as the legal owner of LP by running
a zero-knowledge proof protocol with him. At the end of this step, V is convinced
that P knows the secret SU used to generate the commitments C1 and that this secret
has been certiﬁed by the CA.
4. Finally, V uses the Kpos and Ktime contained within LP to evaluate the validity of
the spatio-temporal information (Lpos, Ltime) claimed by the prover:
Check(Kpos, auxpos, Lpos) ∧ Check(Ktime, auxtime, Ltime).
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Figure 7.4: Overview of the veriﬁcation procedure.
7.5 Protocol analysis
In this section, we analyze how Props fulﬁls the security and privacy properties described
in Chapter 4.
7.5.1 Privacy
Anonymity and unlinkability of prover and witnesses. Due to the use of commit-
ments and zero-knowledge proofs in Props, users can remain anonymous in the system
as long as they behave honestly. Furthermore, the prover creates periodically nonces to
generate the commitments C1. Therefore, due to the hiding property of the underlying
commitment scheme, these commitments do not disclose any information that can be used
to trace back to the identity of the prover. In addition, the anonymity and unlinkability of
witnesses are ensured by the use of group signature. Finally, the use of a zero-knowledge
proof enables the prover to anonymously authenticate himself to the veriﬁer as the owner
of a LP.
Witness location privacy. When establishing a LP, a witness never discloses his
exact position but rather checks that the position claimed by the prover is in the vicinity
using the proximity testing protocol. Therefore, a local eavesdropper can only infer that
the witness is in the proximity of the prover but does not learn his exact position.
Prover location privacy. The location information is ﬁrst encoded into the hash
chains before being endorsed by the witness. This information cannot be modiﬁed later by
the prover and it does not appear in clear in the LP.
Location sovereignty. Within Props, the LPs gathered by a user are saved locally on
his device in contrast with other schemes in which the proofs are stored and controlled by
remote servers. Finally, due to the use of hash chains the prover can decide the granularity
of the information he wants to disclose (cf. Section 7.3.5).
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7.5.2 Security
Correctness. The correctness property is trivial. Once a LPS is received by the prover,
he can verify that the spatio-temporal information contained within it is valid. The spatial
and temporal soundness are ensured because revealing a geolocated context that does not
match the one contained in the LP will be detected during the Step 4 of the veriﬁcation
process. Thus, a malicious prover cannot alter the integrity of a LPS and fool the veriﬁer
by claiming a diﬀerent location than the one contained in the LPS. In the following, we give
more details about how Props ensures the spatial soundness property (cf. Section 2.7.2) by
proving its resistance to the distance fraud and maﬁa fraud.
Resistance to distance fraud. In a distance fraud, a malicious prover tries to convince an
honest witness that he is closer than in reality. By assumption in Props, the distance
fraud is prevented by the use of the ProximityTesting(δ, C1) protocol.
Resistance to mafia fraud. Let P be an honest prover located at position Lp and W an
honest witness located at position Lw such that dist(Lp, Lw) > δ with dist(., .) the euclidean
distance. Consider W¯ and P¯ , which are two diﬀerent colluding users or the same malicious
user playing two diﬀerent roles. In the maﬁa fraud, the objective of an adversary is to
replay a session that involved a honest prover P to fool W and make him believe that P
is closer than he really is. Thus, two sessions need to be run, the ﬁrst one involving W¯
and P with the objective to get commitments from P followed by a second one performed
between P¯ and W in which the commitments of the ﬁrst protocol are replayed in order to
obtain a location share on behalf of P . In the second session P¯ will need to compute a
fresh zero-knowledge proof using R from W to prove knowledge of the identity SU of P ,
which is impossible without the knowledge of SU .
Proof of ownership and non-transferability. During the veriﬁcation phase, the
veriﬁer checks that the current prover is eﬀectively the legitimate owner of the LP by run-
ning a zero-knowledge protocol over the pseudonym C1 included in the proof. Therefore,
without the knowledge of the secret SU involved in the creation of these commitments, it
is impossible to claim the ownership of that location proof, which is also the case for a
malicious veriﬁer that wants to use a location proof that he has observed from an honest
prover.
Within Props, the non-transferability property is equivalent to the resistance to the col-
lusion P − P . The resilience to the collusion P − P follows directly from the resilience
to the terrorist fraud of the distance-boudning protocol we have used to implement the
ProximityTestting tool.
Unforgeability. The unforgeability is ensured partially by the uniqueness property
provided by unique group signature, which prevents the adversary controlling a collusion
of m malicious users to gather enough LPSs as long as the size of the collusion is less than
the number of shares needed (i.e., k > m).
Resistance to distance hijacking. In a distance hijacking attack, a malicious user M tries
to hijack the gathering session of an honest prover P . More precisely, M waits until P
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has successfully proved that he is in the vicinity of an honest witness W and then hijacks
P ’s session to collect its LPS. However in Props, a witness veriﬁes that the entity who
ran ProximityTesting(δ, C1), is the same as the one that computes the commitments C1.
Therefore, such an attack will be detected by W and the gathering process will be aborted
before the malicious prover receives the LPS, thus avoiding the possibility of hijacking the
session.
7.6 Implementation
In this section, we brieﬂy report on the current proof-of-concept implementation of Props.
Our main objective is to demonstrate that the architecture of Props can be implemented
with currently available technology. Our implementation relies on Idemix1 2.3.4, a Java
library containing advanced cryptographic primitives such as CL-signatures, commitment
schemes and zero-knowledge proofs (cf. Section 7.3). Section 7.6.1 describes the test bench,
while Section 7.6.2 gives the result of our experimentation.
7.6.1 Overview of the implementation
We implemented a Java prototype client application on Android. Our experiments are
carried out on two Android devices: (1) a Samsung Galaxy Note 2 equipped with a Quad
Core 1.6 GHz processor, 2GB of RAM, a GPS and running Android OS 4.1.2, acting as a
prover, and (2) a Google Nexus 7 (2012 version) equipped with a Nvidia Tegra processor
and 1 GB of RAM acting as a witness. The measurements that we report for each phase
have been computed by averaging over 10 independent trials. In our testbed, we illustrate
a scenario in which the witness listens to the network until he receives a location proof
request from a nearby prover. As a result, the witness decides whether he accepts to serve
the request or not. If the request is accepted, the witness sends an acknowledgement back
to the prover. This process is denoted as the initialization phase in Figure 7.5. After the
initialization phase, the witness checks that the prover possesses a valid credential from the
CA on the value that is contained in the commitment (authentication phase), otherwise a
cheating prover could encrypt gibberish or someone else’s identity. Afterwards, the prover
and the witness executes the proof creation phase. Finally, we also test the proof sending
phase in which the witness sends the location share to the prover. During our experiments,
we have measured the computational time (also an indicator of power consumption) and
storage that are needed to run our current implementation Props on real smartphone
devices.
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Figure 7.5: Cost of the diﬀerent phases of the proof generation for the witness.
7.6.2 Experimental evaluation
From a memory point of view, each LPS has a size of 3444 bytes, which is higher com-
pared to those of previous works. However, Props provides stronger privacy and security
guarantees. The running time of the whole gathering phase conducted by a witness is on
average of 2.98± 0.02 seconds.
For the veriﬁcation phase, we have designed a realistic scenario in which a prover wants
to show a LP to a remote LBS server. The server we used run on an Intel i5-2435M dual-
core processor at 2.4 Ghz with 4 GB of 1333 Mhz DDR3 SDRAM running OSX 10.8.3.
The average time needed to verify one LPS is around 0.66± 0.03 seconds for the veriﬁer.
Unique group signature in the dynamic setting has been proven eﬃciently realizable [FZ12]
under the CCA-anonymity assumption using any CCA-secure signature scheme (i.e.secure
against adaptive chosen message attack) and Groth-Sahai proofs systems. In practice
uniquely sign a message is equivalent to create three signatures and two Groth-Sahai proofs.
Unique group signature in the dynamic setting veriﬁes CPA-anonymity(i.e. the adversary
cannot query the opening oracle. It is assumed that Opener is highly trusted and adver-
sary cannot access it as long as it is honest) and CCA-anonymity. Our implementation of
unique group signatures relies on the concept of domain pseudonym oﬀered by the Idemix
library. In a nutshell, a domain pseudonym can be used to link all the group signatures
performed by a user within the same domain. Within the context of Props, we set the
domain to the value s = {C1|Kpos|Ktime} included in the location proof, thus allowing a
veriﬁer to check the uniqueness of the location proof share.
Regarding our proximity-testing black box, current implementation of distance bound-
ing (e.g., Rasmussen and Capkun [Rv10]) are hardware proof-of-concepts, thus they are
not mature enough to be used on mobile devices like it is the case in PROPS. Nonethe-
less, one distance bounding protocol was really suitable for our needs in term of privacy
(anonymity and unlinkability of the prover and his witnesses) but have been recently proved
insecure against terrorist fraud [BBM+12]. From these facts, we have decided to abstract
this distance bounding as a black-box while designing our protocol. In fact, the protocol
is designed in such a way that it can be rearrange when needed. In practice, the lack of
1http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/idemix/
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implementation of distance bounding will surely endanger the security aspect (resistance
to distance fraud, maﬁa fraud and terrorist fraud) of the protocol but not the privacy
principles that we highlight in Chapter 4.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced Props, a novel privacy-preserving location proof system
based on a collaborative architecture. The main strengths of this location proof system are
the following: (1) the LP collected by a prover are under his control and does not reveal
any information about his identity, (2) the prover has the ability to remain anonymous
even when presenting a proof to a veriﬁer, (3) the privacy of users is preserved with respect
to a man-in-the-middle adversary, (4) a veriﬁer can detect abuses of a malicious user that
tries to produce fake LPs, and ﬁnally (5) the prover can selective disclose the spatial and
temporal information to the granularity of his choice. We also demonstrate the security of
Props to standard attacks such as collusion P − P/terrorist fraud, distance fraud, mafia
fraud and replay attack. In the future, we would like to extend Props to deal with the
collusion W − P in which a witness systematically reports false LPS for a colluder even
though one or both of them are not at the location claimed in the LPS. Indeed, unless
trusted infrastructures are deployed at each possible location, it seems quite diﬃcult to
detect that a particular LPS is a result of such a collusion [TCB12,WZP+, ZC11]. A line
of research that we would like to pursue in the future is the use of anonymous peer-to-
peer reputation system as a countermeasure to frauds in this mobile environment. Finally,
another research avenue is the design of a secure multiparty computation version of the
protocol involving a joint interaction with the prover and multiple witnesses rather than
relying on pairwise interactions between the prover and each witness.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and future work
8.1 Conclusion
Over the last four decades, mobile phones have become more than just a way to make
calls. In fact, they are now “smart” enough to provide us real time assistance thanks
to the existence of location-based services. Location-based services (LBS) are a class of
services exploiting location data to deliver personalized features to its users. Examples
of location-based services include the navigation systems found in many new cars, traﬃc
advisories, roadside assistance and etc.
LBS help saving time in our daily tasks and become more productive in a world con-
stantly moving. For example, a user looking for a gas station may just ask for it and the
system provides him with the location and the directions to follow to get to his destination.
Actually, transmitting data regarding a user’s location to LBS causes two main prob-
lems. The ﬁrst one is the lack of mechanisms for the LBS to check for the veracity of
the data it receives from the user (i.e., is the user attempting to access the service really
present at the location he declares?). The second one is the potential other uses of data
transmitted to the LBS because users are increasingly worrying about privacy and do not
want governments to learn their whereabouts, stalkers to spy on them or even a spouse to
monitor their movements.
In this thesis we have designed secure and privacy-enhanced protocols for authenticating
distance and location claims for mobile devices. The systems we have designed in this
work provide an answer to the location veriﬁcation problem while embedding security
mechanisms and privacy protection features. This work extends previously existing work
by combining location proof system with distance-bounding protocols.
The ﬁrst contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a distance-bounding protocol,
as described in Chapter 6 that we named VSSDB. As introduced in Chapter 5, distance-
bounding refers to a two-parties protocol that allows one entity called the veriﬁer to authen-
ticate another entity called the prover while at the same time ensuring that the distance
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separating them does not exceed a predeﬁned threshold. Distance-bounding is tradition-
ally ran in three phases which are the initialization, bit-exchange and veriﬁcation phases.
During the initialization phase, the prover and veriﬁer initialize registers for the ongoing
session. The bit exchange phase is a series of challenge-response sub-protocol called round.
Each round of the bit-exchange phase is initiated by the veriﬁer, usually by sending a
challenge to the prover. Then, each challenge received by the prover is combined with the
session registers to determine a response bit that is sent back to the veriﬁer as soon as
possible. Finally, during the veriﬁcation phase, the veriﬁer checks that the response for
each round are related the session registers and that the time between sending a challenge
and receiving the response from the prover does not exceed a predeﬁned threshold.
VSSDB diﬀers from the other distance-bounding protocols found in the literature be-
cause it does not need the prover and the veriﬁer to share a secret key to create the session
register. In fact, each prover is initiated with a public/private key pair. Then, the prover
is authenticated by the veriﬁer using the public key. This feature removes the veriﬁer
constraints to maintain huge database containing valid pseudonyms in the system then
avoiding leakage of the private keys when a veriﬁer gets corrupted by attackers. Therefore
our system is more secure than state-of-the-art protocols.
Another novelty of our protocol is the use of modes, which are communicated dur-
ing the initialization phase, and complement the challenges sent during the time-critical
rounds. More precisely, the responses answered by the prover during one of these rounds
depend both on the mode of this round and the challenge. As we demonstrated, this
feature improves the protocol’s security, while preserving the lightweightness of calcula-
tions performed during the time-critical rounds. We design two response functions for the
VSSDB protocol. One that uses two responses modes and another which uses four. The
two modes response function is well suited for environments with few privacy requirements
because the private key of users need to be generated and checked by a central authority
to guarantee their security. This condition is ruled out by the four modes responses func-
tions. In addition, in contrast to other distance-bounding protocols that use secret-sharing
technique to hide the secret known to the prover within the responses bits, we rely on the
use of three shares rather than two, which allows for more richness in the responses while
better hiding the secret from man-in-the-middle attacker.
We have also deﬁned in this thesis a notion of terrorist-fraud resistance called KeyTF-
security. Essentially, KeyTF-security is a relaxation of GameTF-security [FO13b]. While
our Vssdb protocol is KeyTF-secure, we also describe a extended version to gain GameTF-
security.
We analyse the security features of the VSSDB protocol in the framework of Dürholz,
Fischlin, Kasper and Onete [DFKO11b]. The results of this formal analysis indicate that
the security properties stated for the protocol are upheld.
The second contribution of this thesis is the design of a privacy-enhanced location proof
system for use with mobile devices. A location proof system denotes a system allowing its
users to prove their location at a particular time to remote entities called veriﬁers.
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In Chapter 3 we have addressed state-of-the-art systems and given a detailed descrip-
tion of how they work. This study has revealed that there exists two main families of
location proof systems. The ﬁrst one includes systems where users collect location proof
by interacting with dedicated access-Point disseminated over the localization area. We call
such an approach of implementing location proof system, the bipartite gathering approach.
Secondly, we investigate systems in which users collect location proof by collaborating to-
gether. We call this latter approach the collaborative gathering approach.
Then within Chapter 4, we have investigated the features oﬀered by the state-of-the-
art location proofs system in terms of security and privacy. This analysis allowed us to
investigate the possibility of vulnerabilities in the design of the protocols and how we can
remedy to them. In general, many of the previous works only considered location proof as
just a signature of location data attesting the presence of a user at a location at a particular
time. In fact, a location proof system must include countermeasures against various frauds
and attacks inspired from the domain distance-bounding protocol and cryptography. We
enumerate those threats and give scenarios to justify why they must be taken into account in
the design of location proof systems. We encapsulate all our recommendations into a uniﬁed
framework compatible with previous works in the domain. Our framework can be used at
any phase during future development of location proof system. It includes an adversary
model that diﬀers from the others as we give more possibilities to veriﬁer in attacking the
system. In fact, the veriﬁer’s role can be played by any party without requiring the prover
to trust him. Additionally, the framework models a location proof system as a tuple of
algorithms (Setup,URegister,VRegister, LTestify, LProve,Vf) and enumerates the threats to
be considered while designing each part of a location proof system. Because privacy is of
central importance to mobile users, we also identify the privacy requirements for each of
these algorithms. In this work, we deﬁned privacy in terms of anonymity of the users within
the system and the unlinkability of their actions. Finally, we give a complete analysis of
the state-of-the-art protocols within the framework we proposed.
From the lessons learned in previous chapters, we proposed a location proof system
that we named PROPS (See Chapter 7) to solve the identiﬁed weaknesses of related work.
PROPS employs an ad-hoc approach to the problem of location proof, enabling neigh-
bouring devices to provide a certiﬁcate which attests of a speciﬁc device’s presence in a
claimed area. We employed distance-bounding to establish a location proof regarding the
presence of a device called the prover in a particular area, according to a neighbouring
device called the witnesses. In our scheme, the proximity of the prover device to a witness
is limited to a single hop communication range only. Anything above this is detected by
the underlying DB protocol and tagged as a proxy exchange, essentially preventing relay
attacks. By employing DB to protect the location proof gathering process, the soundness
of the location proof is guaranteed, as tampering with the distance will be detected and
the gathering session aborted.
Additionally, by protecting the conﬁdential information pertaining to the participants
during a session of the protocol, it is more diﬃcult for an adversary to identify who has
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participated.
Malicious participants are prevented from linking the identity of other participants to
running sessions through the use of changing pseudonyms. The protocol protects against
external observers by encrypting the sensitive data transmitted during the slow phase
of the protocol. Due to the use of distance-bounding, it is obvious that local observers
could deduce the position of devices participating in a gathering session based on traﬃc
and message content analysis. However, they are not capable of discovering the identity
of the participants or any information to uniquely identify them. To better ascertain
the properties of our protocol, we analyse its properties according to the framework we
have developed in Chapter 4 and then compare our work to previous works. This latter
comparison shows that our protocol enables better security and privacy features than
previous proposals.
8.2 Perspectives
As we introduced in Chapter 2 the location veriﬁcation problem has become of signiﬁcant
importance with recent research turning towards ad-hoc systems. In this dissertation, we
mainly focus on the design of security protocols for authenticating distance and location
claims for mobile devices with an eﬀort to move away from infrastructure dependence.
While the work presented in this dissertation is comprehensive, there remain a number of
avenues for future research.
A ﬁrst research direction of this work would be to deﬁne veriﬁer-side mechanisms to set
trust score to a prover according to the location proof he discloses. I would be interesting
to extend Props to deal with the collusion W − P in which a witness systematically
reports false location proof share for a colluder even though one or both of them are not
at the location claimed in the LPS. At ﬁrst glance, unless some sort of trusted computing
is deployed at each possible location, it seems quite diﬃcult for the veriﬁer to detect that
a particular location proof shares is a result of such a collusion [TCB12,WZP+, ZC11].
Therefore, a line of research that we would like to pursue in the future is the use of
anonymous peer-to-peer reputation system as a countermeasure to the above mentioned
fraud in this particular setting.
Another research avenue would be the design of a secure multiparty computation version
of Props involving a joint interaction with the prover and multiple witnesses rather than
relying on pairwise interactions between the prover and each witness.
We also think that the popularity of distance-bounding protocols will become more and
more important because of the importance of relay attacks within traditional authentication
systems. A future research direction in this domain would be to obtain privacy for VSSDB,
of which the asymmetric nature of the prover secret key is a necessary ﬁrst step, as well
as investigating the possibility of using other secret-sharing techniques to obtain better
distance- and terrorist-fraud resistance.
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